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Abstract 
 
The  following  analysis  takes  as  its  starting  point  a  divergence  in  views  on  what 
philosophers and linguists call ‘effability’ or ‘expressibility’ (the extent to which it is 
possible, through the use of a public language, to make one’s thoughts available to 
others). While philosophers and linguists (Searle, Katz, Recanati) defend stronger or 
weaker  forms  of  effability,  the  ‘struggle  of  the  poet  to  defeat  the  ineffable’  is  a 
recurring motif in most 20
th century critical thinking. In trying to explain this apparent 
divergence, I reconsider a wide range of interdisciplinary issues of particular interest 
to linguists, psychologists, literary theorists and philosophers of art; these include the 
limits of linguistic expression, the role of perceptual representations in our mental 
tapestry, the existence or otherwise of a property of literariness or essence of art, the 
distinctiveness of the poetic/ artistic mind and the nature of aesthetic experience.  
In due course, my discussion brings to light a novel account of the possible 
evolutionary origins of art and sketches an empirically tractable model of aesthetic 
experience that lend us significant insight on the actual mental goings-on behind the 
poet’s discontent with language. In view of the distinct ways in which, as it will be 
argued, an artistic mind is creative and the psycho-cognitive particularities of the kind 
of action art is, the ‘struggle of the poet to defeat the ineffable’ is soon ranked as a 
problem of an entirely different order than had been previously thought. The thesis 
takes the thread from the empirical observation that the limitations of speaking out the 
contents of the mind are so much more intensely felt in the literary mentality, in order 
to arrive at a deeper understanding of this very mentality, of the kind of action art is 
and the mind that brings it to light.   
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Prologue 
Don’t be surprised to see that what purports to be an extensive essay on the question 
of effability or expressibility of thought will along the way grapple with issues as wide 
and diverse as the essence of literature and art, the nature of the ‘poetic mind’, the 
content  of  aesthetic  experience,  the  role  of  perceptual  representations  in  human 
mental tapestry and the evolutionary origins of art.  
One  pretty much knows  what to  expect from an  empirical theorist -say, a 
cognitive scientist, a theoretical linguist or a philosopher of language- dealing with a 
question like effability. At present, when theoretical specialisation is a methodological 
necessity in empirical studies, the ‘characteristic mind set of the empirical theorist’ -
as I will refer to it in the first chapter- is such that she can only achieve relevance by 
keeping her subject matter relatively restricted and narrow. Certain types of empirical 
mind will happily invest an entire theoretical life investigating lines of argument that, 
to a  literary-artistic eye,  differ from one another by a hair’s breadth. The present 
analysis, however, is at least partly the work of a thinker from the humanities. And it 
will be pursued at least partly in the literary-artistic way.  
An underlying theme throughout the discussion will be the relation between 
thinking in the humanities and empirical/scientific theorising of the type produced in 
the cognitive sciences, linguistics and philosophy of language. From the outset, I have 
consciously tried to develop this thesis within a broader -and, in a sense, political- 
framework involving not just the content and import of theorising in the humanities 
per se, but also its relationship to and possible interaction with theory articulated 
within the empirical/ scientific world. Towards the end of this analysis (Chapter 8), I 
will argue that interdisciplinary exchanges in the Humanities in the last 50 years lack 
genuine  reciprocity.  Theorising  in  the  humanities  has  borrowed  extensively  from  
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disciplines such as cognitive  psychology,  theoretical  linguistics and philosophy  of 
mind, but in turn has had little, if any, retroactive effect on any of these disciplines.  
The belief that theorising in the humanities is intrinsically incapable of making 
truth claims
1 -the only way in which it could achieve retroactive effects on other 
disciplines-  has  become  so  deeply  entrenched  in  the  post-modern  literary-artistic 
mentality  that  theorists  seem  to  have  entirely  given  up  any  ambition  of  actually 
forming  or  pursuing  such  claims.  It  goes  to  show  how  much  theorising  in  the 
humanities  has  alienated  itself  from  straightforward  reason-preserving  thought 
processes that post-modernism still holds pride of place in many departments and 
universities around the world. I take it as self-evident that nothing can be a theory of 
something unless it can make at least one truth claim about this something. Thus, 
theorising in the humanities, like theorising in the cognitive sciences, is committed to 
the pursuit of truth.  
With these broader issues in mind, the question of effability may be seen as 
more an ‘excuse’ than a genuine question. Even so, this excuse was not chosen at 
random. The question of the effability of human thought itself, and the very different 
perspectives literary and philosophical camps have adopted towards it, seem to offer 
an excellent vantage point for looking afresh into a diverse range of pervasive literary 
and art-theoretical questions. How is this theoretical divergence to be explained? Are 
the different views put forward by literary authors and empirical theorists respectively 
arbitrary or empirically justified? Could the pessimistic perspectives on language and 
communication held in the literary world give ground for thinking that the literary 
                                                
1 The testability of the claim, or the way truth is pursued and arrived at, may vary, but the 
claim should nevertheless be capable of being both intended and recognised as a claim for 
truth, for it to be relevant to any adequate notion of theory.   
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mind is different from other minds, or that literature is a distinct kind of object from 
others?  
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  twofold:  my  goal  is  not  just to  investigate  these 
questions  anew,  but  also  to  pursue  them  in  adequately  theoretical,  genuinely 
interdisciplinary and mutually retroactive terms. In constant dialogue with a range of 
empirical disciplines, each chapter will lie on the borders of different interdisciplinary 
exchanges. The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the debate on 
effability  of  thought  and  the  tensions  between  linguistic  optimism  and  linguistic 
pessimism; these tensions are then put forth as an excellent starting point for getting a 
better grip of the nature of literature/ art and the uniqueness of the mind that makes it 
possible. In Chapter 2, I consider how major 20
th century developments such as the 
move from World to Mind, the emergence of so-called ‘cognitivist’, ‘mind-internal’ 
or ‘psychologistic’ accounts and the subsequent move from Codes to Pragmatics may 
radically alter perspectives on the issue of effability. Chapter 3 turns to the Mind once 
again, this time to explore and account for any justification linguistic pessimism may 
deserve: empirical facts such as the expressive difficulties that seem inexorably tied 
up with phenomenal -i.e. perceptual as opposed to conceptual- representations force 
us  to  accept  the  relative  ineffability  of  at  least  some  of  our  thoughts.  Chapter  4 
discusses  whether  an  essence  of  literature/  art  can  still  be  defended:  an  essential 
distinctness  of  literature/  art  would  explain  why  linguistic  pessimism  is  more 
widespread in the poetic mentality than the generic folk mentality. The chapter gives 
an overview of the positions of two main intellectual precursors, Jerry Fodor and 
Arthur Danto. In Chapter 5, I propose a new account of the essence of literature/ art as 
a case of etiological and more specifically mental/ psycho-cognitive distinctness. The 
etiological  distinctness  of  literature/  art  as  an  action  and  the  special  demands  it  
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imposes  on  communication  provides  new  grounds  for  understanding  much  of  the 
poet’s discontent with language. Chapter 6 launches an empirically tractable account 
of aesthetic experience as a special case of non adaptive sensory response and hints to 
the possibility much of what a poet refers to as ‘agony of expression’ to be agony for 
aesthetic achievement. Chapter 7 takes the thread from where the previous chapter has 
left to propose an evolutionary scenario on the origins of literature/ art and discuss 
extensively the locus of aesthetic experience in the kind of action literature/ art is: 
when  a  poet  refers  to  the  ‘inadequacy  of  language’  or  speaks  of  her  ‘agony  of 
expression’, she is producing an impressionistic description of the ‘symptoms’ with 
which the particular kind of action literature/ art is presents itself to her experience. 
This impressionistic report, however, is very far removed from and only minimally 
captures the intricacy of the actual goings-on in the poet’s/ artist’s mind. It is only 
when  focusing  on  the  latter  that  we  get  an  idea  of  the  complex  and  retroactive 
psychological and sensory states undercutting linguistic pessimism, never mind the 
complexity and beauty of the kind of action literature/ art is. Finally, in Chapter 8, I 
lay out the rationale of this thesis, discussing the possibility of an up-to-date and 
genuinely interdisciplinary form of literary and art theory.   
Having given an overview of the entire thesis, let us briefly go back to some of 
the interdisciplinary contributions to be attempted along the course of this analysis. 
Chapter 5 will introduce the notion of a ‘poetic thought state’, a compound creative 
mental  state  of  potential  interdisciplinary  interest  to  cognitive  psychology  and 
creativity-related  research.  The  discussion  will  also  be  relevant  to  ontology/ 
metaphysics,  as  I  will  attempt  to  outline  a  novel  type  of  relational  essence  and 
propose  a  solution  for  at  least  some  instances  of  the  problem  of  perceptually  
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indiscernible objects -also known as twin events. Artworks and their ‘twins’
2, I will 
argue, differ in that they have distinct psycho-cognitive histories: the one event is 
related to a particular type of thought state, while the other isn’t.  
In Chapters 3, 6 and 7, my proposals will relate implicitly to current debates in 
philosophy  on  the  ‘thesis  of  non-conceptualism’  (Tye  2006),  while  explicitly 
broadening the machinery of cognitive pragmatics by considering the addition of two 
theoretical terms (aesthetic relevance and perceptual effect) to Sperber and Wilson’s 
‘Relevance Theory’ (1995). Finally, in Chapters 6 and 7, evolutionary arguments -
speculative and preliminary as they may be- on the origins of aesthetic experience, 
and hence the origins of literature and art, will be linked to existing discussions on the 
evolutionary course of various human capacities and dispositions, and offer a new 
account
3 of the range of evolutionary processes  relevant  to the dissemination and 
propagation of art.  
To conclude and get down serious business. My aim in writing this thesis 
was not only to grapple with the effability of human mental representations, but to 
show  how  theory  within  empirical  and  semi-empirical  domains  can  not  only 
influence but also be effectively influenced by the study of literature and art.  
                                                
2 E.g. mere Brillo boxes and Warhol’s Brillo Boxes or a stretch of ordinary language and a 
stretch of literary language. 
3 The speculations to be put forward in this chapter differ significantly in both their content 
and rationale from the evolutionary accounts so far proposed in archaeology, evolutionary 
psychology and the newly emerging trend towards ‘Darwinian criticism’ (e.g. Boyd 1998, 
Tooby and Cosmides 2001, Zeki 2002, Gottschall and Wilson 2005, Pinker 2007, Dutton 
2008).   
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Chapter 1 
How much of our mind can we speak out? The question of expressibility.  
 
I haven’t spoken to anyone for three days. In fact it seemed a good thing to keep 
silent. After all, words can’t express all a person feels; words are inadequate. 
 
Andrei Tarkovsky, ‘Mirror’, 1974, A Mosfilm Unit 4 Production 
 
 
 
Dear Everyone, 
Words are inadequate, but I just wanted to thank you all for making my 'last' day 
both happy and memorable.   
 
From Neil Smith’s e-mail to the UCL students who organised his farewell party 
 
 
 
…it’s ripped my heart apart. There are no words really to express it 
 
Sion Jenkins, describing what the experience of being in prison for 6 years has done 
to him 
 
 
 
I knew that I would write no books either in English or in Latin in the coming 
year, the years after that, or in all the years of this life of mine. There is only one 
reason  for  this,  a  strange  and  embarrassing  one;  I  leave  it  to  your  infinite 
intellectual superiority to give it a place among what to your clear eyes is an 
orderly array of mental and physical phenomena. It is that the language in which 
I might have been granted the opportunity not only to write but also to think is 
not Latin or English, or Italian, or Spanish, but a language of which I know not 
one word, a language in which mute things speak to me and in which I will 
perhaps have something to say for myself someday when I am dead and standing 
before an unknown judge.  
Hugo von Hofmannsthal, ‘The Lord Chandos Letter’  
 
The idea that language falls terribly short when it comes to articulating the rich and 
disparate contents of the human mental tapestry is not only intuitively appealing but 
also deeply entrenched within everyday folk thinking. At one time or other in our  
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lives, we are bound to find ourselves facing up to mental goings-on that words cannot 
quite capture.  
This introspectively well evidenced fact seems to have been woven into the 
conventions  of our daily  verbal give and  take. It is an accepted convention for a 
speaker to say something along the lines of ‘You should have seen the look on his 
face’, which implies that there was a noteworthy facial expression but does not go 
anywhere near to describing it; circumventions of this sort are never perceived as 
preventing speakers from being communicatively relevant. It does indeed appear as if 
some things cannot be conveyed, and as if human public language systems have found 
and established ways of by-passing existing expressive limitations.  
An interesting corollary of this question is, what sort of things are they that 
cannot be conveyed? Introspective evidence again suggests that some aspects of our 
private mental lives are more difficult to convey than others. In discussing the poets 
of the Great War, and especially Robert Graves, Cohen (1999: [online paper]) writes:  
 
The  great  limitations  of  language  are  never  more  fully  realized  than  in  the 
description of excruciating trauma. It is this sense which is most brutally exposed 
in the work of the poets of the Great War; their utter incapacity to comprehend 
the devastation, as well as their further inadequacy in passing on their experience 
through the simple and capacitating medium of language is the soul of much war 
poetry.  Robert  Graves gives  voice to  this frustration in his poem,  ‘Recalling 
War’,  in  which  he  predicts  indifference  as  a  result  of  his  generation’s 
unavoidable  inability  to  capture  the  absolute  destruction  of  war  through 
literature. ‘Recalling War’ itself is a testament to the fact that prose and imagery, 
however  inspired,  are  simply  incapable  of  expressing  what  is  essentially 
expressionless. 
 
 
It is relatively easy to put into words a thought that crosses your mind, provided that 
the thought is clearly conceived, but very hard to convey the feeling a certain thought 
may elicit, quite independently of how ‘clearly’ this feeling is perceived. The reason  
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for saying ‘quite independently’ rather than just ‘independently’ is the intuitive fact 
that feelings too can be experienced with greater or lesser clarity. Just as intensely 
reflecting on a thought allows the thought to become progressively more refined and 
graspable, so intensely experiencing a feeling allows this feeling to gain greater and 
greater  luminosity.  It  may  be  that  clarity  for  thought  systems  and  clarity  for 
perception/sensation systems are rather different things, but the rule seems to apply 
equally to both: varying degrees of clarity in the way an object is thought about or 
perceived  go  hand  in  hand  with  varying  degrees  of  expressibility  and  clarity  of 
expressibility.
4 Sensation systems, and emotion systems, for that matter, appear to 
evade the resources and expressive repertoire of public human languages in a way not 
fully applicable to thought systems.  
In the 20
th century, folk reservations about the expressive capacities of public 
human languages were brought to the foreground of literary-theoretical discussion, 
and were fundamental in the deconstructive turn ‘against language’ on the part of 
avant-garde artists, theorists and movements. ‘The struggle of the poet to defeat the 
ineffable’ gained unprecedented urgency, and established itself as a telling motif of 
most  20
th  century  critical  thinking.  This  is  by  no  means  a  contingent  fact.  The 
intensity with which the folk discontent with language came to the fore in the early 
20
th  century  must  certainly  be  linked  to  the  profound  effect  that  emerging 
psychoanalytic doctrines had on the art world, taking the inward turn towards the 
artist’s  and  poet’s  private  mental  life
5  to  an  entirely  new  level.  Movements  like 
surrealism  or  vorticism  aimed  to  capture  the  mechanics  of  the  subconscious,  the 
                                                
4 This is something I very often encounter in my poetic endeavours: concentrating mentally 
on a feeling helps me experience it with clarity, which, in turn, is somehow reflected in the 
way this feeling or sensation is conveyed through words.  
5 It can be claimed that this inward turn towards one’s own mental life had already begun with 
the practises of the Romantics in the previous century, although it had occurred for the first 
time in the 6
th century BC, in ancient Greek lyric poetry.  
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workings of instantaneous perceptual impression and the elusiveness of dreams. This 
shift from the facts of an outside world to the way this outside world is perceived and 
responded  to  by  the  individual  consciousness  somehow  propelled  the  avant-garde 
poet’s  growing  discontent  with  the  expressive  powers  of  language.  Language  is 
‘attacked’, deconstructed and distorted at all levels -syntagmatic, paradigmatic and 
phonological; its expressive repertoire stretched to breaking point with an ambiguous 
‘gesture’ that appears to be both a retribution for the limitations it imposes upon the 
limitless conceptions and perceptions of the mind, and, at the same time, a plea for 
entirely  novel  possibilities  of  expression.  The  voices  that  drew  attention  to  our 
imprisonment in language were particularly intense and abundant in the 20
th century, 
but  had  not  been  lacking  in  the  previous  century  either.  In  the  mid  1800s,  the 
impotence of language was central to the work of Gustavo Bécquer: pondering the 
‘irrationality of inspiration’, Bécquer sees the actualised poem as a pale reflection of 
what the poet would have wanted to express. Shelley takes pretty much the same line, 
insisting that ‘the most glorious poetry that has ever been communicated to the world 
is probably a feeble shadow of the original conception of the poet’, while in a sonnet 
by Mallarmé a swan, in the face of which the poet is symbolized, is trapped in a 
freezing lake. The water is the swan's element but at the same time, it is this element 
itself that traps him and pins him down (see Peter La Marque 1999, online paper). 
Along  the  same  lines,  in  his  paper  ‘Mary  Shelley  on  the  therapeutic  value  of 
language’  Brewer  (1994:  1  [online  paper])  sees  the  inadequacy  thesis  as  an 
intellectual  meeting  point  between  Mary  and  Percy  Shelley.  Brewer  assumes  that 
many of the pronouncements in Mary Shelley's fiction regarding the effectiveness of 
language -her concern, for example, on the failure of words to improve the human  
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condition  in  her  historical  novel  ‘The  Fortunes  of  Perkin  Warbeck’-  are  direct 
influences by Percy’s similar declarations: 
 
Mary  Shelley's  somewhat  skeptical  attitude  toward  the  power  of  words  was 
probably influenced by Percy Shelley's views on language. In ‘On Life’, Percy 
writes: ‘How vain is it to think that words can penetrate the mystery of our 
being’ (475); he goes on to argue that ‘the misuse of words and signs’ prevents 
‘the  mind’  from  acting  freely  (477).  His  frustration  with  the  inadequacy  of 
language  is  forcibly  expressed  in  his  note  to  ‘On  Love’:  ‘These  words  are 
inefficient and metaphorical- Most words so-- No help—’ (474). Moreover, in 
‘A Defense of Poetry’, Percy Shelley asserts that over time words decline into 
‘signs for portions or classes of thought [i.e. abstract ideas] instead of pictures of 
integral  thoughts  ‘-if  poets  do  not  intervene  to  revitalize  them,  the  language 
becomes dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse’ (482). Percy's 
concern about the inadequacy and abstraction of language is also expressed in his 
poetry. In ‘Prometheus Unbound’ Prometheus repudiates his curse on Jupiter, 
declaring that ‘words are quick and vain’ (IV.i.303), a sentiment echoed by the 
Maniac in ‘Julian and Maddalo’, who exclaims ‘How vain / Are words!’ (472-
473).  
 
 
However,  more  interesting  than  any  explicit  complaint  against  language,  I 
think, is the multitude of implicit accusations, the range of major literary works that 
criticism  has  identified  as  ‘self-referential’  allegories  of  the  limitations  and 
inadequacy of public language. Kafka's The Trial could potentially be read as a self-
referential allegory of the deceptive and inadequate nature of language. In The Trial, 
the emphasis is on the language’s inability to communicate sense and, to some extent, 
on  its  occasional  pointlessness  and  meaninglessness.  In  L'Innommable,  Beckett 
undermines  grammatical  form  to  produce  an  allegory  of  the  speaker's  sense  of 
imprisonment  within  an  alien  and  alienating  language  (Taylor-Batty  2007:  163). 
Gustave  Flaubert’s  Madame  Bovary  and  its  protagonists’  failure  to  communicate 
explores the idea that words fail to capture even a small part of the depth of human 
life.  Gabriel  García  Márquez's  One  Hundred  Years  of  Solitude,  Kundera's  The 
Unbearable Lightness of Being and Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom may be perceived  
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as questioning the validity of language as a means of reporting and its potency as a 
means of expressing, while Orlando has been acclaimed by critics as ‘Woolf's own 
story of the inadequacy of language to name the thing itself’ (Smith 2006: 57). 
Quite  obviously,  developments  which are  for  the  most  part internal  to  the 
literary and art world are responsible for the thesis of the ‘inadequacy’ of language -or 
linguistic pessimism, as I would like to call it- becoming so prominent within the past 
couple of centuries. But can these developments be held responsible for the apparent 
pervasiveness in folk thinking of the belief that language is inadequate? This belief 
seems so strongly evidenced according to universal human intuitions that linguistic 
pessimism could, perhaps, claim for itself a certain level of justification. I’ll come 
back to this shortly.   
Here, the stronger or weaker forms of linguistic optimism advocated by many 
pragmatic theorists and philosophers of language in the last three decades provide a 
notable contrast. When the literary thinker defends the ‘ineffable’ as an empirically 
uncontroversial fact, the pragmatic theorist’s and philosopher’s unshakable faith in 
the expressive adequacy of language can only be received with a certain degree of 
surprise. To summarise what I will call the thesis of linguistic optimism, let us turn for 
a moment to Carston’s (2002: 33) illuminating discussion: 
 
The most general formulation of a principle of effability is along the following 
lines: ‘each proposition or thought can be expressed by some sentence in any 
natural language’. Much hangs on what is meant by ‘expressed’ here. In the 
previous sections, when I have talked of a proposition or thought expressed, I 
have not assumed this meant that it was ‘encoded’, or fully formulated, by a 
linguistic expression, quite  the contrary in  fact. But, as  used by  Katz  (1978, 
1981), ‘can be expressed by some sentence’ could seem to mean ‘can be encoded 
by  some  sentence’.  So  there  are  at  least  the  following  two,  very  different, 
possible principles to be considered: 
 
First Principle of Effability: ‘Each proposition or thought can be expressed (= 
conveyed) by some utterance of some sentence in any natural language’.  
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Second Principle of Effability: ‘Each proposition or thought can be expressed 
(= encoded) by some sentence in any natural language’.  
 
 
The first of the two principles is relatively weak and does not seem to raise too many 
objections. This is not to say, of course, that any individual speaker should always be 
able to express verbally any particular thought she has; the claim is more along the 
lines of any thought being in principle expressible -say, by a more able speaker- in 
some context. With no given limits on either the richness of available contexts or the 
ways in which contextual material could be used to enrich encoded material, the first 
effability principle seems largely uncontroversial. The second principle, on the other 
hand,  is  relatively  stronger  and  can  be  said  to give  rise  at  least  to  the  following 
objection: it has been argued that in our internal language we often fix time and space 
references in terms of a private logbook and an ego-centered map rather than in terms 
of some kind of universal co-ordinates (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 192). Most 
kinds of reference to individuals, places or events, it seems, are fixed on the basis of 
such  private time and  space co-ordinates,  hence making the thoughts that contain 
them impossible to represent completely and fully encode in natural language. Again 
few words from Carston (2002: 33): 
 
(…) The force of this point is perhaps most vividly felt by considering thoughts 
one has about oneself; how I represent myself to myself must inevitably be quite 
different from the way you or anyone represents me, and so it must be for all of 
us. The same holds for the way I mentally represent my spatial and temporal 
location at any given instant, that which I might express by the words ‘here’ and 
‘now’; (…) This is a function of the ‘ego-centered map’ referred to in the quote 
and it extends far beyond these self-references. My mental representation of the 
woman who is my mother is doubtless a private one, probably not even shared 
with my siblings. (…) These sorts of differences in representations of an object 
are not, and cannot be, encoded in natural-language sentences.
 6  
                                                
6 Carston goes on to discuss a third effability principle -‘For every statement that can be made 
using a context-sensitive sentence in a given context, there is an eternal sentence that can be  
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It follows from this brief discussion that the debate on the effability of human 
thought is somehow inextricably tied up with another debate, on what is technically 
known as the linguistic underdeterminacy thesis: the thesis that sentence meaning 
typically underdetermines speaker meaning, or to put it in folk/ pre-theoretical terms, 
the thesis that speakers typically use sentences to communicate a lot more than the 
words  of  these  sentences  mean  in  their  own  right.
7  And,  although  a  distinction 
between what words mean and what speakers mean in using these words
8 is explicit in 
Carston’s distinction between an ‘encodability’ version and a ‘conveyability’ version 
of the principle of effability, the fact remains that to the eyes of a poet, even the 
weaker of the two principles seems counter-intuitively strong.   
Did the poets get it wrong? Or is it that pragmatic theorists and philosophers 
are missing the point? If it is true that each proposition or thought can be conveyed by 
an utterance of some sentence in any natural language, does this mean that linguistic 
pessimism is an illusion, a figment of the mind, an epiphenomenon? If so, how is the 
pervasiveness of this illusion in folk intuitions to be explained? And furthermore, how 
are we to account for the palpable difference in the intensity with which linguistic 
pessimism is experienced by an ordinary and a poetic mind?  
Research in the last 30 years has provided strong evidence that both ordinary 
and literary language exploit the same pragmatic mechanisms (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/1995,  2008),  depend  on  the  same  innate  and  universal  human  capacity  (the 
language  capacity/  I-Language,  Chomsky  1976)  and  draw  on  the  same  abstract/ 
                                                                                                                                       
used to make the same statement in any context’ (2002: 34)-, which is not strictly speaking 
relevant to our discussion. My  aim in this thesis is not so much to assess the debate on 
effability  per  se,  as  to  use  the  divergence  in  views  about  effability  between  literary  and 
philosophical camps as a starting point for reconsidering pertinent literary-theoretical and art-
philosophical questions. 
7 In the next chapter, I will explore in some detail how semiotic and pragmatic models of 
communication offer different perspectives on linguistic optimism and pessimism. 
8 The different perspectives can be described as code-based or semiotic, on the one hand, and 
pragmatic, on the other.  
 
 
20   
symbolic system of mental representations (the ‘language of thought’ or ‘mentalese’ 
Fodor  1983).  Given,  then,  that  the  formal  medium  in  which  poets  and  ordinary 
speakers express themselves is the same, one is almost compelled to ask: could there 
be a non-trivial explanation for why the alleged inadequacy of language is so much 
more intensely experienced in the poetic mind?  
It is not only poets that grapple with language all the time. Philosophers and 
scientists also grapple with language. If language is after all in some sense and to 
some extent inadequate, scientists and philosophers should be no less disappointed by 
the expressive limitations of language given their equal involvement in the act of 
spelling  out  the contents  of  the  mind.  A  plausible  line  of  explanation,  then,  may 
concern the nature of what the poet is trying to convey and the ways in which this is 
significantly different from what the philosopher and scientist is trying to convey. I 
shall focus on this line of approach in Chapter 3, in my investigation of phenomena.  
Other lines of investigation are also worth pursuing, each highlighting distinct 
sets of issues for a philosophy of literature and art. It may be, for instance, that much 
of the poet’s discontent with language is entirely independent of the mechanics of 
expression, and results to some extent from the retroactive effects of critical thinking 
on the way poets/ practising artists assess and evaluate introspective evidence. It is not 
implausible, for instance, that the emergence and commercial success of semiotics in 
the 20
th century has led to an over-inflation of linguistic pessimism. Alternatively, the 
poet’s discontent with language may be independent of the mechanics of expression 
precisely because expression is not the issue after all. In later chapters, I will offer 
preliminary arguments against an approach I call interpretationalism, and argue that 
neither expression nor interpretation is as central to the nature of art as has been  
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previously assumed.
9 Finally, I would like to suggest that, if there is a genuinely 
significant reason why language seems so inadequate to the poetic mind, it may relate 
more to particularities of the poetic mind itself, and the specific kind of use to which 
poets put language: the specific kind of use we refer to as poetry or art.  
From  this  perspective,  the  divergence  in  views  between  literary  and 
philosophical camps on how much of the mind we can actually speak out relates not 
so much to language as to the mind itself. A mind that responds to the world through 
its senses, that appreciates the world, or at least some objects in the world, in an 
aesthetic  way,  that  pulsates  from  the  intensity  and  richness  of  its  perceptual 
representations. A mind capable of special forms of creativity, capable not only of 
thinking about something but also of thinking that it is thinking about something. A 
mind capable of art.  
The debate on effability is an excellent starting point for reconsidering a range 
of  long-standing  questions  with  implications  for  a  range  of  long-established 
disciplines (linguistics, literary and art theory, philosophy, psychology etc). I hope 
that this reconsideration will help to show how the apparently contradictory views of 
thinkers  in  the  humanities  and  the  cognitive  sciences  may  nevertheless  not  be 
mutually exclusive
10, and may enable us get closer to understanding the special nature 
of literature/ art and the uniqueness of the mind that creates it. 
In the next chapter, I will consider how a major 20
th century development, 
which the literary and art-philosophical worlds are only just beginning to discover, 
may radically alter perspectives on what humans can and cannot communicate. More 
                                                
9 And the same goes for interpretation. In a way, expression and interpretation go hand-in-
hand, involving equivalent processes at the production and reception end. However, I will 
argue later that neither of them should be seen as the focal element in an analysis of the nature 
of art.  
10 Hopefully, by the end of this analysis you will have seen that this isn’t an oxymoron.   
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specifically, we will look at the move from World to Mind -i.e .the emergence of so- 
called ‘cognitivist’, ‘mind-internal’ or ‘psychologistic’ accounts- and the subsequent 
move from Codes to Pragmatics.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Language, World and Mind  
 
Two behaviourists meet in the street.  
The one says to the other:  
‘You’re feeling well. How am I?’ 
 
I sit in front of my laptop thinking how this chapter should go. I have a cup of hot 
coffee in my hand. From time to time I bring the cup to my mouth and take small sips. 
My coffee is a full-bodied Arabic blend. The white coffee-cup looks yellowish in the 
deep orange light of the afternoon.  
My coffee exists. The coffee-cup exists. The orange light of the afternoon also 
exists. The most immediate evidence of the existence of an outside world comes from 
such sense data. Things look a certain way or feel a certain way. Yet it may be that 
this particular class of data are mere epiphenomena, delusions of the mind. The most 
powerful evidence of the existence of an outside world is interpretive convergence: 
alongside the amazing multiplicity and diversity of our reactions to the world, we 
need to acknowledge the equally amazing fact that we would all more or less see a 
coffee cup next to my laptop, we would all more or less see it looking yellowish in the 
afternoon light
11, and we would all more or less find out that it is roughly five past six 
by glancing at the clock or noticing that Friends is on TV.  
If we were to track the two or three most influential schools of thought in 
literary  theory  during  the  last  century,  and  if  we  were  to  do  this  in  reverse 
                                                
11 Albeit we may have quite different individual representations of, say, the ‘yellowness’ of 
the light reflecting on the cup.   
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chronological  order,  postmodern  criticism  would  be  amongst  the  first  to  come  to 
mind.  The  deconstructive  legacy  that  postmodern  criticism  bequeathed  to 
contemporary theorising on literature and the arts has affected many innocent victims, 
from ‘truth’ to ‘text’, ‘interpretation’, ‘meaning’ and ‘language’.  
In  a sense, postmodern deconstruction can be  seen as an extreme form  of 
relativism. It seems that the success of relativistic approaches to sociolinguistics and 
cultural studies in the 60’s and 70’s
12 had such an effect on, and were given such 
importance  in,  postmodern  thinking  that  their  actual  theoretical  implications  were 
considerably over-stated: inter-individual and cross-cultural relativism was taken as 
evidence that there is no such property as truth. Here is how the argument goes: inter-
individual and cross-cultural relativism, together with variation in value judgements -
e.g.  judgements  about  beauty-  or  in  acts  of  interpretation  -e.g.  various  lines  of 
interpretation for the same text or artwork- seems to suggest that there are numerous 
truths, all of them equally valid and all of them equally impressionistic, subjective and 
context dependent. Hence, talk about truth as a stable and objective property of some 
human  thoughts  is  futile.  The  same  rationale  seems  to  have  been  applied  to  the 
deconstruction
13 of ‘meaning’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘language’. The fact, for instance, 
that speaker meaning is underdetermined by sentence meaning -a fact acknowledged 
by contemporary pragmatics as an essential feature of human natural languages (Grice 
1967  and  1989,  Bach  and  Harnish  1979,  Levinson  1983  and  2000,  Davis  1991, 
                                                
12 As for instance in Linguistic Relativism and the so called ‘Whorf Hypothesis’ . 
13  Here,  ‘deconstruction’  is  synonymous  with  ‘destruction’.  However,  this  is  not  an 
uncontroversial reaction to postmodern theory or Derrida’s system of thought. In her book 
The  Critical  Difference  (1981:  39),  Barbara  Johnson  suggests:  ‘Deconstruction  is  not 
synonymous with ‘destruction’, however. It is in fact much closer to the original meaning of 
the word 'analysis' itself, which etymologically means ‘to undo’ -a virtual synonym for ‘to de-
construct’. (...) If anything is destroyed in a deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the 
claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another’. In any case, and in 
order to reach own conclusions, a foundational text for deconstructive criticism is Derrida’s 
Of Grammatology (1976).  
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Sperber and Wilson 1995, Carston 2002)- was not taken as evidence that humans infer 
communicators’ meanings from clues provided by the utterance and the context, or as 
a  starting  point  for  investigating  how  the  gap  between  sentence  meaning  and  the 
variety of potential speaker meanings it may correspond to is bridged, but rather as 
evidence  of  the  relativistic fluidity  of  interpretation.  Open  and  uncontrolled,  such 
fluidity  makes  linguistic  communication  pointless,  removing  ‘meaning’  from 
meaning.
14  
I won’t spend much time on the logical weaknesses of postmodern reasoning. 
A  reader  who  has  followed  the  present analysis  this  far  will  certainly  be  able  to 
identify without my help many logical inconsistencies in the postmodern theoretical 
edifice, and find more than enough clues to why certain postmodern endeavours were 
described by analytic philosophers of the time as ‘semi-intelligible attacks upon the 
values of reason, truth, and scholarship’.
15 The point that does deserve attention, and 
may  shed  some  light  on  the  source  of  some  linguistic  pessimism,  is  somewhat 
different:  where  do  beliefs  -whether  folk  beliefs  or  academic,  literary  and  art 
theoretical beliefs- come from? Recently, I gave a talk on truth, scientific method and 
the explanatory nature of theory in contemporary philosophy of literature and art, 
trying, amongst other things, to replace deconstructive ideas with arguments in favour 
of scientific optimism, and to reveal some of the logical weaknesses in postmodern 
thinking. My audience, instead of devising counterarguments to what I was saying, 
                                                
14 Thirty years later, with all the theoretical advances in domains like pragmatics or cognitive 
anthropology, and despite the expectation that in the light of these  advances,  postmodern 
myths and fallacies of the sort just mentioned would be things of the past, one of the best-
selling and most highly praised books in Greece this year contains a series of essays that take 
the diversity of possible interpretations in literature as proof that there is no such thing as 
meaning. 
15 Quote taken from the open letter against Derrida (Barry Smith et al. 1992), signed by 
eighteen philosophy professors of the time, including Quine and Armstrong.   
 
 
26   
simply kept repeating what they had read in Derrida. I’ll stop before this analysis 
turns into journalism. 
The  first set  of  factors  underlying  linguistic  pessimism  and  the  belief  that 
language  is  inadequate  that  I  would  like  to  consider  is  epistemological  and 
anthropological. Linguistic pessimism, like some other theoretical stances in the Arts 
and Humanities, is rooted partly in the observation of reality, and partly in appeals to 
authority.  The  issue  is  anthropological  in  the  sense  that  it  relates  to  the  human 
propensity to hold what Sperber (1997) calls ‘reflective beliefs’, half-understood or 
unsubstantiated beliefs that an individual accepts as true on the grounds that they 
come from a credible source. The issue is also epistemological in the sense that in 
constructing theories in the Arts and Humanities, people do not always turn to the 
World in order to test and assess the credibility of a theory, but rather turn to the 
theory  in  the  hope  of  learning  what  the  World  is  like.  If  there  is  a  significant 
generalisation to be made here, it is about the effect of theories on our ability to make 
something  out  of  the  data  that  come  to  us  from  the  external  world  in  an 
‘uncontaminated’ way. Instead of making testable claims to be assessed against the 
available  evidence,  theories  instead  turn  into  contaminating  factors  distorting  and 
altering an individual’s initial response to introspective evidence and data. 
Linguistic  pessimism,  I  would  like  to  suggest,  could  to  some  extent  have 
arisen as  a backward effect of theorising  on the way poets and theorists  evaluate 
introspective data. Postmodern deconstruction merely pushed to the extreme ideas 
that had already become available through the emergence of semiotics -i.e. a code-
based  model  of  human  communication-  and  the  theoretical  dominance  of 
behaviourism in the life sciences for most of the 20
th century. Let me briefly outline  
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how these two paradigms may have contributed to the overtly pessimistic way literary 
individuals have perceived and evaluated language.  
With the increasing prestige of cognitive enquiry in the present day, it may be 
easy to forget that in the first half of the last century, it was considered unscientific to 
talk directly about the mind. By the mid 20
th century, the entire philosophical and 
psychological establishment was dominated by behaviouristic practices and ideas. In 
my view, behaviourism was not simply a theoretical tendency within the developing 
field of psychology, but also provided a paradigm with considerable implications for 
research in philosophy and the humanities. Behaviourism gives investigative priority 
to the observable. While there  is no doubt that behaviour  exists,  it  provides only 
indirect evidence for the existence of minds. This elusiveness of the Mind in the eyes 
of behaviourists led to the abandonment of introspection as a source of evidence, and 
made  the  results  obtained  by  introspection  seem  dangerous  and  unsafe.  From  a 
behaviouristic point of view, then, every truth claim made by a theory has to satisfy 
the demand for observability. Thus, linguistic theory, for instance, could have only 
two possible levels of analysis: observable linguistic data and linguistic behaviour.  
Semiotics  as  a  linguistic  theory  has  its  roots  in  the  work  of  the  father  of 
contemporary linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure
16. Semiotics, or semiology, from the 
Greek  word  semeion  (sign)/  semeia  (signs),  treats  natural  languages  as  huge 
articulated  systems  of  signs/  signals,  each  of  which  expresses  a  corresponding 
message and picks out a corresponding object in the outside world.
17 Thus, semiotics 
is  fundamentally a code-based model  of human communication. Words/ signs are 
taken to encode the messages they are paired with: for instance, the word ‘tree’ is seen 
                                                
16 Its ancient precursors can be traced as far back as Aristotle and his De Interpretatione.  
17  Semiological  theory  has  been  applied  to  a  wide  range  of  domains  (Fine  Art,  Cultural 
Studies, Ethnology and so on) and has been used to discuss anything from the semiology of 
clothing to the semiology of image.   
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as encoding the concept tree, which picks out an object in the outside world, i.e. a 
tree. 
Semeia are observable entities. Words perceived as semeia are phonologically 
realised  concepts  that  have  become  i)  observable  by  encoding  themselves  into 
phonetic signals and ii) in principle, fully decodable by allowing a receiver who has a 
copy of the code to recover the sender’s thought in full. The meaning of signs comes 
from the fact that  they pick  out an item from another set of similarly observable 
entities, i.e. real world objects.  
Here  I  would  like  to  draw  attention  to  two  relevant  implications  of  the 
semiotic model. The first is that, if the relationship between words and messages/ 
thoughts is 1:1, then the relationship between utterances -as combinations of words- 
and messages/ thoughts is also 1:1. It trivially follows that utterances are seen as 
typically capable of expressing and capturing a thought in its entirety: 
 
Utterance A ￿ Thought A 
 
One  standard  definition  of  a  thought  is  that  it  consists  of  a  proposition  and  a 
propositional attitude -e.g. believing, wondering whether, desiring, etc. Οn the whole, 
the philosophers who argue for effability explicitly adopt this narrow ‘proposition + 
attitude’ view of thought. Or, to put it another way, most philosophers treat thoughts 
as purely conceptual. Throughout this analysis, however, we are going to talk about 
thought  in  a  fuller  and  broader  sense,  which  partly  departs  from  the  standard 
conceptual approach. We will treat thought as a complex state, a mixture of causally 
interconnected perceptual and conceptual representations. In this fuller construal, a 
thought  is  a  mental  representation  that  involves  not  only  a  proposition  and  a  
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propositional attitude but also a range of idiosyncratic, private, perceptual or emotive 
properties.  From  this  standpoint,  the  idea  that  utterances  typically  capture  a 
communicator’s thoughts in their totality is rather counter-intuitive.
18 
The  second  implication  involves  the  notion  of  thought  in  its  narrower 
construal  as  a  proposition  combined  with  a  propositional  attitude.  Of  the  two 
principles of effability discussed by Carston (2002) and quoted in Chapter 1 above, 
the semiotic model seems to imply the counter-intuitive one. If what sentences do is 
encode thoughts, then the claim that human thought is expressible through natural 
language  would  amount  to  the  claim  that  each  proposition  or  thought  can  be 
expressed (= encoded) by some sentence in any natural language.  
Semiotics treats communication as a matter of encoding thoughts into signals 
and decoding them again at the receiver’s end. The code normally used by humans in 
communication is natural language. So, for natural language to be seen as adequate, it 
would be necessary that i) sentences capture mental representations in their entirety, 
so that there is a 1:1 relationship between a sentence and the mental representation it 
encodes, and that ii) every thought can be expressed (= encoded) by some natural 
language sentence. The fact that, intuitively, neither condition seems to be fully met 
was then interpreted not as a defect in the semiotic model itself -which should have 
led to an immediate reconsideration of main claims of the theory- but as a defect of 
natural language. Here’s what I suspect has happened.  
I develop a theory (T) which claims that for an object to function adequately, 
it must fulfil a certain prototypical goal in a satisfactory manner. In developing my 
theory (T), though, I make the mistake of treating as the prototypical goal of this 
object one that is either not appropriate to the object or not fully compatible with the 
                                                
18 In Chapter 3, I shall come back to this point in great detail and discuss its implications for 
the expressibility of human thought.  
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actual nature of the object. My theory (T), for example, assumes that a key would 
function adequately if it could be used in frying eggs. I fail to find any satisfactory 
way  in  which  a  key  could  be  used  in  frying  eggs,  and  conclude  that  the  key  is 
functionally inadequate in relation to this goal. Having treated the code as central to 
communication,  semiotics  created  unrealistic  expectations  about  language,  which 
language  of  course  did  not  fulfil  -not  because  it  is  inadequate  as  a  means  for 
communicating  thought,  but  because  the  expectations  to  be  fulfilled  were  not 
reasonable in the first place.  
Semiotics had, and continues to have, what might be called a meta-theoretic 
effect  on  the  literary  world,  ‘contaminating’  the  literary  individual’s  expectations 
from the code, and turning an otherwise reasonable discontent with language into a 
wholesale attack on language. In the case of the noetic experiment/ example with the 
key and my theory’s unrealistic expectations about the key, the logical fault is rather 
obvious. In the case of the semiotic model of communication, spotting the logical 
error was not so easy. The behaviouristic demand for observability of the object under 
investigation and the consequent dichotomy of Language and World made the puzzle 
literally  unsolvable.  Why?  Well,  because,  as  theoretical  developments  eventually 
showed, for the logical error to be spotted, a third parameter was needed, and this 
parameter  was  neither  observable  in  the  behaviouristic  sense  nor  part  of  the 
Language-World dichotomy. This intermediate parameter was the Mind. 
Thanks  to  Chomsky  and  the  cognitive  revolution,  the  Mind  was  finally 
brought into discussions on language and communication, and showed philosophers a 
possible way out of the behaviouristic dead-ends. In New Horizons in the study of 
Language and Mind (2000: 4), Chomsky writes: 
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The cognitive perspective regards behaviour and its products not as the object of 
inquiry, but as data that may provide evidence about the inner mechanisms of 
mind  and  the  ways  these  mechanisms  operate  in  executing  actions  and 
interpreting  experience.  The  properties  and  patterns  that  were  the  focus  of 
attention  in  structural  linguistics  find  their  place,  but  as  phenomena  to  be 
explained along with innumerable others, in terms of the inner mechanisms that 
generate expressions. The approach is ‘mentalistic’, but in what should be an 
uncontroversial sense. It is concerned with ‘mental aspects of the world’, which 
stand alongside its mechanical, chemical, optical, and other aspects. It undertakes 
to study a real object in the natural world -the brain, its states, and its functions- 
and thus to move the study of the mind towards eventual integration with the 
biological sciences.  
 
The cognitive perspective was an indispensable enabling factor. Reference to 
the  Mind,  use  of  robust  introspective  evidence  and  enrichment  of  the  Language/ 
World  dichotomy  with  the  intermediate  level  of  humans  and  their  mental 
representations open the way for pragmatic models of language and communication. 
Wharton (2003: 219) puts this beautifully:  
 
(…)  from  Grice’s  earliest  work  through  to  relevance  theory,  linguistic 
communication is an intelligent, intentional, inferential activity. Utterances do 
not  encode  the  messages  speakers  want  to  convey;  rather,  they  are  used  to 
provide evidence of intentions, which hearers must infer. Although the extent of 
the role played by inference in communication is still the subject of much debate 
(as  indeed  is  the  precise  nature  of  what  constitutes  ‘inference’  itself)
19  most 
pragmatists now agree that verbal communication is more than a simple coding-
decoding process. 
 
It’s worth remembering, however, that it is not just when involved in acts of 
communication that humans are inclined to attribute mental states to others. The 
human disposition to attribute mental states is so much a part of our individual 
(or collective, species-specific) psychological make-up, that -as I know to my 
cost- it is not something we can choose to do or not to do: it’s something we just 
can’t help, any more than we can help pulling our hand back from a source of 
extreme heat. 
 
Plainly, other people’s intentions and mental states generally are not objects to be 
perceived in the world in the same way as are their faces or bodies; they are ‘out 
there’, but they are invisible. It is hard, however, to even imagine what it would 
be like not to be able to sense the mental states of others in some way. The world 
would be such a different, potentially terrifying place. 
 
                                                
19 See Recanati (2002).   
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And a final quote, this time from Sperber and Wilson (1995: 7-9) and from the earliest 
phase of relevance-theoretic pragmatics: 
 
Saussure  expected  that  ‘the  laws  discovered  by  semiology  will  applicable  to 
linguistics, and the latter will circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of 
anthropological facts’. What actually happened was that for the few decades in 
which  structuralist  linguistics  flourished,  the  semiotic  program  was  taken 
seriously and spelled out in more detail. (…) However, no semiotic law of any 
significance  was  ever  discovered,  let  alone  applied  to  linguistics.  After  the 
publication in 1957 of Noam Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures, linguistics took a 
new turn and did undergo remarkable developments; but these owed nothing to 
semiotics. As the study of language became better understood, its sui generis 
nature became more and more striking. The assumption that all systems of signs 
should  have  similar  structural  properties  became  more  and  more  untenable. 
Without this assumption, however, the semiotic programme makes little sense.  
 
(…)  It  is  true  that  a  language  is  a  code  which  pairs  phonetic  and  semantic 
representations  of  sentences.  However,  there  is  a  gap  between  the  semantic 
representations  of  sentences  and  the  thoughts  actually  communicated  by 
utterances. This gap is filled not by more coding, but by inference.  
 
 
The  pragmatic  approach  to  linguistic  communication,  and  particularly  the 
inferential cognitive-pragmatic model developed within Relevance Theory (Sperber 
and Wilson 1995) has now shown that linguistic communication is a much more 
flexible, creative and context-dependent process than code-based approaches predict. 
It is the semantics – pragmatics distinction, and the resulting gap between sentence 
meaning  and  utterance  meaning,  that  should  in  principle  enable  a  change  in 
perspectives on the expressive capacities of language. Simply put, the semantics – 
pragmatics distinction captures and aims to explain the empirical fact that in human 
communication  -both  linguistic  and  non-linguistic-  a  lot  more  is  actually 
communicated than is coded.  
The  underdeterminacy  relationship  between  linguistic  meaning  and 
communicated meaning is neither occasional nor incidental (Carston 2002: 15-93). 
Built into the very nature of linguistic communication, the richness of what humans  
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can contextually infer from the relative poverty of the linguistically encoded evidence 
they are presented with justifies a more optimistic turn in discussions about what 
humans can and cannot communicate. At the same time, recent research on word 
meaning and communication suggests that the underdeterminacy relationship between 
what is encoded and what is communicated does not apply only at the level of whole 
utterances, but also at the level of individual words. Aiming to develop explanatory 
accounts of a cluster of characteristic cases of creative word use, and to address recent 
experimental evidence that the human mind can form ad hoc concepts in a flexible 
and context-dependent way (Barsalou 1987, 1992), the developing field of lexical 
pragmatics  shows  that  the  richness  and  variety  of  what  the  human  mind  can 
contextually infer from a relatively poor and finite repertoire of linguistically encoded 
meanings also applies at the level of the word. As Deirdre Wilson suggested in her 
lectures on lexical pragmatics at UCL in 2005:  
 
(…) words are often used in ways that depart (sometimes a little, sometimes a 
lot) from their ‘literal’ meanings, the ones assigned them by the grammar. We 
invent new words, and people understand us. We blend two words together, and 
people understand us. We use nouns, adjectives or prepositions as verbs, and 
people understand us. We borrow words from other languages; we use words 
approximately, metaphorically or hyperbolically. As children or adults, we pick 
up the meanings of unfamiliar words without being taught, just by hearing them 
uttered in context. We see words come into fashion and vanish; we see them 
acquire  new  meanings  and  lose  old  ones.  While  sociolinguists,  historical 
linguists,  philosophers and psychologists  have  all been  interested  in different 
aspects of these phenomena, it’s only in the last five years or so that pragmatists 
have begun to look systematically at how the semantics/ pragmatics distinction 
applies at the level of the word, and to talk of a separate domain of ‘lexical 
pragmatics’ (see for instance Carston and Uchida 1997, Carston 2002; Blutner 
1998, 2002; Sperber & Wilson 1998; Wilson 2003).  
 
 
Between 2004 and 2006, I had the opportunity to carry out some corpus-based 
research  for  a  UCL-based  lexical  pragmatics  project  led  by  Deirdre  Wilson  and 
Robyn Carston. The aim of the project was to develop a unified theory of lexical  
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pragmatics that would bring together under a single theoretical account a number of 
word-related pragmatic phenomena that the existing literature had so far dealt with 
individually and separately. I will not tire you with the details of my research, which 
is too specialised for the purposes of the current analysis. I would very much like, 
though, to quote part of the evidence that my corpus investigation brought to light, 
since I think it speaks in the most articulate of ways about a plasticity in the human 
mind, combined with a flexibility, fine-grainedness and sophistication in linguistic 
communication, that the semiotic legacy has largely bypassed: 
20 
 
A corpus-based investigation of issues in Lexical Pragmatics is in many respects a 
pilot  project.  With  the  interface  of  Corpus  analysis  and  Pragmatics  hugely 
unexplored, the corpus analyst cannot rely on a given paradigm. An awful lot of 
strategic planning must be heavily improvised. Or, to put it differently: when we 
embarked on the corpus-based strand of the project, we didn’t have the faintest 
clue where to start from or what to do next. 
 
In  a magical way, however, the data  started showing the way themselves. It 
pretty  soon  became  clear  that  our  investigation  is  not  aiming  that  much  for 
statistical significance. The ‘pragmatics’ (in the non-technical sense) of a corpus-
based  study  of  lexis  (let  alone  the  technical  and  temporal  limitations  of  the 
project)  do  not  allow  firm  statistical  generalizations:  in  the  56million  word 
corpus The Bank of English that we are currently using, the word- set ‘red eyes’, 
for instance, occurs a mere 29 times. After alternating our search terms into ‘eyes 
+  red’  or  ‘red  +a  number  of  intervening  items+  eyes’  etc,  we  managed  to 
increase this number to 54 occurrences. The same goes for other terms as well. 
(…)  The  problem  has  been  squarely  epitomized  by  John  Sinclair  who 
acknowledged that with grammatical words occurring in the Bank hundreds of 
thousands of times and lexical words just a few dozen, statistical generalizations 
on lexical meaning are relatively hard to obtain. 
 
Yet, the corpus has proved an invaluable source of inspiration, when it comes to 
highlighting  existing  hypotheses,  testing  some  of  the  main  assumptions  that 
Lexical  Pragmatics  (…)  has  set  out  to  scrutinize  and  motivating  new  and 
worthwhile questions. 
                                                
20 Τhe following passage comes from my talk Kolaiti, P. 2005. The empty vessel makes the 
greatest  sound:  Corpus  analysis  and  lexical  pragmatics,  delivered  at  the  ‘International 
Workshop on Word Meaning, Concepts and Communication’ at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor 
Great Park.  
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(…)  We  looked  at  the  collocation  ‘red  eyes’  with  the  aim  of  testing  the 
hypothesis that the interpretation of ‘red’ is the outcome of a ‘default routine’ 
which involves a purely semantic rather than creative use, and found tangible 
evidence of Narrowing as a highly context sensitive and flexible process.  
 
More specifically, in all utterances under investigation, use of the word ‘red’ 
communicates  a  slightly  more  fine  tuned  concept  RED*,  RED**  etc  (which 
picks out a particular shade other than focal red) even though the adjective ‘red’ 
steadily  collocates  with  ‘eyes’.  Simultaneously,  the  same  contextual 
considerations  that  have  an  effect  on  the  narrowing  of  ‘red’  also  appear  to 
prompt significant variation in the interpretation of ‘eyes’: the concept EYES is 
also loosened in different directions and to different extents (as in each example 
some other distribution is called for other than the entire eye being represented as 
red). Compare: 
 
(1) …red eyes denote strain and fatigue. 
Here ‘red’ picks out a reddish, pink shade ranging around the edges of the eye, 
on the bags under the eye and maybe partially on the cornea too. 
 
(2) [This flashing light is] to stop you getting red eyes (in a context about red- 
eye effect in photographs) 
Here ‘red’ picks out a luminous, rusty red ranging over the iris only. 
 
in a context about demons: 
 
(3) two burning red eyes she recalled…    
Fiery red and luminous. Either both the cornea and the iris consistently red or the 
iris alone. 
 
and finally used as a metaphor: 
(4) …eyes red with resentment… 
 
We looked at ‘raw’, ‘painless’ and ‘boiling’ with the aim of testing the view 
that a continuum between literal and loose uses does exist.  Our findings showed 
that loosening is not epiphenomenal to language use; in fact, in the cases of 
‘painless’ and ‘boiling’, loose uses predominate. (…) 
 
Our investigation of ‘painless’ was particularly useful evidence of the proximity 
between literal use and approximation. Cases such as 
(5) I would want something clean and painless: no botch-ups. It would be the 
doctor or no one.  [in a context about euthanasia] 
where the utterance allows either a strict interpretation (the procedure might be 
literally painless) or an approximate one (a small amount of physical pain might 
be involved in the procedure, but it would still be insignificant compared to the 
distress the patient would have to go through if left to die naturally) and either of 
them  indeed  seems  relevant  and  *true  enough*,  occupy  roughly  14%  of  all 
occurrences of ‘painless’, with strictly literal cases occupying roughly 19%. The  
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significant extent to which approximate interpretations seem as satisfactory as 
literal ones argues in favour of a noteworthy proximity between literal meaning 
and approximation. 
Our  investigation  of  ‘boiling’  fully  revealed  the  form  that  the  continuum  of 
literal and loose uses of the same concept can take. In a total of 323 occurrences, 
we found 148 cases of literal use: 
(6) Poached eggs come out well in a small dish using boiling water.   
 
43 cases where either a literal or an approximate interpretation would be true 
enough: 
(7) Cover the cake with the icing, smoothing with a knife dipped in boiling water. 
 
2 instances where only an approximate interpretation would be true:  
(8) For sauce, melt chocolate with syrup and water over boiling water, then beat 
until smooth 
 
78 cases of metaphor  
(9) …several small boats disappeared in boiling seas.   
 
4 cases of hyperbole  
(10) Bring some more ice, this whisky is boiling hot     
 
13 cases of metaphor and hyperbole combined 
(11) This summer is promising to be long and boiling    
 
and 31 cases of synecdoche 
(12) a. You're changing small things like boiling a kettle…   
         
In all three searches (‘raw’, ‘painless’ and ‘boiling’) we found ourselves puzzled 
by the elusiveness of literal meaning: we embarked on each search with what 
we believed at the time were strong intuitions about the literal meaning of the 
given word-set, but before long, these very intuitions started to tremble under the 
weight of the extremely diverse, thoroughly context-sensitive and remarkably 
creative facts of language use. 
 
 
The  literary  world  has  been  focused  on  the  coded  aspects  of  linguistic 
communication for too long, and has thus failed to grasp the striking richness and 
sophistication of what language can be used to communicate. That is not to say that 
linguistic communication does not also present the mind -either folk or literary- with 
stifling  limitations;  the  chapters  to  follow  will  try  to  account  for  some  of  the 
legitimate reasons for this dissatisfaction with language, with particular emphasis on 
the  literary  mind.  Still,  things  are  not  remotely  as  bleak  as  the  semiotic  and  
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behaviouristic  legacy  has  led  us  to  believe.  Note,  for  instance,  how  the  two 
fundamental conditions for linguistic communication to be regarded as adequate in 
the semiotic sense (that is,: i) sentences should capture mental representations in their 
entirety, so that there is a 1:1 coding relationship between a sentence and a mental 
representation, and ii) every thought, in either the narrow sense of a proposition plus a 
propositional  attitude  or  the  broader  sense  of  a  mental  representation,  should  be 
*encodable* by some natural language sentence) are being radically altered in the 
inferential pragmatic model. Moreover, both radical alterations make it possible to 
take a more optimistic view of the expressive capacities of language: 
 
i) the relationship between sentences and the thoughts they are used to convey is not 
1:1, as semiotic accounts assumed, but 1: many. The gap between the two is bridged 
by a flexible, context-dependent inferential process: 
 
      Thought A 
Sentence A     Thought B 
      Thought n… 
 
The same goes for words: 
 
Concept A 
Word A    Concept B 
      Concept n… 
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This view radically loosens the rigidity of the semiotic model and makes room within 
a theory of linguistic communication for the plasticity and creativity of the human 
mind and the richness of its representations. 
 
ii) with the relationship between sentences and thoughts being 1 : many, and with 
thoughts not being seen as encoded by the sentence itself but as contextually inferred 
from an utterance of the sentence, it follows that it is not the role of sentences to 
capture thoughts in their totality. The role of sentences is to provide evidence that a 
hearer’s  mind  can  use  as  starting  point  in  an  inferential  process  of  interpretation 
(Sperber and  Wilson  1995). Transferred to word level, the story  goes  as follows: 
words  may  encode  concepts,  but  they  do  not  necessarily  communicate  on  every 
occasion of use the concept they encode; rather, they provide flexible access to fine-
tuned occasion-specific concepts in a context-sensitive way (Wilson 2003; Wilson 
and Carston 2007). 
The  cognitive  pragmatic  view  is  again  a  turn  towards  a  more  optimistic 
position. First, its psychologistic/ mentalistic approach allows us to acknowledge the 
infinite range and striking wealth of fine-tuned thoughts communicated by use of a 
finite set of words and sentences. At the same time, it significantly expands the set of 
thoughts that language can be used to express: there is a much wider set of thoughts 
that can be inferentially conveyed than can be encoded in language. Or, to put the 
same point in a different way: along with the set of thoughts that can be expressed by 
being  linguistically  encoded,  there  is  a  much  wider  set  of  thoughts  that  can  be 
expressed by being inferentially conveyed. 
By  bringing  the  Mind  into  the  picture  and  accounting  for  introspective/ 
psychological  evidence  that  is  integral  to  linguistic  communication,  (cognitive) 
pragmatics has brought us to the end of this chapter with an air of linguistic optimism.  
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This optimistic breeze is necessary if this analysis is to be built on a sound underlying 
structure.  It  is  also  necessary  because  it  exposes  the  epistemic,  sociological  and 
therefore in some way institutional origins of linguistic pessimism.  
In the next chapter, we shall turn to the Mind once again; this time to explore 
and account for whatever justification linguistic pessimism may deserve. Only a small 
amount of linguistic pessimism can be accounted for as a backward effect of semiotic 
and  behaviourist  theoretical  models  on  the  way  poets  evaluate  introspective  data. 
Empirical facts such as the major role of phenomenal -i.e. perceptual as opposed to 
conceptual-  representations  in  the  human  mental  tapestry,  and  the  expressive 
difficulties that seem inextricably bound up with them, force us to acknowledge that 
linguistic pessimism is to some extent justified, and to accept the relative ineffability -
even  in  the  weaker  of  the  two  senses  discussed  above-  of  at  least  some  of  our 
thoughts.  I  shall  start  from  an  example  based  on  kinaesthetic  representations  -i.e. 
representations  involving  bodily  posture  and  movement-  and  then  generalise  the 
discussion by suggesting that all perceptual/ phenomenal representations, being rich 
and complex informational states, test our expressive capacities to the limit. Linking 
the modernist poet’s discontent with language to the ineffability of phenomenal states, 
I  argue  that  such  states  may  be  more  pervasive  than  is  sometimes  thought.  In 
developing these ideas, I consider whether perceptual states are associated only with 
certain  sorts  of  concepts,  distinguish  between  two  different  types  of  phenomenal 
qualia -one associated with objects, events or states in the world, and the other with 
words or other linguistic expressions- and, finally, use a list-poem to show that even 
proper names, whose primary function is referential, can give access to phenomenal 
states.  
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Chapter 3 
The curse of the phenomenal: a case from Kinaesthesia 
 
3.1. Kinaesthesia: a case study  
‘Solo’ is a study in improvised movement danced and choreographed by William 
Forsythe and celebrated mainly for its idiosyncratic and peculiar gestures.  
For the sake of argument, let us consider a slightly odd scenario: imagine that 
you are given a 5 second sequence from ‘Solo’ and asked to produce as accurate a 
verbal description as possible of what you see. You are even told that in the room next 
door a dancer will be listening to what you say and will try to perform the ‘Solo’ 
sequence on the basis of your description alone. You have no visual contact with the 
dancer and hence cannot make corrections based on how your instructions are being 
followed. You need to make your instructions so clear and precise in the first place 
that the resulting dance sequence is almost identical to the one from ‘Solo’. 
If the task doesn’t sound bewildering enough to make you opt out from the 
start, you are first likely to realise that 5 seconds of real time can accommodate a 
rather long stream of bodily movement. You might then consider breaking down this 
stream into individual instances -only to find that describing posture is no easier a task 
itself.  Even  the  crudest  static  visual  representations  are  in  fact  very  complex 
informational states. On the simple business of what it means to see a floor tile as 
‘square’
21, Evans (1985: 392) writes:  
 
                                                
21  The  word  ‘square’  is  intended  here  to  represent  a  shape  that  a  subject  can  identify 
perceptually without being aware of the geometric definition.  
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To  have  the  visual  experience  of  four  points  of  light  arranged  in  a  square 
amounts to no more than being in a complex informational state which embodies 
information about the egocentric location of those lights. 
 
Bodily posture is a complex configuration of many concurrent ‘goings on’. Its 
informational complexity -so simple to perceive and represent visually- is felt more 
when trying to render it in a conceptual system like language. What in vision is sub-
attentively perceived, in language would have to be first brought to attention and 
consciousness.
22 What in vision is automatically fixed in space through an egocentric 
map of spatial reference points, in a linguistic description would have to go through a 
complex process of labelling -where origins/ starting points, references and axes must 
be  explicitly  determined.  What  in  vision  is  instantaneous  and  concurrent,  in  a 
linguistic description would inevitably take sequential form.  
So here you are, having to observe the intricate configuration of the many 
‘goings  on’  that  make  up  bodily  posture,  possibly  describe  each  ‘going  on’ 
individually, show in what way each ‘going on’ relates to some other ‘going on’ -e.g. 
position of the head in relation to the torso- and how they all hang together as a 
whole. And without exaggeration your pains are only just beginning.  
You will stumble upon movements or body parts you never realised you don’t 
have  vocabulary  for.  You  will  quickly  write  off  easily  accessible  but  sketchy 
descriptions of the sort ‘the head leans towards the back’ or ‘hands and arms face 
                                                
22 As Heil (1991: 10) suggests in passing, while gazing at our surroundings, we are, in some 
sense, aware of far more than we recognise or bother to identify. Much of what constitutes the 
mental representation of a perceived object might not be consciously attended. Along the 
same lines, Crane (1992: 138-139) points out: ‘(…) there are [also] the states of the so-called 
“sub-personal” computational systems like the visual system, but whose content is not (…) 
phenomenologically  salient’.  Finally,  Colin  Mc  Ginn  (1989:  163)  labels  non-conceptual 
mental content ‘subpersonal content’: ‘the kind of content routinely attributed by cognitive 
scientists to information processing systems of which the subject has no awareness’ (quoted 
from Crane 1992).   
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forward’, seeing the indefinite number of ways in which they could be physically 
realised.  
As you stretch your inventiveness to the limit to improvise literal descriptive 
strategies  and  show  where  each  body  part  rests  or  how  it  moves  in  space,  you 
automatically also resort to figurative ways of spelling out what you see. Just like 
your once-upon-a-time ballet teacher who used to say things like ‘Girls! Toes in the 
pond’  instead  of  attempting  a  literal  description.  But  you  are  soon  to  find  that 
figurative language leads by different means to the same result.  
Although figures often come so much more easily to mouth -in our everyday 
verbal  give-and-take  we  readily  prefer  them  to  literal  language  when  it  comes  to 
conveying our perceptual experiences
23- they bring troubles of their own. (For some, 
the story so far might feel like a journey from the commonplace to the banal, but 
some things need spelling out for the sake of discussion.) 
‘Toes in the pond’ and other figurative descriptions represent an intelligent 
move, by an intelligent organism who is thus able to bypass very complex literal 
alternatives.  But  while  they  seem  just  right  for  a  multitude  of  communicative 
occasions, on others -like the odd one we are imagining- they simply do not achieve 
the desired levels of accuracy. Or when they do, they seem to have done so at the 
expense of large investments of creativity, time and mental energy.  
Also, the very mechanics of figurative language at times makes it an even 
more  dubious  solution.  Figures  rely  heavily  on  existing  background  experience, 
entailing -at the least- that for a figurative expression to succeed, interlocutors often 
                                                
23 For instance, we naturally  and  spontaneously  come  up  with expressions like ‘the  cash 
machine spat out the card’, whose perceptual force is very difficult to capture in literal terms. 
Cristina Cacciari in ‘Why do we speak metaphorically? Reflections in thought and language’ 
(1998) and Adrian Pilkington in ‘Non-lexicalised concepts and degrees of effability: poetic 
thoughts  and  the  attraction  of  what  is  not  in  the  dictionary’  (2001)  offer  an  interesting 
perspective on the interconnections between perceptual states and figurative language.   
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need a degree of shared background resources that might not be readily available. 
Ultimately, a representation can be so unusual or idiosyncratic that no matter how 
much we stretch our creativity and imagination, no matter how thoroughly we sieve 
our  background  in  search  of  that  valuable  piece  of  relevant  information,  we  still 
consistently fail to find a satisfactory figurative way of conveying it. 
Before the invention of the video camera, modern choreographers had little 
choice  but  to  resort  to  an  intricate  type  of  notation  known  as  labanotation:  a 
stenographic language in which they hoped to code their choreographies and make 
them  available  to  others.  It  is  astonishing  to  see  that  in  the  formal  system  of 
labanotation,  a  relatively  uncomplicated  initial  position  with  just  a  single  motor 
departure  from  it  could  easily  devour  pages  and  pages  of  absurdly  tortuous 
description. Such a representation would take roughly the following form:  
 
Description of: 
Initial position of the head with regard to vertical and horizontal planes 
Initial position of upper back, shoulders and chest with regard to vertical and 
horizontal planes  
Initial position of lower back with regard to vertical and horizontal planes 
Initial position of upper and lower arm with regard to vertical and horizontal 
planes  
Initial position of hands with regard to vertical and horizontal planes 
Position of legs and feet with regard to vertical and horizontal planes 
Relative position of each body member with regard to the rest to compose the 
overall design of initial body position 
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Then a similar set of descriptions would be used for every single departure from the 
initial position. The more complex the intended design, the more parameters -such as 
additional spatial reference points- had to be introduced; the parametric system was 
thus open-ended and could expand ad infinitum. Complex movements that involved 
more  than  a  simple  departure  from  horizontal  and  vertical  planes  could  not  be 
represented at all without being radically underdetermined by the representation used. 
 
3.2. The curse of the phenomenal 
As humans, we have the ability to entertain mentally, recall from memory, track in 
our  immediate  physical surroundings or assemble from scratch  in imagination the 
most refined phenomenal representations.
24 
It  might  be  odd  to  quote  a  philosopher  who  contemplates  the  possible 
redundancy of the phenomenal altogether, but this following paragraph by John Heil 
nicely serves my discussion. Heil writes:  
 
Philosophers cut their teeth on talk about perceptual experiences. Seeing, hearing, 
tasting, smelling, and touching things is, we are taught, a matter of our having 
experiences of those things. (…) Experiences are of objects and events, particulars 
and particular goings-on, not facts. And experiences are, or often are, in some 
degree, conscious. 
 
That we have perceptual experiences with these characteristics is widely assumed, 
hence  rarely  defended.  The  attitude  is  one  inherited  from  Locke:  ‘What 
[perceptual experience] is every one will know better by reflecting on what he 
does  himself  when  he  sees,  hears,  feels,  etc.  than  by  any  discourse  of  mine. 
Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it: and if he does 
not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it’. 
(Locke [1690] 1979, book II, Chapter 8, section 2, p. 143) 
 
                                                
24 I use the broader term ‘phenomenal’ rather than the narrower ‘perceptual’ to refer not only 
to states associated with the senses but also to emotions. Strictly speaking, emotions are not 
perceptual states -with perceptual states defined as states that give information about distal 
objects; emotions are responses to the world rather than perceptions of it. My use of the term 
‘phenomenal’, then, stands for every non-conceptual representation that the human mind can 
potentially entertain and covers both the categories of ‘perceptual’ and ‘emotional’.   
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Indeed in considering the matter, one may feel a certain sense of foreboding. Like 
time,  perceptual  experience  is  something  we  have  a  grip  on  so  long  as  we 
postpone thinking about it. It is only after we trouble to reflect on the topic that it 
loses its obviousness. (1991: 1) 
 
 
Or, so long as we postpone talking about it, one could legitimately add.  
Our private mental lives are teeming with images, sensations, smells, sounds, 
textures; and yet for some reason, more often than not, the attempt to communicate 
even the most elementary of them proves overwhelming. From this standpoint, the 
‘discontent  with  language’  (Waldrop  1971)  that  characterised  most  20
th  century 
literary theory seems neither  unjustified nor  absurd. It might not be the  case that 
language
25 is ‘inadequate’ tout court. As noted in Chapter 2, such extreme romantic 
views  were  largely  side-effects  of  traditional  semiotic  theory,  a  pragmatically 
unsophisticated programme that dominated literary study for much of the last century, 
and which more or less reduced the richness of linguistic communication to the code 
alone.  
Dismissing language in its entirety is as crude as accepting it in its entirety. As 
Dan Sperber suggested to me at a recent conference (P.C. July 2005, International 
Workshop on Word Meaning, Concepts and Communication’, Cumberland Lodge, 
London’,) , the amazing fact about language is not what we cannot express by it but 
what we can, the astonishing range of thoughts that we can make available to others 
because  we  have  language.  We  wouldn’t  want  to  deny  that  language  performs 
                                                
25 Allow me to speak of ‘language’ here -since this is the term used in traditional literary 
theory- but use it to denote something much broader than the code alone. In using the term 
‘language’,  I  actually  refer  to  linguistic  communication,  which  -taking  into  account  the 
Relevance-theoretic programme (Sperber and Wilson 1995, Carston 2002)- involves not only 
a  linguistic  code  but  also  pervasive  and  diverse  pragmatic  processes.  At  the  time  when 
traditional literary theory was developing, the discipline of pragmatics hadn’t been invented 
yet. So, in line with the then dominant semiotic model of communication, literary theorists of 
the  time  assumed  that  language  (in  the  sense  of  the  linguistic  code)  is  all  that  linguistic 
communication involves. I am sure that if they were around today, they would also adhere to 
a pragmatically enriched view of linguistic communication.   
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exceptionally  well  in  many  areas:  in  simple  scene  descriptions,  for  instance, 
instructions for achieving goals, complex logical arguments and long trains of abstract 
thought. A ‘defence of language’ is redundant because language does not need to be 
defended. But would we want to discount the possibility that in some other areas 
language doesn’t really make the grade? All one has to do is focus on the right set of 
phenomena and the business of publicly expressing what is privately present in our 
minds will begin to appear less and less straightforward. 
In this sense, representations of bodily posture and movement -let me refer to 
them  from  now  on  as kinaesthetic  -are  not  special.  They  are just  one  amongst  a 
number  of  different  phenomena  whose  common  thread  is  that  they  bring  out  an 
incompatibility between our mental lives and our expressive capacities.  
In the OED, ‘kinaesthesia’ is defined as ‘the sense of muscular effort that 
accompanies a voluntary motion of the body’. It is thus standardly understood as the 
(internal) sense  of one’s own body’s disposition in  space. I am not certain about 
whether  ‘kinaesthesia’  is  the  most  appropriate  term  for  the  kind  of  mental 
representation I have in mind, but I shall stick with it until I find a more appropriate 
term. In using the term, I am interested in both the (internal) sense of one’s own 
body’s  disposition  in  space  and  the  (external)  description  of  the  disposition  of 
someone else’s body in space. In the former sense, my understanding of ‘kinaesthesia’ 
is very close to what Martin (Sight and Touch, in Crane 1992: 201) refers to as body-
awareness:  
 
In talking about bodily awareness, or body sense, I mean to group together some of the 
various ways in which we are aware of our own bodies. At present I am aware of 
my posture, orientation in space, the position of my limbs; I have some sense of the 
shape and size of my body, and within and on it I am aware of various goings on - 
itches, aches, patches of warmth. What is interesting about these kinds of ways of  
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being aware of oneself as opposed to seeing, hearing or touching oneself is that one is 
aware of one's body in a way that one is aware of nothing else in the world. One 
might grandly say that the world of bodily awareness is restricted to one's own body. 
But there is an important sense for us in which that is false: in our awareness of 
ourselves we are aware of ourselves as being an object in a world which potentially 
can contain many other objects. We are aware of ourselves as bounded and limited 
within a world that extends beyond us.  
One's own body is the proper object of such awareness in that anything which 
one feels in this way is taken to be part of one's body. There is no case, for instance, 
of feeling someone's legs to be crossed and then determining from how it feels 
whether the legs are one's own or someone else's. What marks out a felt limb as one's 
own is not some special quality that it has, but simply that one feels it in this way. 
Likewise when one feels a bodily sensation to have a location there is no issue over 
whose body it appears to belong to (see O'Shaughnessy 1980, volume 1, p. 162). Rather 
in as much as it feels to have a location, it feels to be within one's own body. 
 
 
Internal and external body-awareness must be somehow interconnected. Our 
sense of our body’s disposition in space can be combined with an imagined visual 
projection of what our bodily disposition possibly looks like externally. Our external 
perception of the disposition of someone else’s body in space can be combined with 
an imagined sense of what this disposition would feel like if experienced internally. In 
other words, we know what it must feel like when we see a body somehow disposed 
in space and we also know what it must look like when we feel our body somehow 
disposed in space. Kinaesthesia need not operate only on representations of human 
bodily movement. We can project our own body awareness upon anything that has a 
‘body’ even in a broad sense: animals, robots, machines. Finally, inclusion of facial 
expression in  kinaesthetic representations seems  to me rather  important, since the 
interaction between face and body plays a decisive part in perceiving or rendering 
expression.  Bodily  movement  underpins  facial  expression  and  facial  movement 
underpins bodily expression. 
Kinaesthesia is quite widespread in our mental tapestry, often fused with other 
representations that  wouldn’t strike us as  kinaesthetic in the first place.  And  it  is 
possible that the particular makeup of kinaesthetic representations -i.e. the articulation  
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of  representations  of three dimensional posture and movement of  individual  body 
parts, including facial expression- might make it rather easier to pin down and peel 
apart  some of the  problems  phenomenal  states pose for our expressive repertoire. 
However, one could take as a starting point for reflection any other of the fine range 
of  phenomenal  states  the  mind  can  be  in,  as  it  is  a  rather  generic  fact  about 
communication that, when the phenomenal element becomes the focus of attention in 
a communicative situation, language is bound to stumble. 
Perhaps some intuition that our expressive capacities fall terribly short when it 
comes to linguistically conveying phenomenal states prevents us from stepping into 
this area in most communicative situations. And this isn’t just a question of a certain 
speaker in a certain context not being able to convey linguistically some phenomenal 
state, but rather an issue of whether any speaker in any context and at any time would 
be able to convey this phenomenal state. 
The ‘no go area’ is skilfully bypassed with manoeuvres such as ‘I have no 
words to express how I felt…’, ‘words cannot describe the experience of…’ or ‘you 
should  have  seen  his  face  when…’,  where  the  existence  of  some  noteworthy 
perceptual state is suggested but we never get to find out how the speaker ‘felt’, what 
the  ‘experience’  was  like  and  why  all  the  fuss  with  that  undescribed  ‘facial 
expression’.  
Mimicry  is certainly  another  manoeuvre  that allows  one to convey  certain 
types of perceptual states through something akin to direct quotation, while avoiding 
the  hassles  of  linguistic  description.  At  a  recent  conference  on  metaphor,  the 
psychologist Ray Gibbs set  out to explain the origin  of the  idiom ‘he  kicked the 
bucket’. The idiom is often seen as deriving from the context of slaughterhouses. 
Gibbs explains that, as the pigs are dying hanging upside down with their throats slit,  
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they often kick the bucket that is there to gather their blood. But this verb ‘kicks’ feels 
somewhat vague for the purposes of his story -it doesn’t capture, for instance, the 
involuntariness of the movement in question, and Gibbs surely doesn’t want us to 
visualise the pig kicking the bucket as in ‘Beckham kicks the ball’. Instead of verbally 
narrowing the manner of the action, Gibbs tilts his head sideways, lifts his right arm 
with the hand in a released position and mimics the involuntary spasmic movement of 
the dying pig. 
Our pragmatic ability enables us to readily draw on our background and depict 
an action in the relevant way in our mentalese, when interpreting uses of common 
verbs  in  different  contexts:  e.g.  ‘open  the  window’  vs  ‘open  the  mouth’  (Searle 
1983:145; Sperber and Wilson 1998; Carston 2002: 64-65). Supplying manner in this 
sense does not require explicit linguistic description. The information needed is so 
generic  in  human  experience  that  the  recipient  of  these  utterances  will  almost 
certainly fish out from their background the right way of mentally representing the act 
of opening.  
In other cases, though, it seems more appropriate to provide explicit linguistic 
clues about the manner of an action. Our background is highly unlikely to contain 
representations  of  how  dying  pigs  kick  buckets.  We  may  as  well  prove  able  to 
improvise the necessary manner by stitching together fragments of information from 
various other areas of our existing experience. But if the speaker wants to increase the 
probability of our representation not going completely astray, it is good to supply 
further clues.  
And of course, manner is not a single-stratum story. In an expression such as 
‘he opened the window as you open an old wound’ there is an evident stratification of 
manner embedded within manner. (So, he opened the window in the way we open  
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windows, not mouths. Then, he apparently opened the window in a particular way; the 
way we open an old wound. And one opens old wounds in the way we open wounds, 
not  windows!)  As  the  stratification  increases  and  manner  becomes  more 
particularised, explicit description of some sort seems all the more necessary. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  when  no  manoeuvre  comes  easily  to  mind  and 
circumstances leave no option but to step into the dreaded zone, we almost always 
produce descriptions that grossly understate the facts. In a BBC documentary about 
the 7/7 London bombings, a man recounts the horrific moments after the subway 
blasts. He recalls how in pitch dark he sensed the body of a woman who had landed 
on his legs twitching from pain. The twitching goes on for some time and then stops. 
To his horror, he gathers that the injured woman must have passed away. ‘What was 
that like?’ the interviewer asks (foolishly). The man looks stunned and stays silent for 
a few seconds: ‘It was gross’ he mumbles.  
 
3.3. More thoughts on the curse 
In the usual affair of human language, a spilt coffee is ‘gross’, the sight of vomiting is 
‘gross’ and a woman dying on you is also ‘gross’.  
In  the  last  decade,  ground  breaking  theory  in  the  relatively  new  field  of 
Lexical Pragmatics (Sperber & Wilson 1998, Carston 2002, Wilson 2003, Wilson & 
Carston 2006, 2007) has put forward compelling arguments that, well… things are not 
as bad as they appear at first sight. A fundamental assumption in Lexical Pragmatics 
is that there is a gap between the concept a word in the public lexicon encodes and the 
concept this word is used to communicate in specific contexts.   
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In the new light of lexical-pragmatic theory, the relationship between concepts 
encoded by words and the concepts these words are used to communicate is neither 
fixed nor inflexible. A word is no more than a clue to the speaker’s meaning. Thus, 
the rigid one-to-one relationship between a signified and a signifier is replaced by the 
plasticity of a one-to-many relationship between what a word standardly encodes and 
what the speaker uses it to communicate in specific contexts. 
This  way,  lexical-pragmatic  theory  accommodates  the  compelling 
psycholinguistic evidence that the human mind has the ability to construct concepts 
on the spot by tracking subtle differences across and within contexts (Barsalou 1987). 
On  hearing  an  utterance,  the  mind  takes  the  discourse  context  and  the  speaker’s 
intentions into account and each time tailors and slightly fine-tunes ex impromptu our 
mental representation of the category of objects a word is used to pick out. Our mental 
representation of the category picked out by ‘bird’ is differently tailored in:  
 
  (1)   As I worked in the garden, a bird perched on my spade. 
  (2)   Birds wheeled above the waves. 
  (3)   At Christmas, the bird was delicious.
 26 
 
Would  you  be  comfortable  with  the  claim  that  what  the  utterer  of  (3)  ate  for 
Christmas is likely to be the same kind of bird that the utterer of (1) saw perching on 
her spade? Unbeknownst to us, in hearing each of these utterances, our mind has 
narrowed the category BIRD to something far more specific; it has allowed certain 
kinds of bird as candidate referents and eliminated others. 
                                                
26 The examples are taken from Deirdre Wilson’s lectures on Lexical Pragmatics at UCL.  
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And if you were hasty enough to think that such ad hoc fine-tunings would not 
appear if the discourse context remained constant, observe how your interpretation of 
‘red’ changes in the following examples that we briefly looked at in the previous 
chapter, and in which the context for ‘red’ is always ‘eyes’: 
 
  (4)  …red eyes denote strain and fatigue. 
  (5)   This flashing light is to stop you getting red eyes in the photos. 
  (6)   …two red eyes she recalled burning from anger.
27     
 
How is that relevant to our discussion? Well, since lexical-pragmatic processes allow 
the same word to recur in different contexts and communicate rather different things, 
so that in each of our previous examples the word ‘bird’ is used to communicate the 
slightly different concepts BIRD*, BIRD**, BIRD***, then we could maybe resolve 
the problem of a spilt coffee being ‘gross’, the sight of vomiting being ‘gross’ and a 
woman dying on you also being ‘gross’, by suggesting that in each of these cases the 
word ‘gross’ is differently fine-tuned and is thus used to communicate quite distinct 
concepts GROSS*, GROSS**, GROSS***.  
‘Gross’ might indeed be used to communicate quite different concepts in each 
case, but the problem still persists: the gap between BIRD (i.e. the concept encoded 
by ‘bird’) and BIRD*, or BIRD**, is a gap in a fairly minimal sense. By ‘fairly 
minimal  sense’,  I  mean  that  in  an  utterance  of  (3)  (‘At  Christmas,  the  bird  was 
delicious’),
 the mention of Christmas and of the bird’s being edible and delicious 
                                                
27 A gripping and diverse range of examples of the latter sort have now allowed lexical-
pragmatic theory to challenge recent ‘default approaches’ to lexical meaning (Lascarides and 
Copestake 1998, Levinson 2000: 37-8, 112-34) which claim that the one-to-many relationship 
between the concept a word standardly encodes and how this concept is eventually narrowed 
in  specific  contexts  is  mediated  by  sets  of  default  rules  and  passes  through  default 
narrowings, which may then be overridden.   
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provides  sufficient  evidence  to  justify  the  fine  tuning  of  BIRD  to  BIRD*,  where 
BIRD* is the type of bird that we normally find at the Christmas table in the Western 
world.  Similarly,  the  fine-tuning  of  GROSS  to  GROSS*  and  GROSS**,  where 
GROSS* and GROSS** denote the particular ways in which the sight of a spilt coffee 
or vomiting are unpleasant, is also a move in a fairly minimal sense.
28 
But  what  context  could  ever  enable  a  leap  from  GROSS  to  the  complex 
emotional, mental and experiential states involved in seeing a woman dying the way 
this woman was dying? The choice of wording seems so inadequate that no ordinary 
form of bridging between encoded and communicated concepts can justify it. And if 
that  is  so,  then  the  question  remains:  why  is  it  that,  when  trying  to  muse  over 
experiential states, we so often and so easily see our words lose their adequacy?  
Philosophy  of  language  and  linguistics  have  always  agreed  that  perceptual 
qualia  need  special  treatment  as  an  exception  to  the  claim  that  whatever  can  be 
thought can be expressed in language, and in the main, the existence of such qualia is 
pretty uncontroversial.
29 (For relevant discussion, see Carston 2002: 32-37, 79-80.)  
To start with, one could group the various sub-problems that have been seen as 
associated  with  the  communication  of  perceptual  experience  under  a  single, 
superordinate  heading.  The  philosopher  Fred  Dretske  lends  us  an  illuminating 
metaphor: 
 
                                                
28  However,  Sperber  and  Wilson  would  say  that,  in  virtually  ANY  lexical  narrowing  or 
broadening, a degree of weakness in communication is introduced: there’s never a guarantee 
that  speaker  and  hearer  will  arrive  at  exactly  the  same  concept,  let  alone  the  same 
implications. 
29 Although there are different views on this too. The philosopher Michael Tye (2006 and the 
forthcoming paper ‘New troubles for the qualia freak’; also in Crane 1992: 158-176), for 
instance, has produced an array of philosophical arguments against the existence of visual -
and, ultimately, all perceptual- qualia.  
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I will say that a signal (structure, event, state) carries the information that s is F 
in digital form if and only if the signal carries no additional information about s, 
no information that is not already nested in s's being F. If the signal does carry 
additional information about s, information that is not nested in s's being F, then I 
shall say that the signal carries this information in analog form. (…) 
 
To illustrate the way this distinction applies, consider the difference between a 
picture  and  a  statement.  Suppose  a  cup  has  coffee  in  it,  and  we  want  to 
communicate this piece of information. If I simply tell you, ‘The cup has coffee 
in it’ this acoustic signal carries the information that the cup has coffee in it in 
digital form. No more specific information is supplied about the cup (or the 
coffee) than that there is some coffee in the cup. You are not told how much 
coffee there is in the cup, how large the cup is, how dark the coffee is, what the 
shape and orientation of the cup are, and so on. If, on the other hand, I photograph 
the scene and show you the picture, the information that the cup has coffee in it is 
conveyed in analog form. The picture tells you that there is some coffee in the cup 
by telling you, roughly, how much coffee is in the cup, the shape, size, and color 
of the cup, and so on.  
 
I can say that A and B are of different size without saying how much they differ in 
size or which is larger, but I cannot picture A and B as being of different size 
without picturing one of them as larger and indicating, roughly, how much larger it 
is. (…) 
 
As indicated,  a signal carrying information  in analog  form will always carry 
some information in digital form. A sentence expressing all the information a 
signal carries will be a sentence expressing the information the signal carries in 
digital form (since this will be the most specific, most determinate, piece of informa-
tion  the  signal  carries).  This  is  true  of  pictures  as  well  as  other  analog 
representations. The information a picture carries in digital form can be rendered 
only  by  some  enormously  complex  sentence,  a  sentence  that  describes  every 
detail of the situation about which the picture carries information. To say that a 
picture  is  worth  a  thousand  words  is  merely  to  acknowledge  that,  for  most 
pictures at least, the sentence needed to express all the information contained in 
the picture would have to be very complex indeed. Most pictures have a wealth 
of detail, and a degree of specificity, that makes it all but impossible to provide 
even an approximate linguistic rendition of the information the picture carries in 
digital form. Typically, when we describe the information conveyed by a picture, 
we are describing the information the picture carries in analog form -abstracting, 
as it were, from its more concrete embodiment in the picture. (…)  
 
To describe a process in which a piece of information is converted from analog 
to  digital  form  is  to  describe  a  process  that  necessarily  involves  the  loss  of 
information (1999: 137-141).  
 
 
This passage squarely explains the problems raised by the case-study with 
which I chose to begin this chapter. It also explains the distress we feel at our failure  
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to convey our experiences fully when attempting to speak out phenomenal aspects of 
our thoughts. And strictly speaking, this failure shouldn’t be seen as a problem for 
language, any more than it is seen as a problem for perception.  
As  the  philosopher  of  language  François  Recanati  suggested  at  a  recent 
conference  (‘International  Workshop  in  Lexical  Pragmatics,  Cumberland  Lodge, 
London, 2005) it is rather a contingent fact that we find it so difficult sometimes to 
share and convey perceptual experience. If there was, for instance, a device that could 
allow us to connect our brain with that of a fellow human so that we would be able to 
‘see’ exactly what they ‘see’ and ‘feel’ exactly what they ‘feel’, none of the hassles of 
perceptual expressibility would arise. The problems begin when we try to translate 
perceptual representations into a different type of representation -conceptual, that is-, 
or analogue into digital streams in the Dretskian sense. That is not something we 
should charge language with or treat as a deficit of language.
30  
Indeed, a problem which arises out of the relationship between two systems is 
no more a problem for the one system per se than it is for the other. Hence, instead of 
accusing language of ‘inadequacy’, one could as well have accused perception of 
being inadequate to be put into words. (Let us move on quickly before we sink too 
deep into such vicious circles.) 
 
3.4. The reach of the phenomenal. How far does the curse go? 
In  the  last  decade,  the  work  of  Adrian  Pilkington  (2000,  2001)  has  brought 
phenomenal states into focus and led the way in exploring how they might relate not 
only to questions of expressibility but also to questions of what he refers to as ‘poetic 
                                                
30 My rough expression of Recanati’s proposals.  
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thought’. The questions Pilkington touches on are of huge importance for poetics and 
literary  theory.  They  ought  therefore  to  be  explored  further  and  pursued  in  great 
depth.  
In  his  paper  ‘Non-lexicalised  concepts  and  degrees  of  effability:  poetic 
thoughts and the attraction of what is not in the dictionary’, Pilkington (2001) seems 
well aware of the fact that some concepts -and consequently the thoughts that contain 
them- are relatively ineffable; and he totally hits the nail on the head in arguing that 
their  relative  ineffability  is  the  result  of  their  carrying  a  significant  phenomenal 
freight. The question I want to consider here is about the scope of the phenomenal in 
our  mental  tapestry.  Is  it  pervasive  throughout  our  conceptual  repertoire,  or  is  it 
perhaps specific to a certain range of concepts?   
Any thought about any object can involve an element of mode or manner in 
the way it is mentally represented: not simply ‘sad’ but sad in a particular manner X, 
not simply ‘flex’ but flex in a certain way Y, not merely ‘a breeze’ but a breeze that 
feels like this, and so on and so forth. The presence of some mode in a thought about 
an object may amongst other things indicate that the thought has to varied extents 
been infused with phenomenal matter. It isn’t, strictly speaking, that the narrower 
concept  is  necessarily  more  perceptual  than  the  broader  one;  it  is  rather  that  the 
layering  of  many  manner  descriptions  sometimes  makes  it  easier  to  evoke  a 
perceptual image. 
If any thought about any object, if any conceptual representation, can involve 
modes  linked  to  phenomenal  states  and  other  private  elements,  then  treating  the 
phenomenal as associated only with certain types of conceptual representations -e.g. 
colour terms, terms for shapes, movements, etc- would hugely understate the intensity  
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and scope of the issue, by mistakenly portraying the expressive problems associated 
with phenomena as specific and restricted to a limited set of our thoughts. 
The idea that some concepts are more closely related to perception has some 
immediate appeal. ΒLUE is, of course, immediately linked to perception in a way 
BIRD isn’t. Still, BIRD can at any time be entertained in a private, de re modality and 
our  encyclopaedic  entry  for  it  is  bound  to  involve  a  rich  cargo  of  phenomenal 
information: ‘it feels [x]’, ‘it looks like [y]’, ‘it gives one an [z] sensation’ and the 
like: 
 
Encyclopaedic entry for the concept BIRD involves 
 
conceptual information 
(flies, has wings, lays eggs, nests, sings, etc) 
and 
conceptual information with embedded phenomenal information 
(it looks like [x], sounds like [y], feels [z] etc) 
 
In principle, our encyclopaedic entries for any concept, even abstract ones, can 
involve a phenomenal component. Abstract concepts, like BEAUTY, for instance, 
have concrete instances, which are causally linked to phenomenal states, which can 
be remembered and reactivated on future occasions. A concept like ALGORITHM 
might have been associated with memories of physical environments or occasions on 
which the object has been encountered and such memories are also bound amongst 
other things to have phenomenal content.   
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A more plausible idea might therefore be that having causal or associative 
links to phenomenal properties is not the privilege only of certain types of concepts, 
because any concept can potentially evoke perceptual states associated with the object 
this concept picks out. All conceptual representations -and concepts themselves- may 
both evoke perceptual representations and be evoked by them.
31  
That  is  one  side  of  the  coin.  The  other  side  is  the  possibility  that  the 
phenomenal  might  in  fact  be  even  more  widespread  than  that.  Language  has  a 
physical, bodily, articulatory dimension. Every sound or word we utter is the product 
of movement in certain areas -e.g. muscles in the mouth or larynx. Whenever we utter 
a  word,  the  body  experiences  rather  precise  kinaesthetic  activity.  In  parallel, 
utterances of words also have an auditory and visual dimension. And it is very likely 
that  because  of  these  perceptual  aspects  of  word  tokens,  we  sometimes  have  the 
intuition that a certain word ‘feels somehow’ or ‘has a particular texture’ which sets it 
far apart from other words with similar meaning. 
Thus, apart from the phenomena that we associate with concepts or objects per 
se,  there  are  also  the  phenomena  that  we  associate  with the  word(s)  that  express 
concepts  in  some  natural  language.  How  are  the  two  types  of  phenomenon 
interrelated? 
When we speak about a certain word, about, say, ‘bird’ in a metalinguistic 
sense, we certainly do not pick out the set of birds; and knowledge about the word is 
not knowledge about the object. We might know in what contexts the word ‘bird’ first 
                                                
31 There are two distinct ways of thinking of these causal links: (a) there are likely to be direct 
associative links between the concept BIRD and a whole variety of perceptual and emotional 
states; (b) some of these states may become embedded within propositional representations 
and go into the encyclopaedic entry for the concept. There are probably many more direct 
causal  links  than  conceptual/  phenomenal  propositions  in  the  encyclopaedic  entries  for 
objects, and obviously, not all patterns of activation pass through the encyclopaedic entries; 
it’s  just  that  for  some  purposes,  e.g.  when  talking  about  relevance  and  contextual 
implications, we have to assume that some do.  
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occurred, we might be aware of its etymology, its use in the milieu of a certain literary 
figure and so on, but none of this amounts to knowing anything about birds. And the 
converse is also true. The relation between our concept of the word ‘bird’ and our 
concept  BIRD  is  neither  one  of  identity  nor  one  of  containment.  It  is,  therefore, 
reasonable to assume that there should exist separate concepts for words, with their 
own encyclopaedic entries:  
 
Encyclopaedic entry for the concept of the word ‘bird’ involves: 
 
conceptual information 
(e.g. it occurs in such-and-such  literary contexts, it has such-and-such etymological 
origin, it occurs in poetry as a symbol of the poet herself, etc) 
and 
conceptual information with embedded phenomenal/ perceptual information 
(looks like [x],  feels [y], sounds like [z], etc) 
 
And the relation between our concept for the word ‘bird’ and our concept BIRD must 
be one of mutual evocation, or activation: 
 
Concept BIRD 
 
Concept of the word ‘bird’ 
 
As words with no conceptual content can also evoke phenomenal representations, I 
wouldn’t  want  to  say  that  phenomenal  representations  are  essentially  features  of 
concepts rather than words. It is rather that concepts are associated with words via  
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their  linguistic  entries, and  words  evoke  phenomenal  representations in  their  own 
right -as well as through the concepts they convey. 
Before they become associated with any memories or experiences, concepts 
can activate phenomenal representations because of the sensory particularities of the 
words that express them in a given language. It is this, no less important, aspect of the 
phenomenal that Jakobson was essentially referring to in suggesting that the appeal of 
certain phrases owes a lot to the sound patterns they exploit.
32 It is this aspect of the 
phenomenal that poets consistently resort to when in the struggle for precision they 
choose a word not because of what it means, not because of the concepts it is linked 
to, but because of what the word per se ‘feels like’. 
 
3.5. The list-poem: proper names as ‘phenomena’?  
A major achievement of modernist poetry was to draw attention to the pervasiveness 
of the phenomenal in our mental fabric and hint at its importance for both literary and 
everyday linguistic communication.  
The modernist poet was not, of course, interested in sketching a theory of 
concepts. Yet in the broader debate about connotations in relation to inter-personal, 
inter-textual  and  intercultural  reading,  modernists  placed  huge  emphasis  on  the 
different  phenomenal  energies  with  which  a  concept  can  be  charged  through 
individual or collective experience.  
The so-called list-poem -initially invented by Dadaism in an attempt to combat 
traditionalist and conventionalist views of poetry as a genre defined by the presence 
of metre and rhyme, or, more outrageously, by the presence of ‘poetic words and 
                                                
32 As noted in Chapter 8, one of the instances Jakobson used was ‘Veni, vidi, vici’.  
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motifs’: daffodils, mists, sunsets, and other ludicrous such- is no more than what the 
word says: a list of words proclaiming itself as a poem.  
In  due  course,  the  list-poem  technique  was  taken  up  by  various  poets  for 
various purposes. In the ‘Journal of an Unseen April’ Odysseas Elytis produces a part 
list-poem  which  -amongst  other  things-  seems  to  be  commenting  on  the  role 
phenomenal  energies  can  play  in  the  possibility  or  impossibility  of  cross-cultural 
reading. The middle part of the poem is a list of proper names. Some are names of 
historical figures and places associated with critical moments in the 3,000 odd years 
of Greek history. Others are names of everyday people and ordinary places of Elytis’ 
time.  
For the non-Greek reader -or more generally the reader who cannot associate 
the  proper  names  in  question  with  any  memories,  images,  historical  knowledge, 
present  and  past  cultural  experience-  Constantine  Palaeologus,  the  Hellespont  or 
Mastr' Antonis are mere referring expressions (if they are anything at all). They do no 
more than pick out persons or places in the actual world.  
For  the  reader  who  has  the  precious  intra-cultural  experience,  these  same 
names have an extra function added to the referential one, a phenomenal function. 
The  phenomenal function,  the  perceptual  and  emotional  involvement,  that  is,  that 
would potentially characterise the intra-cultural reading, is more likely to be totally 
absent  in  the  cross-cultural  one.  An  involvement  of  this  sort  goes  beyond  purely 
conceptual  encyclopaedic  information  or  historical  awareness;  the  cross-cultural 
reader who knows in theory who these persons and places happened to be, still in the 
main does not have the phenomenal resources for his understanding of these concepts 
to  draw  on.  And  Elytis’  poem  seems  to  suggest  that  engaging  emotionally  and 
perceptually in the act of reading relies precisely on such resources.   
 
 
62   
‘Thursday, 16  
DRIZZLE MEANS SOMETHING to everyone. To me 
nothing. I secured the windows and began calling al-
phabetically: the Angel of Astypalaea; Briseis; Con-
stantine Palaeologus; Crinagoras' servant; Gaugamila; 
the Hellespont; Homer (with his entire Iliad); Ibycus 
(impassioned); Issus; Late; the Libation Bearers; Mastr' 
Antonis; Nicias; Origen; the Pelasgi; Phestos; the Pro-
phet Elijah; Psara; Roxanna; Saint Pelagia's shoal; 
Sthenelai's; Tatavla; Theodorus the martyr from 
Mytilene; and Zagoria. 
I awoke having gone through the history of the Death of 
History or rather the history of the History of Death (and 
this is no play on words)’ (Elytis 1998: 57). 
 
 
Α more mundane example that came up in discussing the matter with Deirdre Wilson  
(P.C. 20.09.05) would be a poem listing the names of famous English cricketers. A 
poem like that might evoke huge emotions in cricket fans but leave others totally cold. 
Of course, this doesn’t show that the phenomenal isn’t expressible at all, but only that 
it isn’t expressible to anyone who hasn’t experienced the appropriate emotions, etc. 
about the appropriate objects. Just as ‘red’ can’t convey a perceptual image to anyone 
who hasn’t experienced it before. 
Obviously, the lack of overlap between interactants need not be of a cultural 
sort. The heteroglossia and dialogical nature of our societies in the Bakhtinian sense 
(Holquist  1981)  that  traditional  literary  theory  and  cultural  studies  so  intensely  
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contemplate  -the  diversity  and  multitude  of  discourses  and  ideologies  which 
individuals are exposed to through social life- and also the heteroglossia of our minds 
and  experiences  makes  it  relatively  easy  to  ponder  and  potentially  attempt  to 
communicate a state, a viewpoint, a particular perception of the world or of an object 
that some other individual hasn’t experienced. Knowing about something in theory 
might facilitate communication, but it is unlikely to replace the engagement that the 
missing experiential state could induce. Through reading, for instance, we know a lot 
about  a  lot.  I  suppose  this  knowledge,  in  conjunction  with  the  human  ability  to 
empathise, allows us some degree of involvement with affairs and events of which we 
do not have phenomenal experiences. A list-poem of proper names that employs such 
references might then be slightly more to one than a meaningless string of referring 
expressions. And at the same time, it would be slightly less than a corresponding 
string of proper names that one could associate with rich phenomenal resources. Here 
are some of mine: 
Constantine Palaeologus: an image of the pilgrims of ‘anastenaria’ dancing on 
burning charcoal and holding icons of the sanctified emperor Constantine the 
Great 
Gaugamila:  a  sculpture  of  Alexander  the  Great  pictured  in  a  high-school 
textbook 
The Hellespont: a certain shot of the Hellespont from the film ‘politiki cuisisne’  
Homer: the first time I was taught Homer at University. My professor reciting the 
beginning  of  the  ‘Odyssey’,  his  voice  echoing  in  the  crowded  but  quiet 
amphitheatre  
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Mastr' Antonis: (strangely) a man wearing a Greek fisherman’s hat  
The Prophet Elijah: the chapel of the prophet at my birthplace 
Zagoria: the mountain of Astraka at dawn as I saw it from my hotel room half 
awake- half asleep. 
 
The phenomenal is not restricted to certain cognitive domains, but is rather 
widespread and pervasive throughout our mental lives. Thus, the challenges for our 
communicative  abilities  seem  to  reach  far  beyond  the  limited  repertoire  of  those 
concepts tightly associated with perception, and rather involve our entire conceptual 
repertoire. It should be reasonably uncontroversial that phenomena put our expressive 
powers to the test. Simple phenomena are in fact complex informational states that 
even the most elaborate sentence, fleshed out by the most elaborate pragmatics, will 
always to some degree understate. Thus, when trying to communicate phenomenal 
states, speakers are, more often than not, likely to see themselves stumble and fall. 
The same goes for poets. But poets cannot afford this fall. They must get up and keep 
on trying. And in this sense, the modernist poet’s persistence in accusing language of 
impotence is at least partially justified.  
 
I  am  entirely  convinced,  however,  that  the  reasons  behind  the  poet’s 
discontent with language go far beyond the universal relationship between analogue 
and digital systems, and are linked to some essential distinctness of the poetic mind 
itself. 
The next chapter starts from the assumption that a certain behaviour is an 
action  when  it  stands  in  the  right  causal  relation  to  an  internal  process,  and  
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particularises it in the following argument: a certain behaviour is art -and the resulting 
object an artwork- when it stands in the right causal relation to a certain internal, and 
more specifically, mental/ psycho-cognitive state. I will call the whole complex state a 
‘poetic thought state’.  
Poetic thought states and the essential distinctness of art as an action provide 
good grounds for expecting linguistic pessimism to be more widespread in the poetic 
mentality  than  the  generic  folk  mentality.  Much  of  the  poet’s  discontent  with 
language  can  therefore  be  seen  as  resulting  from  the  special  demands  that  the 
particular type of creative mental representations (aspectual representations, I will call 
them) involved in art-specific thought states may impose on communication. 
  
 
 
66   
Chapter 4 
Varieties of essentialism in Art 
 
 
4.1. Essentialism and its ethics 
Blaming essentialism for all the mischief it has been used for in human intellectual, 
social  and  ideological  history  -the  repertoire  is  surprisingly  rich  and  ranges  from 
sexism  and  its  doctrines  to  racism  and  its  doctrines-  is  as  wise  and  advisable  as 
blaming the knife for a killing. Essentialism and its ethics are two rather different 
things. Scepticism about the latter cannot legitimately permit dismissal of the former.  
It is accepted practice in philosophy, social science and anthropology to talk 
about kinds, and the fact that some kinds have an essence is fairly uncontroversial. 
These  include  natural  kinds,  which  exist  independently  of  the  human  mind,  and 
nominal  kinds,  whose  essence  we  humans  invent  in  the  form  of  a  definition.  Α 
question that immediately arises is whether artifacts -however they are characterised- 
can also be said to have an essence, and if so, what it is like. Could it be a prototypical 
shape? Or a prototypical function? Or maybe an essential structure or function? Or, 
perhaps, none of these.  
Apart  from  conventions  of  terminology,  the  borders  between  artifacts  and 
natural kinds are anything but sharp. Biological artifacts (Sperber 2003), which have 
both a natural and a cultural dimension, are perhaps the prime examples of fuzziness 
in  the  borderline  between  the  two  categories;  as  Dan  Sperber  (2003:  124)  has 
proposed, ‘the notion of an artifact commonly used in social sciences, particularly in 
archeology and anthropology, is a family resemblance notion, useful for a first-pass 
description  of  various  objects  and  for  vague  characterisation  of  scholarly,  and  in 
particular museographic interests. It should not be taken for granted that this notion  
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could  be  defined  precisely  enough  to  serve  a  genuine  theoretical  purpose’.  The 
following quote from Chomsky (1976: 50-52) is rather revealing about the nature of 
the long-standing debate over essential properties: 
 
To take another case, Kripke suggests that ‘(roughly) being a table seems to be 
an essential property of the table’ (1972: 351), that is, of a particular thing that is 
a table. Exactly what weight is being carried by the qualification ‘(roughly)’ is 
unclear. If we drop the qualification, the proposal can hardly stand. Suppose we 
discover that the designer of this particular object had intended it to be a hard 
bed and that it is so used. Surely we would then say that the thing is not a table 
but a hard bed that looks like a table. But the thing is what it is. Neither a gleam 
in  the  eye  of  the  inventor  nor  general  custom  can  determine  its  essential 
properties, though intention and function are relevant to determining what we 
take an artefact to be. Suppose further that the thing in question is a table nailed 
to the floor. We would be inclined to say that it would have been the same thing 
had it not been nailed to the floor, but it could not have been other than a table. 
Thus it is necessarily a table but only accidentally immovable. Consider now 
another creature with a different language and a different system of common-
sense  understanding,  in  which  such  categories  as  movable-immovable  are 
fundamental,  but  not  function  and  use.  These  creatures  would  say  that  this 
immovable object would have been a different thing had it not been nailed to the 
floor, though it could have been other than a table. To them, immovability would 
appear to be an essential property of the thing, not ‘being a table’. If this is so, a 
property  may  be  essential  or  not,  depending  on  which  creature’s judgements 
prevail. 
 
 
Chomsky’s  argument,  then,  is  that  essentialist  claims  may  reveal  more  about  the 
cognitive systems of those who make them than about the essences of the objects 
described: 
 
We  might  discover  that  humans,  operating  within  cognitive  capacity, will  not 
develop ‘natural’ systems of the sort postulated for this hypothetical creature. If 
true, this would be a discovery about human biology, but I do not see how such 
biological properties of humans affect the ‘essence’ of things.  
 
(…)  A  study  of  human judgements  concerning  essential  properties  may  give 
considerable insight into the cognitive structures that are being employed, and 
perhaps beyond, into the nature of human cognitive capacity and the range of 
structures that are naturally constructed by the mind. But such a study can carry 
us no further than this.  
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(…)  In the Aristotelian framework, there  are certain ‘generative  factors’  that 
enter  into  the  essential  constitution  of  objects;  we  gain  understanding  of  the 
nature of an object insofar as we grasp the generative factors which enable it to 
be what it is -a person, a tiger, a house, or whatever. Constitution and structure, 
agent responsible for generation within a system of natural law, distinguishing 
factors for particular species, are among the generative factors. These generative 
factors  are  close,  it  seems,  to  Kripke’s  ‘essential  properties’.  Under  this 
formulation, there are essential properties of things because of the way the world 
is in fact constituted, but we may easily drop the metaphysical assumptions and 
say that x is a generative factor of y under the description D (or, perhaps, when y 
is categorised as a C within the system of common-sense understanding).   
 
 
At the same time, though, ‘essence’ in itself need not be a single, unitary 
notion  applying  in  the  same  way  to  both  artifacts  and  natural  kinds,  or  even  to 
different types of artifacts. In fact, it seems to me much wiser to talk about ‘essences’ 
in  the  plural,  acknowledging  the  many  different  forms  essence  may  take,  each 
applying to different sets of artifacts -just as it is more appropriate to talk about the 
‘structures’  (rather  than  the  ‘structure’)  of  natural  kinds,  with  types  of  structure 
ranging from biological to genetic to chemical, etc. 
The  attribution  of  essences  is  an  evolved  part  of  human  psychology.  Our 
cognitive organisation has an inbuilt propensity not only to track essences and build 
certain categories of concepts around them, but also to create complex and induced 
states of essential fuzziness -in, say, effortlessly constructing concepts like BLUISH 
or CENTAUR. 
Inter alia, in this chapter and the next I will attempt a defence of essentialism 
in literature and art. I will propose a possible story about what the essence of art might 
be, and an alternative account of literariness that could potentially answer questions 
that 20
th century formalist and structuralist models of literary essence left hopelessly 
unanswered.
33   
                                                
33 The question of artistic essence is as central to literary theory as it is to the philosophy of 
art.  
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4.2. Structural essentialism in literature and the other arts 
In Chapter 8, I briefly discussed how the early 20
th century avant-garde set out on a 
venture widely known as the poetics of language. Defending the view that there is a 
distinct language of literature, poets and intellectuals of that time treated the literary 
text as a deviation from the ‘norms’ and ‘canon’ of ordinary language, and assumed 
that  what  makes  a  literary  text  distinct  from  an  ordinary  linguistic  object  is  its 
linguistic form and structure. Ambitious as it may have been, the project was ill fated. 
Founded  on  largely  unsubstantiated  assumptions  and  lacking  in  psychological 
plausibility, in the second half of the 20
th century the poetics of language eventually 
collapsed  under  the  weight  of  compelling  psycholinguistic,  pragmatic  and 
philosophical evidence. 
Few  nowadays  still  acknowledge  that,  although  incorrect,  the  poetics  of 
language was a venture of noteworthy intellectual courage. Even fewer realise that 
this venture was an essentialist project.  
To assume that literature  is a distinct object  because of inherent linguistic 
properties of the literary text is to assume that literature has an essence. If the poetics 
of language had been correct, it would have shown that what makes a literary object 
essentially distinct from an ordinary linguistic object is some deviation at the formal 
and structural level. Generalising this assumption to all art, it would then have been 
possible to claim that what makes an artistic object essentially distinct from a ‘mere 
thing’ is a medium-specific deviation at the formal and structural level.  
Not only was the poetics of language an essentialist project, it was also an 
essentialist  project  of  Putnam’s  structural  variety.  In  Putnam’s  metaphysics,  the 
essence of a natural kind -the property (P) that makes it the natural kind it is- is 
determined by the kind’s structure or microstructure (Putnam 1975). When Putnam  
 
 
70   
walks  in a ‘gallery  of indiscernibles’, a ‘gallery’  of perceptually  indistinguishable 
natural  kinds,  he  peels  them  apart  on  the  grounds  of  structural  criteria.  Of  two 
superficially indiscernible substances, only one of which is actually water
34, water is 
the substance that has the structure H2O. Here, ‘structure’ amounts to chemical make-
up. Of two superficially indiscernible beings, only one of which is actually human, the 
human is the one that has the appropriate DNA structure. Here, ‘structure’ takes the 
form  of  genetic  make-up.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  poetics  of  language  can  be 
accommodated in this framework. For the poetics of language, the distinctness of 
literature  as  an  object  (as  opposed  to  ordinary  language)  was  the  result  of  a 
differential and deviant linguistic structure.  
I would be inclined to propose that the last serious attempt in the 20
th century 
to defend the poetics of language and show the essential distinctness of literature in 
structural linguistic terms was Jakobson’s notorious ‘Closing statement in linguistic 
and poetics’ (1958/ 1996). In that paper, Jakobson aims to capture the inherent -and 
therefore essential- linguistic property that makes literature a distinct object, and thus 
emerges as an advocate of structural essentialism, whether he is aware of doing so or 
not. His answer to what this essential -‘inherent’, he calls it- property might be is 
                                                
34 For those acquainted with Putnam, what I am referring to in brief here is the famous ‘Twin 
Earth problem’ (Putnam 1975: 139-140):  
 
(…) we shall suppose that somewhere in the galaxy there is a planet we shall call Twin 
Earth. (…) In fact, apart from the differences we shall specify in our science-fiction 
examples, the reader may suppose that Twin Earth is exactly like Earth. (…) One of the 
peculiarities of Twin Earth is that the liquid called ‘water’ is not H2O but a different 
liquid whose chemical formula is very long and  complicated. I shall abbreviate this 
chemical formula simply as XYZ. I shall suppose that XYZ is indistinguishable from 
water  at normal temperatures  and  pressures.  In  particular,  it tastes  like  water  and  it 
quenches thirst like water. Also, I shall suppose that oceans and lakes and seas on Twin 
Earth contain XYZ and not water, that it rains XYZ on Twin Earth and not water etc.  
 
The relevant metaphysical question in Putnam’s Twin Earth example is what makes Earth 
water and Twin Earth ‘water’ ontologically/ essentially distinct.   
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notably his notion of the poetic function (1958/ 1996: 17), and ‘poetic function’ is 
incontestably a structural concept.
35  
While in the case of literature the arguments against structural essentialism 
came mainly from the outside -as noted above, the poetics of language was eventually 
defeated by compelling psycholinguistic, pragmatic and philosophical evidence-, in 
visual art, the decisive evidence against essential structure emerged from within the 
art world itself. Conceptual art and its ready-mades caused visual art to enter the 
philosophical ‘gallery of indiscernibles’ and created an art-specific variety of twin 
event.
36  Ordinary  Brillo  boxes  and  Warhol’s  Brillo  Boxes,  ordinary  urinals  and 
Duchamp’s  Urinal  are  twin  events,  physical  tokens  of  the  same  type.  More 
importantly, ordinary Brillo boxes and Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, ordinary urinals and 
Duchamp’s Urinal are not just perceptually indiscernible objects, but are also, and 
crucially, structurally indiscernible.  
If  there  was  any  hope  at  all  for  structural  essentialism  in  the  first  place, 
conceptual art certainly made it evaporate. If Duchamp’s Urinal is a work of art -and 
there is strong introspective evidence that it is- and given that Duchamp’s Urinal has 
identical  structural  properties  to  those  of  an  ordinary  urinal,  then  the  essential 
property that makes a certain object art cannot be down to its structure. The problem 
provides a useful rule-of-the-thumb for distinguishing a serious intellectual from a 
run-of-the-mill one: ask them what they take to be the implications of conceptual 
artworks for an ontology of art. The serious intellectual should recognise that what 
really follows from conceptual art is that, if there is an essence of art, it is not part of 
                                                
35 As it will be noted in Chapter 8, the poetic function is present when both paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic/ structural selections during utterance/ text production are made on the basis of 
systematic  structural  equivalence.  ‘Structural  equivalence’  in  turn  refers  to  systematic 
relations of similarity and dissimilarity at a structural level. 
36 The term ‘twin-event’ is an alternative name for a set of indiscernible objects.  
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the artwork’s structure. The run-of-the-mill one is more likely to suggest that there is 
no essence of art. 
Structural essentialism had been dead in the context of the visual arts long 
before the death of its literary equivalent (i.e. the poetics of language).  
 
4.3. Relational essentialism: Arthur Danto and Jerry Fodor 
More recently, two theorists have put forward notable proposals on the essence of art. 
The  first  is  Arthur  Danto.  In  ‘The  Transfiguration  of  the  Commonplace’  (1981), 
Danto draws directly on Wittgenstein’s proposal to distinguish behaviour from action 
in terms of the contexts in which they occur, and suggests that what distinguishes an 
artwork from a perceptually and structurally indiscernible ‘mere thing’ is (historical) 
context.  For  Danto,  the  twin  events  that  concern  him  (ordinary  Brillo  boxes  and 
Warhol’s Brillo Boxes) have identical perceptual and structural properties, but are 
essentially  distinct  because  they  clearly  have  differential  contextual  histories:  the 
artwork, unlike the ‘mere thing’, is located in an artworld context (1981: 142).  
Notice that while Danto’s agenda is unquestionably essentialist, the version of 
essentialism he is pursuing is critically different from that pursued within the poetics 
of language: Danto seems to have insightfully weighed the philosophical implications 
of ready-mades and realised that essentialism of the structural variety -while perhaps 
adequate for pinning down the essence of natural kinds- is not appropriate to works of 
art. ‘The Transfiguration of the Commonplace’ thus represents an innovative move 
away from the problems of structural essentialism, and celebrates an essentialism of a 
relational sort. The property (P) that makes an object a work of art is not part of the 
object’s perceptual or structural properties, and is not to be found within the object  
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itself. It is rather a relational property -in Danto’s particular case, a relation between 
the artwork and a certain artworld-specific historical context.  
In my view, Danto is right to look for a relational property; but wrong in what 
he takes this property to be. My own account will be consistent with Danto’s to the 
extent that it also treats (P) as a relational property.  
The second theorist to seriously tackle essentialism in art is the philosopher of 
mind  Jerry  Fodor.  As  Fodor’s  ‘Déjà  vu  all  over  again:  how  Danto’s  aesthetics 
recapitulates the philosophy of mind’ (1993) has a more advanced and up-to-date 
relational story to tell about the essence of art -and is anyway in direct dialectics with 
Danto-, I will not directly argue against Danto’s position at all. I will try and grapple, 
though, with one or two of Fodor’s philosophical arguments about the essential role of 
intentions  in  distinguishing  artworks  from  other  objects,  hoping  to  show  why  his 
account is not satisfactory either.  
To say that Danto’s and Fodor’s frameworks give inadequate accounts of the 
essence of art is not to say that these frameworks have no place whatsoever in an 
overall philosophy of art. My proposal does not exclude either Danto’s contextual or 
Fodor’s intentional story, but simply assigns them a different locus. Both stories have 
a lot to say about art as a phenomenon; it is just that none of what they have to say 
tells the full story about the relational essence of art.  
Fodor’s  story  is  one  of  intentional  etiology  (1993:  44).  His  account,  like 
Danto’s, pursues an essentialism of the relational sort, and is strongly related to recent 
philosophical work on intentionality. Quite unsurprisingly for a theorist who has had a 
major impact on both cognitive science and philosophy of mind, Fodor argues that (P) 
-the property that makes a work of art the kind of object it is- is a relation between the 
artwork and a certain type of mental state: in this case, an intention.   
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Just as Danto appeals to Wittgenstein’s definition of action in developing his 
particular relational account, so Fodor appeals to Descartes’ definition of action in 
establishing the particular relationship that he takes to hold between intentions and the 
essence of a work of art: 
 
A first approximation to the Cartesian story [about action] is this: in the typical 
case, what makes a motion an action is that it is caused, in the right sort of way, 
by the agent’s intentions. In the typical case, for example, what makes a motion 
an act of F-ing is that it is caused, in the right sort of way, by an intention to F. 
(What makes a rising of an arm an arm raising is that it’s caused, in the right sort 
of way, by an agent’s intention that his arm should rise.) (…)  Suffice it that the 
Cartesian story (…) would explain why there can be action twins. Having the 
causal  history  it  does  is  itself a  relational  property  of  an  event,  hence  it’s  a 
property  that  may  distinguish  events  that  are  “indistinguishable  to  all 
appearances”. (…) [T]o come to the point at last, this option also suggests itself 
in the case of artwork twins. A relatively unilluminating version of the Cartesian 
story might be that what makes something an artwork is that it was intended as 
an artwork by whoever made it. In which case, it could distinguish between an 
artwork and a mere thing that the latter but not the former was made with the 
intention  of  providing  a  container  for  Brillo  pads.  (…)  …”artwork”  is  an 
etiological concept -thereby explaining how there can be artwork twins; and it 
connects the intentionality of artworks (their aboutness) with the intentionality of 
mental states. (1993: 44-45).  
 
 
Fodor admits that ‘the Cartesian proposal isn’t of much help as it stands’: 
 
[I]ntending to make an artwork needs explication in a way that, say, intending 
one’s arm to rise does not. (…) it’s a lot less clear what it is that one intends 
when one intends that something should be an artwork. (1993: 45)  
 
 
Hence, the goal of his discussion thereafter -and more specifically, his appeal to the 
notions  of  audience  and  object  function  (1993:  46)-  is  to  develop  the  Cartesian 
proposal  and  make  it  more  concrete.  I  will  come  back  to  this  shortly,  after  first 
considering an example.  
Little Johnny is sitting next to his mom scribbling on pieces of paper with his 
coloured pencils. Little Johnny recently heard the word ‘masterpiece’, and discovered  
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what it means. In fact, he is just now deciding to draw one. He grabs one of his 
coloured pencils and clumsily smudges a piece of paper. He then summons his mom 
and says snootily, ‘Mom, look! A masterpiece!’ His mom takes the drawing/ smudged 
paper in her hands and agrees: ‘Yes, it’s a masterpiece!’ Little Johnny is over the 
moon.  
Johnny’s  behaviour  is  an  action  of  trying  to  create  a  masterpiece  in  the 
Cartesian sense, in that it is caused, in the right sort of way, by an intention to create a 
masterpiece. And we know it’s ‘the right sort of way’ because the action brought 
about by this intention is an action of trying to create a masterpiece, as opposed to, 
say, an action of trying to eat an ice-cream. Defenders of the intentional approach may 
not find this line of argument satisfactory. Indeed, one could propose that you can’t 
rationally form an intention to do something that you know is impossible and creating 
a  masterpiece  is  impossible  for  most  children.  The  claim  might  then  be  further 
generalised: if you want your mental state to count as a genuine intention rather than a 
mere desire or wish, you cannot rationally intend to perform action A unless you are 
capable of performing A. I want to propose, however, that intentional objects with 
evaluative content should be excluded from this claim. You cannot intend to create 
evaluative objects in the way you intend other things. Part of what it means for an 
object to be evaluative -and both masterpiece and artwork, as I will argue, are objects 
with an evaluative element- is that an agent cannot intend in the strict sense to bring 
them about, because she can never assess with complete confidence her ability to 
bring them about -in the way, let us say, that an agent can assess with confidence the 
ability to bring about an action like raising one’s own arm. An artist may cut his own 
ear off in despair at the limitations of his abilities, spend a lifetime seeing the creation 
of art as unachievable, doubt the actual artistic status of his output, and still be said to  
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have a rational intention to bring about a work of art. The dimension of artworks as 
objects with an evaluative element allows one to intend to produce an artwork and 
simultaneously hold the belief that what one intends may not be achievable by him in 
the given time, with the whole scenario not being a paradox. 
So, Johnny’s behaviour is clearly an action of trying to create a masterpiece in 
the Cartesian sense, in that it is caused, in the right sort of way, by an intention to 
create  a  masterpiece.  Moreover,  Johnny’s  intention  to  create  a  masterpiece  is 
recognised as such by his mother. In recognising this intention, his mother interprets 
his behaviour as an action of trying to create a masterpiece, and happily acknowledges 
the drawing as a masterpiece, although what she is looking at is a smudge. Is Johnny’s 
smudge a masterpiece?  
Having  an  intention  to create a  masterpiece  may  bring  about  an  action  of 
trying to create a masterpiece, but does not necessarily create a masterpiece per se. 
Johnny intends to create a masterpiece, and this intention brings about, in the right 
sort of way, an action of trying to create a masterpiece. As it happens, though, the 
output of this action is not a masterpiece but a smudge. Although the smudge was 
clearly  intended  as  a  masterpiece,  its  causal/  intentional  history  is  not  in  itself 
sufficient to make it a masterpiece. ‘Masterpiece’ is an evaluative concept. The causal 
history of an object is sufficient to tell us what the object was intended as, but not 
what the object actually is. There is a certain sense, as I will argue later, in which 
‘artwork’ is also an evaluative concept. An object may be intended as an artwork, and 
this intention may even be recognised by an audience; its intentional history, however, 
is not in itself sufficient to make this object an artwork. Its intentional history tells us 
whether the object was intended as an artwork, but not whether the object actually is 
an artwork.  
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This is a fundamental weakness of the intentional account, which seems to be 
pervasive throughout discussions on intentionality. I think I could not put it better 
than Dretske (1988: 64):  
 
Philosophers  have  long regarded  intentionality as a mark of the mental.  One 
important dimension of intentionality is the capacity to misrepresent, the power 
(in the case of the so-called propositional attitudes) to ‘say’ or ‘mean’ that P 
when P is not the case.  
 
 
It may be that some actions like raising one’s own arm fall under etiological concepts 
in the intentional sense, although there is a lot of room for debate here too. In fact, it 
can be argued that even with actions like raising one’s own arm, the intention alone of 
raising one’s own arm does not suffice to bring about the intended action: if, for 
instance the arm in question is stranded, the upper limbs are paralysed, etc. There are 
thus various other boundary physiological and cognitive conditions that have to be 
met in order for intentions to bring about even simple, uncomplicated actions like 
raising  an  arm;  which  brings  into  question  whether  even  these  actions  fall  under 
etiological concepts in a full-fledged and uncontroversial sense.  
In any case, art is not such an action, and all intentional etiology can reveal 
about an object is whether it was intended as a work of art, whether it was produced 
by an action of trying to create a work of art, but not whether it actually IS a work of 
art. An artwork is not constituted by its intentional etiology -by its being intended as 
an artwork- any more than a masterpiece is. Intentional etiology leaves the question of 
the essence of art entirely untouched.  
Fodor’s attempt to clarify his Cartesian story only adds to the problem. First, 
he introduces a notion of audience, which, although not theoretically redundant, does 
not make any obvious contribution to a discussion on the essence of art:  
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(…) the intention that a thing be an artwork is in part the intention that the thing 
have an audience. (…) that’s how it can be that [Warhol’s] Brillo Boxes is an 
artwork  though  Brillo  boxes  aren’t.  Whereas  Brillo  Boxes  is  intended  to  be 
shown, to be exhibited, Brillo boxes are intended merely as boxes for Brillo. 
(1993: 46) 
 
 
Let’s reverse this assumption for a moment. Imagine a scenario where Picasso 
starts working on Guernica with a clear and firm intention that Guernica is never to 
be shown or exhibited. He takes extra care so that no living soul ever lays eyes on it. 
When the work is at last complete, he sets it on fire and allows it to turn into ash. How 
are we to explain the strong introspective evidence that, although the Guernica of our 
somewhat odd scenario was neither seen by an actual audience nor intended to be 
seen by one, in its short life it certainly WAS a work of art? It may be that an appeal 
to possible or ideal audiences could add something to theoretical explanations of how 
a certain object is recognised as art, and highlight issues of aesthetic value, cultural 
purpose and communicative success; but as regards the essence of art, Fodor’s notion 
of audience seems totally redundant. It could be argued, of course, that although this 
hypothetical Guernica of our scenario has not been seen by an actual audience, and 
was not intended to be seen by one, the notion of some ideal audience cannot be 
totally eliminated. At the least, the producer himself sees the work while producing it, 
and  thus  there  is  always  some  feedback  between  production  and  response.  My 
concern  here  is  with  how  far  we  want  to  treat  this  notion  of  ideal  audience  as 
constitutive  of  the  essence  of  art.  My  reaction  is  that  audience  in  any  sense  is 
irrelevant to issues concerning artistic essence. 
Second, Fodor draws on some implicit notion of (practical) function with the 
aim  of  distinguishing  further  between  artworks  and  ‘mere  aesthetically  gratifying 
objects’.  Greek  pots:  are  they  artworks  or  aesthetically  gratifying  objects?  Fodor 
suggests the latter:   
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…Greek  pots  aren’t  artworks  because  they  were  intended  to  put  (the  Greek 
equivalent of) Brillo in. (1993: 46) 
 
 
Despite  my  sheer admiration  for anyone  who  can  come  up  with  such a  brilliant 
conception as ‘the Greek equivalent of Brillo’, I must admit that Fodor’s claim here 
is also problematic. Is having a practical function enough to stop a perceptually -as I 
would prefer to call it- gratifying object from also being a work of art?
37 Imagine 
another odd philosophical case. Da Vinci decides to create the Mona Lisa not with 
the intention of showing or exhibiting it, but with the intention of covering a wall 
damaged by erosion and mould. Strong introspective evidence again suggests that 
this practically motivated Mona Lisa is, nevertheless, far more than a perceptually 
gratifying object; that it is, indeed, a work of art. If Greek pots aren’t artworks -and 
let me not give a firm response to this as yet- this is certainly not because they were 
solely intended for the practical purpose of putting (the Greek equivalent of) Brillo 
in. 
As  has  been  pointed  out  by  other  theorists,  of  whom  Danto  is  the  most 
prominent,  Fodor’s  claim  that  there  can  be  such  a  thing  as  an  artwork  with  no 
aesthetic value whatsoever (1993: 43) is even more problematic. The claim is pretty 
standard in so-called ‘non aesthetic theories of art’ (for discussion see Zangwill 2002) 
but on closer inspection, the line of reasoning that leads Fodor and other defenders of 
the non aesthetic thesis to this conclusion is slippery and contains a crucial mistake. I 
will come back to this point later, in discussing my own proposal.  
                                                
37  It’s  quite  standard  to  think  of  objects  as  having  several  functions.  For  illuminating 
discussion, see Dan Sperber’s paper ‘Seedless grapes’ (2003). From this standpoint, it is easy 
to  argue  against  the  standard  claim  that  artworks  do  not  have  practical  function:  if  it  is 
acceptable to think of objects as having several functions, then having a practical function 
does not exclude the possibility of the same object also having an aesthetic function.   
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Those familiar with Fodor’s ‘Déjà vu all over again: how Danto’s aesthetics 
recapitulates  the  philosophy  of  mind’  will  find  that  the  framework  I’m  about  to 
develop has quite a few similarities to Fodor’s own. For instance:  
 
1. Like Fodor, I will treat the essential property (P) that makes a work of art the kind 
of object it is as a relational property. Moreover, I will treat this property as a relation 
between artworks and a certain type of mental object/state. However, this type of 
mental object/ state is not the one Fodor is proposing, i.e. an intention. 
  
2. Like Fodor, I will also adopt the framework of intentional realism. There is indeed 
very good evidence from contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology 
that we may have been guilty of ‘killing the author’ a bit too early. Not only do 
humans  entertain  mental  states  such  as  intentions,  desires  and  beliefs,  but  the 
possession and  recognition  of  these  states  seems  to  play  a  pivotal  role  in  human 
communication and cognition (Searle 1983, Sperber & Wilson 1995, Sperber 2000 
etc). Intentional realism, though, should be assigned a very different place from the 
one Fodor wanted to give it. 
 
3. In line with Fodor’s rationale, I will propose what can be described as a mentalistic/ 
noetic view of art. It will concentrate not on sets of objects per se, but on mental 
states and the relation between such states and objects out there in the world.  
 
4. The shift from talking about art as a mere inert object to talking about it in terms of 
actions is an admirable move on the part of both Danto and Fodor, and one that was 
long overdue in both literary theory and the philosophy of the arts. Artworks (literary 
texts, for instance) are local facts, art/ literary events are global. Artworks are local 
occurrences  within  the  global  phenomenon  of  an  art  event,  in  that  the  art  event  
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involves a characteristic action, which leads to some (occasionally prototype-related) 
end-product (artwork), which is likely to trigger some characteristic response. An 
action-based account which gives priority to dynamic events rather than static objects 
enables us to grasp not only the physicality of the object produced as part of the art 
event,  but  also  the  less  ‘visible’,  yet  no  less  real,  facts  of  humans  and  their 
representations. 
 
5. My account assumes that a certain behaviour is an action when it stands in the right 
causal relation to an internal process, and particularises it in the following argument: a 
certain behaviour is art -and the resulting object an artwork- when it stands in the 
right  causal  relation  to  a  certain  internal  and,  more  specifically,  mental/  psycho-
cognitive process. Following the philosopher Fred Dretske (1988: 17) I assume that 
an action involves a process of A causing Β that begins with A and ends with B. I 
therefore  propose  that  art  is  an  action-process  that  begins  with  internal  efferent 
activities  which  bring  about  artistic  behaviour  and  ends  in  those  external 
manifestations,  physical  objects/  results  of  artistic  behaviour  that  are  commonly 
perceived and recognised as artworks.  
 
6. If ‘artwork’ is an etiological concept -and there is good reason to believe that it is- 
the etiology involved is not intentional. Hopefully my brief discussion on Johnny’s 
‘masterpiece’ and the argument I unfolded there have convinced you that etiology of 
the intentional variety cannot account for whether an object is an artwork or not. The 
crucial element in an artwork’s causal history is not its intentional history but what I 
will call its psycho-cognitive etiology. Now, because the psycho-cognitive etiology of 
artworks is in some sense evaluative, artworks can be said to be etiological objects 
with an evaluative element.   
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7. Finally, following the example of Danto and Fodor, I will make a genuine effort to 
ensure that my aesthetics throughout this analysis are informed by recent advances in 
the  study  of  language,  communication  and  mind.  More  specifically,  my  view  of 
human communication and cognition will be in line with and draw on the hypotheses 
of, Wilson and Sperber’s ‘RelevanceTheory’ framework (1995).  
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Chapter 5 
 The Poetic Mind  
5.1. From ‘Language’ to ‘Thought’  
In Chapter 3, I briefly referred to Adrian Pilkington’s book Poetic Effects (2000) and 
paper  ‘Non-lexicalised  concepts  and  degrees  of  effability’  (2001),  in  which  he 
introduces his notion of poetic thought. My own account owes a great deal to this 
encounter  with  Pilkington.  The  questions  Pilkington  raises  seem  to  me  to  point 
towards something interesting, original and new.  
In the last 25 years, since the poetics of language received its final and fatal 
blow  through  the  emergence  of  cognitive  pragmatics,  almost  everyone  in  literary 
studies seems to have realised that a step in a new direction is called for, but no one 
seems to be sure what this direction might be. The collapse of the poetics of language 
and the structural variety of essentialism it advocated left literary study numb and 
unable to defend the claim that its object was distinct. The potential consequences of 
this development for both literary study and the philosophy of the arts are enormous. 
One immediate consequence would be to turn literary theory into a domain without a 
proper subject of enquiry. If every aspect of literary art can be as well accounted for 
in terms of the study of ordinary language -given that ordinary and literary language 
are not after all essentially distinct- then literary theory runs the risk of becoming a 
discipline  without  a  domain.  What  was  supposedly  its  dedicated  domain  will  be 
increasingly appropriated by disciplines which investigate ordinary discourse, such as 
linguistics, pragmatics or psychology. Generalise these implications to all theory of 
art, and it becomes clear why the fall of the poetics of language left literary people in 
a state of anxiety and confusion. It wasn’t just a theoretical framework that was at  
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stake here, but the whole edifice of literary enquiry and the reasons for its existence. 
A number of literary figures of that time -particularly stylisticians and text linguists 
such as Alan Durant and Nigel Fabb- responded vigorously to these developments and 
defended the dedicated study of literature as a variety of elaborate discourse under 
the heading ‘Linguistics of Writing’ (1987).  
I want to remain optimistic and propose that maybe we have been too hasty in 
giving up. The collapse of structural essentialism and the fact that we cannot defend 
the distinctness of literature at a structural (i.e. linguistic) level does not in any way 
entail that literature is not distinct as an object in any other interesting sense. It only 
entails that, if the essence of literature is to be found somewhere, this somewhere is 
definitely not its language. Structural essentialism has collapsed, but an essentialism 
of some other sort is still an open possibility. Before giving in to the idea that there is 
no essence of literature, and trying to rescue the proper subject of literary theory by 
approaching it on similar lines to the language of advertising, maybe we should try 
and think of levels beyond linguistic structure at which a distinct essence of literature 
might still be found. 
In my view, a poet has a moral obligation to defend the distinctness of her art 
with every ounce of rationality at her disposal. It is of less importance whether you 
agree  with  the  account  I  am  about  to  propose.  What  really  matters  is  that  we 
investigate new ways of thinking, which offer a possible escape from three decades of 
dead ends.  
The hypothesis I want to investigate is that our early 20
th century precursors, 
poets and intellectuals, were mistaken only in that they were looking for the essential 
property of literature in the wrong place. Their venture was structural, and therefore 
medium-specific -where the medium for literature is language. Looking for significant  
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differences at the level of language indeed has some immediate appeal, but it proved 
entirely misleading in the end. It might be, though, that it is still possible to find an 
essence of literature as long as we look for it in the right place. And it might be that 
the place to look for it is not language but thought, not media but mental states. After 
a hundred years or so of poetics of language, it might be that the 21
st century will be 
the century of a poetics of thought.  
My theoretical affinity with Pilkington does not go much beyond the fact that I 
will be using a theoretical notion that I also intend to call poetic thought. The two 
notions are fundamentally different, even though they share a name. Allow me here a 
very  brief  detour  to  explain  why  my  proposals  are  somewhat  distant  from 
Pilkington’s,  although  his  account  too  involves  the  crucial  move  from  media  to 
mental states that I am so interested in.  
In discussing the difficulties that perceptual objects -smells, images, sounds, 
textures, etc- create for the human expressive repertoire and the relative ineffability of 
some of these objects, Pilkington (2001: 5) proposes the term ‘poetic thought’ for a 
type of thought involving such perceptual objects:  
 
[This] kind of thought is very likely the kind of thought that only a poet would 
attempt to communicate, or could communicate. It is a thought that uses a non-
lexicalised concept  that  has  to  be  partly  constructed  using  some  [perceptual] 
component. The [perceptual] component is typically evoked through the use of 
figurative  language  such  as  metaphor,  simile  or  quasi-simile.  Imagine  some 
chickens getting down from their roost. How might the manner of their getting 
down be described? (…) Here (…) is Robert Gray: ‘They jump down stolidly 
from their roost/ as an old sailor jumps/ With wooden leg’.   
 
 
It is clear that Pilkington’s notion of poetic thought refers to a type of thought 
that involves what I would call a proper object. Proper objects of poetic thoughts, 
according  to  Pilkington,  are  perceptual  objects:  smells,  images,  sounds,  textures.  
 
 
86   
What Pilkington seems to be saying is that when a perceptual object is the object of a 
thought,  or  at  least  features  in  a  thought,  then  this  thought  is  poetic.  At  the 
International Workshop on the Pragmatics of Poetic Communication in Paris in 2006, 
Pilkington  put  forward  the  idea  that  involving  a  perceptual  object  is  a  sufficient 
condition on poetic thoughts, but under pressure of similar criticisms, he eventually 
revised this view and suggested something entirely different: poetic thought, he said, 
involves  an  affective  stance  towards  an  object.  This  new  approach  is  still  quite 
problematic. First, it is not clear at all why affective attitudes should be given such 
special  status  in  literature  and  art.  Second,  this  framework  fails  to  explain  how 
movements  like  vorticism,  which  despised  sentimentality  and  affect  and  adored 
formal  properties  like  dynamicity  and  commotion,  can  be  art.  Third  and  more 
worryingly, to try and capture the distinctness of the poetic/ artistic mentality in terms 
of affect is more or less to suggest a poetics of the ‘Romantic novel’ variety. 
In  any  case,  as  I  argued  at  length  in  Chapter  3  above,  there  is  good 
introspective evidence that perceptual states are so pervasive in the human mental 
tapestry that almost every thought, even a thought about an abstract object, is likely to 
carry a smaller or greater cargo of perceptual material. If so, then, given Pilkington’s 
definition, almost every thought is a poetic thought. But then, why call it poetic at all? 
Why not simply call it a ‘thought’? To the extent that ‘poetic thought’ means thought 
that involves perceptual material, the notion is theoretically redundant. All thoughts 
can be shown to involve such material. 
To the extent that Pilkington’s notion of ‘poetic thought’ is intended to capture 
something  distinct  about  the  poetic  mentality,  it  is  not  just  redundant  but  also 
theoretically quite risky. To say that what is distinct about the poetic mentality is its 
ability to focus in a certain way on certain types of objects -e.g. phenomenal objects  
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such as how blades of grass move or how chickens jump- has much in common with 
pre-20
th century conventionalist poetics: it assumes that there are proper objects for 
literature and art. To assume that there are proper objects for literature and art is to 
assume that there is a set of objects which are more appropriate subjects for literary 
and artistic contemplation than other objects that do not fall in this set. For pre-20
th 
century poetics, the proper objects would be mists, daffodils, sunsets. For Pilkington’s 
poetics, they are blades of grass, chickens jumping and kangaroos eating. Even the 
addition of ‘how’ does not improve the picture much. How blades of grass move, how 
chickens jump and how kangaroos eat grass is still an object external to individual 
consciousness, and therefore a proper object in the conventionalist sense.  
It is often said that art can be anything. In some sense, this seems true. In 
another  sense,  it  seems  entirely  untrue.  For  some  reason,  debate  in  both  the 
philosophy of art and the theory of literature tends to revolve single-mindedly around 
two  recurring  reference  points:  one  is  the  artwork  as  a  physically  tractable  and 
tangible entity, and the other is our reception of it. It should be a matter for at least 
mild amusement that the third part of the triptych that makes up an art event, the 
production part, has merited so little attention.  
Martin Heidegger’s analysis of the origin of the work of art (1971: 18-76) is a 
good illustration of what has happened to the study of production in the best existing 
theoretical scenarios. Here is a relevant extract from Heidegger’s work: 
 
Origin here means that from and by which something is what it is and as it is. 
What something is, as it is, we call its essence or nature. The origin of something 
is the source of its nature. The question concerning the origin of the work of art 
asks about the source of its nature. On the usual view, the work arises out of and 
by means of the activity of the artist. But by what and whence is the artist what 
he is? By the work? For to say that the work does credit to the master means that 
it is the work that first lets the artist emerge as a master of his art. The artist is the 
origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the  
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other. Nevertheless, neither is the sole support of the other. In themselves and in 
their interrelations artist and work are each of them by virtue of a third thing 
which is prior to both, namely that which also gives artist and work of art their 
names -art. (…) Art is present in the art work. But what and how is a work of 
art? 
 
What art is should be inferable from the work. What the work of art is we can 
come to know only from the nature of art. Anyone can easily see that we are 
moving  in  a  circle.  (…)  [Τ]he  nature  of  art  can  no  more  be  arrived  at  by  a 
derivation from higher concepts than by a collection of characteristics of actual art 
works. For such a derivation, too, already has in view the characteristics that must 
suffice to establish that what we take in advance to be an artwork is one in fact. 
(…) Thus we are compelled to follow the circle.  (1971: 18-19)  
 
On first starting to read this analysis, I was filled with enthusiasm for Heidegger’s 
insightful attempt to bring the artist, and thus the production-related aspects of art, 
into the ontological discussion. But my enthusiasm soon faded. What happens to the 
artist in Heidegger’s account of the origin of the work of art is exactly what happens 
to him/ her in the short passage quoted: the artist sooner or later fades out of the 
picture and the treatment of the ontological question regresses into circularity. I shall 
disagree with Heidegger. We are not ‘compelled to follow this circle’.  
Amongst the many reasons why art is not an action like raising one’s own 
arm, the production-specific particularities of art immediately stand out. It seems to 
me  pretty  uncontroversial  that,  while  any  human  being  -provided  they  are  not 
physically or mentally impaired- can raise their own arm, not every fully physically 
and mentally capable human being can produce De niemandsrose or Guernica. They 
might  produce  a  poem  in  the  conventional/  sociological  sense:  something  that  is 
intended as a poem, purports to be a poem and is conventionally recognised as a 
poem; but can they produce a real POEM, a poem in an essential sense? An adequate 
theory of the essence of art should at least in principle allow us to distinguish not just 
between artworks and ‘mere things’, but also between artworks and objects that are  
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falsely claimed to be artworks (e.g. simulacrums of artworks).
38 If all that is not good 
enough reason to assume, first, some significant psycho-cognitive distinctness about 
art as an action, and, second, the possibility that the concept of art has evaluative 
content, then nothing is. 
 
5.2. Poetic thought states 
Let us start from the uncontroversial assumption that there exist objects and mental 
representations of/ ways of ‘seeing’/mentally entertaining objects. Do not take the 
notion  of  object  too  narrowly.  Construe  it  broadly  as  anything  that  a  mental 
representation could be about: an existing or fictional concrete ‘thing’, a state of 
affairs, a situation, a sensation, a feeling, a psychological, emotional or mental state, 
or even a tightly  interwoven bundle of all these. Do not  take representation too 
narrowly either. Think of it not as a mere mental image or conceptual description of 
an object, but as being in a complex mental state in relation to some object, involving 
conceptual descriptions, perceptual images and affective attitudes towards it. In this 
broad  sense  of  the  term,  even  non-representationalist  art  involves  an  element  of 
representation, in that some object -e.g. a surface, a material, a volume, a texture or 
colour etc- is ‘seen’/ mentally apprehended by the artist in a certain way.
39 
Particularly in art -and for reasons that inter alia derive from the pragmatics of 
artworks  as  instances  of  ‘weak  communication’  (for  discussion  of  this  term,  see 
Sperber and Wilson 1995: 217-224, 235-237, Sperber and Wilson 2008)- objects are 
of such complexity and fluidity that it is often almost impossible to entirely grasp and 
                                                
38 Both questions are relevant to the metaphysics of art; the second is also relevant to its 
ethics. 
39 Minimalist artworks, for instance, may be seen as involving a purely perceptual variety of 
representation  in  that  they  involve  an  object,  pre-existing  or  manufactured  by  the  artist, 
whose formal, spatial, perceptual, substance-related properties are represented by the artist in 
some non-trivial way.  
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pin them down, never mind exhaust them.
40 In fact, the better the artwork, the less 
likely  that  its  object  will  ever  be  exhausted.  The  fact  that  such  objects  are  not 
explicitly tractable within the framework of art does not, however, entail that they are 
not metaphysically or psychologically real. Both introspective evidence and also the 
amazing  fact  of  interpretive  convergence  -i.e.  the  fact  that  an  artwork  can  cause 
different recipients to have surprisingly similar perceptual, affective or conceptual 
responses- suggest that objects of art must exist. So, even when we are utterly unable 
to explicitly and rationally pin down our intuitions about what is the object of an 
artwork, or what a representation is a representation of, our analysis need not admit 
any serious degree of artificiality.  
From the indefinite number of lines that hover somewhere at the back of my 
head, here are a few:  
 
A child squeals as if being slaughtered / or someone is slaughtered and squeals 
like a child.  
(Boukova 2000, The Boat in the Eye) 
 
Lemon/ Waxen totem of death/ Luminous lust 
(Iliopoulou 2007, Mister T) 
 
 
My heart/ a warm meek mouth/ that your heart’s scented caress/ has condemned 
to survive/ wide open/ stammering/ without lips 
(Kotoula 2007, in the anthology Karaoke Poetry Bar) 
 
 
We are in spring already and the flowers/ bloom upon the temples of the dead 
(Polenakis 2007, The blue horses by Franz Mark) 
 
 
(…) with all the ways birds have to fly, step after step, towards infinity 
(Elytis 1972, The light-tree and the fourteenth beauty)  
 
                                                
40 What is the object of Joel-Peter Witkin’s ‘Portrait as a vanité’? What is the object of the 
‘Wasteland’? What mental object can they be taken to represent? How can we ever capture 
that entirely or exhaust it?  
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If we want to tell an interesting story about the essence of art, this is a very good 
place to start. The object of these lines eludes my ability to fully explicate it. At the 
same time, though, I can intuitively and pre-rationally grasp that there is ‘something’ 
about the way this object is being mentally apprehended. I can also intuitively and 
pre-rationally  grasp  that  this  ‘something’  is  not  simply  conveyed  by  the  formal 
properties of these utterances, but is rather inextricably bound up with them.  
In talking about birds flying step after step towards infinity, Elytis makes an 
exciting  and  unexpected  connection.  His  utterance  fluently  transforms  a  vague 
gestalt
41 into structured commotion. It does that with enviable formal simplicity and 
clarity. There is ‘something’ vigorous and startling and un-trivial in the way Elytis 
sees and speaks about his object. Moreover, this ‘something’ is not external to Elytis’ 
consciousness. It does not concern how birds fly, or even Elytis’ attending to how 
birds fly. If there is a ‘something’ here that is relevant for a philosophy of art, it’s the 
way in which Elytis ‘sees’ the flying of birds. Note that ‘how birds fly’ is an external -
real world- object. ‘The way in which one sees the flying of birds’ is an internal, 
mental object.  
The way in which Elytis ‘sees’ the flying of birds is inexorably tied to the way 
in which Elytis ‘speaks’ about the flying of birds. It would be impossible for Elytis to 
speak of birds ‘flying, step after step, towards infinity’ unless he was in some, even 
subconscious, sense, able to see birds as ‘flying, step after step, towards infinity’. I 
would also suggest that it is impossible -and I will show later why I think so- for 
Elytis to be able to see birds as ‘flying, step after step, towards infinity’ but not be 
able to speak of birds as ‘flying, step after step, towards infinity’. 
                                                
41 The raw, undifferentiated input to perception.  
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I would like to propose that there is a special kind of representation involving 
a  certain  way  of  ‘seeing’  (objects).
  42  I  am  inclined  to  call  it  aspectual 
representation
43, from the meaning of ‘aspect’ in ‘his aspect of the mountain…’ -i.e. 
the impression/ impact the mountain made/ had on him, the way in which he saw/ 
perceived the mountain, the aspects of the mountain that he attended to, conceived of, 
came up with.  
Aspectual representations are internal, mental entities. It is not the external, 
real-world object of a representation that makes it aspectual but the way in which this 
object  is  being  mentally  apprehended;  there  are  no  proper  objects  of  aspectual 
representations. Describing something as an aspectual representation is only relevant 
as a comment about the properties of the representation. There is a lot of room for 
debate as to what these properties might be, but seeing old objects in novel non-
trivial
44 ways seems to be at least one of the overarching relations that holds them 
together. And seeing old objects in novel non trivial ways is in effect seeing novel, 
non trivial aspects of objects or novel, non trivial connections amongst objects.  
It is likely that this ability is enabled by a whole host of more particular sub-
abilities: e.g. 
 
                                                
42  ‘Seeing’ here is to be interpreted metaphorically along the lines of to ‘mentally grasp’ and 
not just in the strict visual or even perceptual sense.  
43 A couple of weeks prior to submitting this thesis Deirdre Wilson and myself discovered 
that the term ‘aspectual’ is already in use by philosophical aesthetics to mean something 
entirely different to its present use in this analysis. I have decided, however, to stick with this 
term for now, since I think I have defined very clearly the particular sense in which I use it. 
This is a matter that will definitely preoccupy my future research work and publications in 
which  ‘aspectual’  may  be  substituted  by  some  other  new-coined  term.  I  wouldn’t  want, 
however, to proceed into this substitution in haste.  
44 Non-trivialness can be thought of in relevance-theoretic terms as depending on the relative 
size  and  accessibility  of  the  set  of  implications  a  representation  has  in  an  individual’s 
cognitive environment at a given time.   
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to see/ conceive of properties of objects
45, 
to break down objects into their components,  
to spot underlying or overarching structures of objects and their relations, 
to spot ‘telling details’, 
to  be  in  rich,  fine-grained  and  complex  informational  states  of  a  perceptual, 
affective or conceptual sort,  
and so on and so forth. 
 
 
Do not focus on these sub-abilities to the extent of losing sight of what the notion of 
aspectual  representation  is  crucially  about.  Being  observant  in  a  certain  way  and 
attending to the implications of certain things are merely enabling factors: one may 
well be observant and attend to the implications of certain objects without nonetheless 
seeing/ conceiving non trivial aspects of and connections between these objects -as 
when one is simply perceptive or pedantic. And entertaining aspectual representations 
is crucially about seeing/ conceiving non-trivial aspects of and connections between 
objects; it is -to put it differently- about being creative in a certain way. Creativity is 
not, of course, only relevant to the arts. Science, philosophy, design, business and the 
management of innovation etc etc rest in one way or other on some ability for creative 
thinking. At the same time, there is a genuine question about what causes this general 
ability  for  creative  thinking  to  take  artistic  form.  Why  is  it,  for  instance,  that 
schizophrenia usually translates into artistic creativity rather than big scientific ideas? 
Why is there such a strong link between Tourette’s Syndrome and musical talent 
rather  than  talent  for,  say,  philosophy?  Although  creativity  has  been  studied  in 
domains such as cognitive psychology and cognitive science, philosophy, artificial 
                                                
45 Just a quick reminder that in the broad construal we have adopted here, the object can be of 
either a perceptual, affective or conceptual nature, or all three interwoven.  
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intelligence, history of ideas, literary and arts theory, business studies and economics 
-to  mention  just  a  few-  and  although  it  seems  so  easy  to  grasp  intuitively,  its 
understanding is still very much on a speculative level. There isn’t at this moment a 
fully tractable and testable perspective on what exactly creativity is, how it could be 
measured, why it takes one form rather than another or how exactly it arises. 
I want to propose that aspectual representations as a particular type of creative 
mental respresentation are a necessary pre-condition for an essentialist notion of art. I 
want  to  propose  that  art  is  not  possible  without  the  ability  to  entertain  aspectual 
representations in one form or another. If there is a relevant sense in which, as Danto 
insightfully put it, art is a ‘transfiguration of the commonplace’, it should be this. 
Being the product of an aspectual mind, arising out of a certain way of being creative 
-the particular way that brings aspectual representations into being- art in its robust, 
essentialist sense should always involve a certain way of seeing: seeing old things in 
new ways, seeing loose, non trivial connections and associations between old objects 
out there in the world or new-coined objects of our imagination, making visible the 
invisible, bringing into being something that did not exist before by re-arranging and 
enriching an existing world of possibilities.  
In the last 25 years of cognitive, psycholinguistic, pragmatic and philosophical 
research,  dissimilar  and  sometimes  mutually  incompatible  theoretical  camps  have 
nevertheless been united in emphasising the creativity and flexibility of the human 
mind.  In  Sperber  and  Wilson’s  Relevance-Theoretic  framework  or  Wilson  and 
Carston’s recent work on Lexical Pragmatics, the mind is seen as having a plasticity, 
flexibility, context-sensitivity, and improvisational range that were inconceivable for 
theories of communication in the past. However, the notion of creativity involved is 
creativity in a broad sense: a notion used to disentangle human communication and  
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cognition from the rigidity of the semiotic model. This is not the sense in which 
‘creativity’ is used in my analysis. Our interest here is not in the species-specific, 
broad creativity that every human mind is capable of. Instead, we are concerned with 
a notion of creativity that is the property of some minds only, aspectual minds.
46  
Aspectual representations are difficult to arrive at. Not everyone is capable of 
them.  It  would  be  possible  to  claim  that  those  capable  of  entertaining  aspectual 
representations meet a pre-condition, a necessary condition, for being poets/artists in 
an  essentialist  sense.  But  then,  not  everyone  who  is  capable  of  aspectual 
representations is a poet/ artist. Some elaboration is clearly called for if we are to 
understand the precise role of aspectual representations in the problematic of art.  
I have always been amazed by the fact that ordinary people who never pursued 
poetic  or  artistic  careers  show  a  mind-blowing  aptitude  for  arriving  at  and 
communicating aspectual representations. Some of the most exciting ‘poetry’ in my 
life  I  have  come  across  not  in  poetry  books  but  in  listening  to  ordinary  people 
talking.
47 Not very long ago, to take one example, Dina Mendonca from Univarsidade 
Nova de Lisboa mentioned to me her young son’s manifesto of boredom: 
 
Mom, I’m bored like a tree. I grow and grow and I’m always at the same place. 
 
 
The  little  fellow’s  thought  is  mind-blowingly  aspectual.  From  an  aesthetic  and 
creative point of view, his utterance has all the aspectual properties of a poem with a 
                                                
46 This  species-specific  creativity  has  been  celebrated  widely in  cognitivist  approaches  in 
recent years. Mark Turner’s The Literary Mind is another prominent example in this tradition. 
To claim that the human mind is ‘literary’ in the way Turner suggests is to say that the human 
mind is creative in the broad sense of linguistic and conceptual plasticity that applies across 
the human species. Here I am interested in a more specialised type of creativity which is the 
property of certain minds only. We may all necessarily be ‘literary minds’ by virtue of our 
cognitive make-up, but not all of us are artistic/ ‘poetic minds’ as I will call it. Hence, the 
model I  hope  to  develop  here is  intended to  pin down  a  schematic representation of the 
specific way in which an artistic mind is creative.   
47 This does not corroborate Turner’s generalised creativity view, and it will soon become 
obvious why.   
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capital  P.  Still,  this  utterance  is  not  a  poem.  I  am  also  thinking:  why  is  it  that 
something changes if, say, I take these words and quote them verbatim in my next 
poetry book, in pretty much the same way that a visual artist (Duchamp) ‘quotes’ a 
ready-made (Urinal) in the gallery? Why is it that, in this latter case, the exact same 
utterance, with exactly the same formal, structural, aesthetic and ultimately aspectual 
properties, suddenly becomes a poem?
48 Notice too that the child, and not I, is the 
creator of this utterance. Isn’t it fascinating that when this utterance is put forward by 
its creator it is not a poem, and when it is put forward by me -even though I am not 
the creator of this utterance- it is a poem? With young Mendonca’s words having 
entered for good the ‘gallery of indiscernibles’, let us see where this philosophical 
problem might take us. 
Loose,  non-trivial  association  making  is  characteristic  of  both  artistic 
creativity  and  schizophrenia.  The  schizophrenic  individual  is  said  to  be  able  to 
conceive non-trivial links and associations amongst objects to the point that in her 
mind  the  whole  world  is  eventually  somehow  connected.  The  schizophrenic 
individual is thus as good an instance of the aspectual mind as the artist. It also seems 
that for some reason, schizophrenia often brings about an insatiable need for what by 
all appearances looks like ‘artistic’ expression and activity. Where is the dividing line 
between insanity and art? Is the schizophrenic individual automatically an artist?  
There  is  a  crucial  element,  I  think,  that  distinguishes  both  Mendonca’s 
utterance and the schizophrenic’s ‘artistic’ rambling: in either case, the creativity is 
not  conscious/  intentional.  Βoth  Mendonca  and  the  schizophrenic  individual  are 
incidental creators, naïve agents, as I will call them, of aspectual representations. The 
                                                
48  To  remind  you  of  the  existing  debate,  Danto  would  say,  ‘because  it  is  embedded  and 
interpreted within an artworld context’, and Fodor would say, ‘because its intentional etiology 
has changed: in the second case it is intended as an artwork’.   
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output of naïve agency is potentially a raw material for art, but is not art. An aspectual 
mind in itself, i.e. a mind with the ability to be creative in a certain way, although a 
necessary condition for being a poet/artist in an essentialist sense, is nevertheless not 
a sufficient condition. For the possibility to become actuality, for an agent to be a full-
fledged  poetic  mind,  she  must  be  able  to  entertain  not  merely  aspectual 
representations but full fledged poetic thoughts.
49 
Our analysis so far has been looking more or less like this: (schema 1) 
 
 
 
      
                                                                        
                      Οbject                                                 
 
Αspectual representation 
(Novel object/ mental entity in a creator’s mind) 
                                                
49 There is nothing about poetic thought that would make it more relevant to poetry than to 
any other art. Poetic thought could as well be called an ‘artistic thought state’ or something 
along these lines. The only reason for calling it ‘poetic thought’ is that I wanted my account 
to take the name of my own art.   
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Let us call this the pre-artistic condition.  
If we are right to think that naïve agency is the common thread that underlies 
Mendonca’s  utterance  and  the  schizophrenic’s  creations,  excluding  them  from 
automatically counting as works of art, then the leap from the pre-artistic towards the 
artistic condition must involve an element of consciousness, reflection and control. It 
is important that all three terms are construed rather broadly. I am not suggesting that 
the  agent  is  at  any  one  time  aware  of  or  reflecting  upon  any  one  aspectual 
representation of any one object. All ‘consciousness, reflection and control’ might 
mean in this case is intuitive awareness. An agent capable of metarepresentational 
thinking,  an  agent  capable  of  mentally  ‘distancing’  herself  from  her  own 
representations by adopting a reflective attitude towards them, is intuitively aware that 
some of these representations are non-trivial; she is intuitively aware, that is, of the 
aspectual nature of some of her representations. Our schema now looks more like this: 
(schema 2) 
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       Object                                                           Reflective attitude toward the 
                mental entity in her own mind 
 
 
 
Αspectual representation of the object 
(Novel object/ mental entity in a creator’s mind) 
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Is the mental state represented in this diagram a full-fledged poetic thought? 
Well, no. As it stands, our schema is still very vague and undifferentiated. It fails, for 
instance,  to  separate  poetic  thought  from  other  types  of  creative  thinking.  Take 
Newton and the legendary apple. In being intuitively aware of, or ‘thinking’ -in either 
the attentive or sub-attentive sense of the term- about what he sees in the falling of the 
apple, Newton has a reflective focus on his aspectual representation of the apple’s 
fall. He is not a naïve agent, but nonetheless, neither his mental state nor its output is 
in any way artistic. All the current schema captures is the move from a pre-aware to 
an aware condition.  
Let’s stay with Newton a bit longer. The apple falls. Newton has an aspectual 
representation which allows him to see the apple’s fall in a non trivial way -connect it 
with  gravitational  forces.  He  also  has  a  reflective  attitude  towards  his  aspectual 
representation, in that he is at least intuitively aware that what he sees in the apple’s 
fall is non trivial. But the mental state he is in cannot be legitimately described as an 
artistic one. I want to suggest that the reason why Newton’s mental state is creative in 
the manner of physics rather than the manner of art resides in the particular way in 
which  his  reflective  attitude  is  focused  on  his  aspectual  representation.  More 
particularly, I want to suggest that Newton is focused on conceptual properties and 
implications  of  his  aspectual  representation,  and  more  specifically,  conceptual 
properties and implications that his aspectual representation might have for physics. 
Poetic thought is a state in which an agent intuitively aware of the aspectual nature of 
her  representations  is  steadily  focused
50  on  these  representations  as  aesthetic 
objects:
51 (schema 3) 
                                                
50 Do not take the notion of aesthetic ‘focus’ on the aspectual representation at face value. It is 
possible  that  for  an  artistic  mentality,  aspectual  representations  will  always  anyway  be  
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POETIC THOUGHT STATE 
 
 
                       
                                                                                                                                 
       Object                                                           Aesthetic attitude toward the 
                mental entity in her own mind 
 
 
 
 
Αspectual representation of the object 
(Novel object/ mental entity in a creator’s mind) 
 
                                                                                                                                       
entertained as nothing other than aesthetic objects; talking about ‘focus’ is only schematically 
relevant.  
51 In Chapters 6 and 7, I consider the content of aesthetic experience in detail, propose a 
scenario describing its evolutionary descent and discuss at length its relation to perceptual and 
sensory experience. I will defer more detailed discussion of the aesthetic until then, since the 
line  of  argument  I  am  pursuing  here  should  be  accessible  even  to  someone  with  an 
introspective/ intuitive and pre-theoretical understanding of aesthetic notions.   
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The idea that full-fledged poetic thoughts involve an aesthetic attitude towards 
one’s own aspectual representations has a number of implications for the nature of 
poetic thought states.  
For one thing, poetic thought has an evaluative element. It crucially involves 
intuitive assessment and evaluation of aesthetic aspects of one’s own representations. 
For another thing, to say that poetic thought involves an agent intuitively aware of and 
steadily focused on her representations in an aesthetic way is to say that full-fledged 
poetic thought states, unlike other non-artistic creative thought states, arise only at a 
point when the aspectual representation has -at least to some minimal extent- been 
entertained in the agent’s mind in the particular medium of the agent’s art-form.  
Some notion of form seems theoretically necessary for aesthetic experience 
and value to obtain. This is not to say that aesthetic value is a property of either forms 
per se or of how forms actualise contents. Aesthetic value is a property of an agent’s 
way of seeing forms and how forms actualise contents. Up to the point where an agent 
is in a mental state in which, say, the concepts TREE, HUMAN, BOREDOM and 
IMMOBILITY feature interestingly connected in her mind, our agent is only thinking 
creatively, aspectually (schema 1); and up to the point where she is intuitively aware 
that the connection is non-trivial, she is a reflective (non-naïve) agent of aspectual 
representations (schema 2). However, as I have explained, being in this thought state 
is not as such or as yet being in an artistic condition. This is not a poetic thought state. 
Notice too that the representation our agent has at this point cannot yet be attributed 
an aesthetic value in any but the very broad, non-technical, sense in which all non-
trivial thinking can be said to be ‘beautiful’ -the sense in which the theory of relativity 
or the conception of gravity have beauty. For a representation to be susceptible to  
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aesthetic appreciation in the strong sense that is relevant to a philosophy of art, the 
representation must have form.  
Poetic thought states, then, cannot be pre-stylistic states (Enkvist 1964:13): 
they cannot exist before the representation has been experienced by the poet -at least 
to a minimal degree- as words in the mind (phenomenal consciousness). In the pre-
stylistic state, the poet is only thinking creatively/ aspectually. She can have intuitions 
about  the  relative  non-trivialness  of  the  content  of  her  representation.  Her 
representation  is  non-trivial  from  a  conceptual  point  of  view.  But  this  is  not 
aesthetically  relevant.  Only  at  the  point  where  her  representation  figures  in 
phenomenal consciousness, the point where words or phrases or longer stretches of 
language pop up in the mind (e.g. ‘I’m a tree’, ‘I’m bored like a tree’) can the poet 
have an aesthetic attitude towards her representation and intuitions about its relative 
aesthetic non-trivialness. Only at that point can our agent be said to hold full-fledged 
poetic thoughts.  
Poetic thought states are at least to a minimal degree stylistic thought states. 
The feedback relationship between pre-stylistic and stylistic states is obscure, intricate 
and complex. The same goes for the relationship between intentional states, poetic 
thoughts and their physical manifestations. In the case of raising one’s own arm, we 
can speak of forming an intention to raise one’s own arm, which can be both mentally 
reflected on and visualised as an act of raising one’s own arm, and also physically 
realised as an action of raising one’s own arm. But the action of creating Guernica is 
the physical realisation of which mental representation? Can we legitimately say that 
such a mental representation could exist -at least in its entirety- prior to Guernica’s 
having been created? And if the action of creating Guernica was caused and brought 
to light by a complex intentional state, what was the initial object of this intentional  
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state? How much of Guernica could have been there before the physical process of 
creating it had begun?
  
It  might  be  that  we  can  assume  a  vague  and  possibly  sub-attentive  initial 
conception, a starting point, which, however, bears at least some similarity to the end 
product  that  Guernica  is.  Indeed,  artistic  creation  sometimes  begins  with  a 
rudimentary and elusive mental seed. Then -and quite unsurprisingly for the kind of 
process it is- it develops in a way and a direction that may have little or even no 
resemblance  to  that  rudimentary  initial  conception.  On  other  occasions,  the  end-
product simply causes itself. The agent experiences the artwork as the result of pre-
conscious  activity,  as  revelation  or  enlightenment.  She can, and  tends  to,  dispose 
herself  aesthetically  towards  it,  but  may  not  be  able  to  say  how  and  why  it  was 
caused, if it was the object of an intention, or what this intention was. 
Another good reason for thinking that art is not an action like raising one’s 
own  arm  is  that  the  complex  processes  of  practical  reasoning  involved  in  it,  the 
constant feedback between initial intentional states, mental representations and their 
physical realisations, are of an intricacy that often makes any attempt to separate them 
seem inappropriate and artificial. Often, I do not know what it is that I have a poetic 
thought of. All I know is that I experience phenomenal consciousness and that I can, 
and tend to, dispose myself aesthetically towards it; often I do not know that I have an 
aspectual representation until after I have already written about it. No one has spoken 
more acutely about this experience than Marina Tsvetaeva (2004: 215-222):  
 
(…) often poems give us something that had been hidden. Obscured, even quite 
stifled, something the person hadn’t known was in him, and would never have 
recognised had it not been for poetry, the poetic gift. Action of forces which are 
unknown to one’s own acts, and which he only becomes conscious of in the 
instant of action. An almost complete analogy to dreaming.  
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It  is  obvious,  I  hope,  that  a  theory  of  the  artistic  condition  need  not  be 
supplemented  with  a  further  notion  of  ‘dexterity’/  ‘ability  to  communicate  poetic 
thoughts’. To speak of such an ability as separate from the ability to entertain poetic 
thoughts in the first place is to assume, falsely, that poetic thoughts can be complete 
prior to being expressed in a certain medium, or to think about them, falsely, as fully-
fledged objects waiting to be put into the right words. To put it another way, it is to 
assume, that poetic thoughts are pre-stylistic thought states, only ‘cloaked’ with the 
language  of  a  certain  artistic  medium  in  retrospect.  I  have  argued  that  both 
assumptions are inadequate. 
The reason I am considering this point is that in discussing a very preliminary 
version of my notion of poetic thought at the 2006 Workshop on the Pragmatics of 
Poetic Communication in Paris, it was suggested to me that some notion of ‘dexterity’ 
might also be useful for my account. After thinking about it, I have concluded that 
such a notion is unnecessary. To summarise: if ‘the ability to communicate poetic 
thoughts’ implies that complete poetic thoughts can exist as pre-stylistic entities -i.e. 
before being given the form of one art medium or another-, I have suggested that it is 
entirely irrelevant to art. If ‘the ability to communicate poetic thoughts’ implies a 
mere propensity such that, in one art form or another, poetic thoughts tend to manifest 
themselves in the particular medium/form of this art, then it might be an interesting 
addition to an account of how poetic thoughts occur and how art happens. 
Do not let the ‘ut pictura poesis’ confuse you. To the extent that a poet ‘holds 
onto’ a mental image, ‘looks’ at it, ‘scrutinises’ it and ‘rotates’ it in the mind, she is 
not doing anything significantly different from looking at a real world object. She is 
still at a stage equivalent to looking at an external object. Ιt just happens that this 
external object is in the mind, and is being looked at with the ‘mind’s eye’. At this  
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stage, our poet does not even have an aspectual representation as yet. She can be 
legitimately  said  to  have  an  aspectual  representation  of  this  mentally  entertained 
object if she starts seeing it in non-trivial ways. She can be legitimately said to have a 
full-fledged  poetic  thought  when  she  has  become  intuitively  aware  of  the  non-
trivialness of her representation and has a steady aesthetic focus towards it. The very 
idea of an aesthetic focus, I have argued, suggests that the aspectual representation 
has already, if only to a minimal degree, manifested itself to the poet in linguistic 
form. Poetic thoughts cannot be distinguished from ‘their expression’. They are one 
and the same.  
 
To be in a state of entertaining poetic thoughts is to be in the artistic condition. 
I  assume that  poetic thoughts are  psychologically real, and that  the  machinery  of 
Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1995) could help shed some light on the 
poetic thought state in explanatory and psychologically realistic terms.  
Human cognition, according to Relevance Theory, has tended to evolve in the 
direction of increasing efficiency, in managing its expenditures of mental effort and 
making the most productive use of its attentional and other resources. The human 
cognitive system tends, as Sperber and Wilson put it in their cognitive principle, to be 
naturally  ‘geared  towards  the  maximisation  of  relevance’,  where  relevance  is 
technically defined as a relation between effort and effect such that the greater the 
cognitive/ contextual effect of an input -assuming that effort remains constant- the 
greater its relevance for an individual at a time
52, and the smaller the effort required-
assuming that effects remain constant - the greater its relevance for an individual at a 
                                                
52  Relevance  is  both  a  classificatory  and  a  comparative  concept  (1995:  129).  In  the 
comparative sense, an organism assesses the relevance of an input intuitively on the basis of 
expectations about the effects to be achieved and the effort required. In the quantitative sense, 
relevance might be tractable by, say, counting the number of contextual implications achieved 
by  adding  an  assumption  to  a  context,  and  measuring  the  effort  required  to derive  these 
contextual implications.   
 
 
107   
time.  The  cognitive  principle  inter  alia  explains  how  human  cognition  avoids 
computational explosion. It explains why it is that our cognitive systems do not attend 
to every single one of the indefinite number of facts that are ‘manifest’ within our 
‘cognitive environment’ (1995: 38-46): that is, the indefinite number of facts that are 
perceptible in or inferable from our physical and mental surroundings. It also, and 
more  crucially,  explains  why  we  attend  to  the  particular  facts  that  we  do:  for  a 
stimulus to merit the attention of the human cognitive system, it must in some way 
seem relevant to that cognitive system.   
Now, whether or not the type of relevance achieved by poetic thought states 
falls entirely under Sperber and Wilson’s cognitive account, the extent to which such 
states can be properly described as cognitive, and the precise way this conception of 
relevance interacts with a parameter so crucial for an adequate notion of the aesthetic, 
perception, are all issues to be tackled in detail in later discussion. Programmatically 
speaking,  I  hope  to  provide  some  evidence  that  an  adequate  empirical  and 
evolutionary model of aesthetic attitude/ experience and the particular kind of object 
art is might reveal new types of effect, and also distinct ways of achieving relevance. 
Ιn the next chapter, I will suggest two new terms -perceptual effect and aesthetic 
relevance-  which  are  intended  to  expand  the  theoretical  machinery  of  Relevance 
Theory in a new direction, and give concrete evidence of the retroactive effects that 
literary-artistic  thinking  may  have  on  theoretical  developments  in  empirical 
disciplines and the cognitive sciences. 
For now, let us say that poetic thought states can be described as characteristic 
of a distinct mentality, of a mind-set for which, inter alia, maintaining a steady focus 
on one’s own aspectual representations as aesthetic objects may achieve considerable 
relevance.  If  attending  to  one’s  own  aspectual  representations  did  not  achieve  
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considerable  relevance  for  this  particular  mentality,  the  cognitive  system  would 
automatically divert the attention elsewhere. To be in the artistic condition is thus - 
amongst other things- to be in a state where masses of implications can be obtained by 
steadily and persistently attending to a certain type of mental entity: to the aesthetic 
qualities of your way of seeing things, the qualities of your aspectual representations 
as aesthetic objects: 
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POETIC THOUGHT STATE 
 
 
                       
                                                                                                                                 
       Object                                                                                  Aesthetic attitude  
                 
 
 
 
 
Αspectual representation of the object 
         
  
 
 
Relevance yielding process  
 
 
110   
To forestall possible objections that may arise from a misunderstanding of the 
nature  of  poetic  thought  states and  the  way  they  may  be  entertained  on  different 
occasions, or even in different art forms, let me add few clarificatory remarks. It could 
be argued that the model of poetic thought states I am discussing here seems more 
relevant to certain art forms -for instance, lyrical poetry- while it is hard to see how 
other art forms or genres -for instance, epic poetry- could fit into this account. What is 
aspectual, someone might ask, about a story that is in any case heavily indebted to 
mythology, and whose content does not for the most part reveal some unusual or 
creative way of seeing? Is there something obviously aspectual in the Odyssey or a 
19
th century realistic novel? My answer is, yes. 
In  my  view,  these  and  other  similar  worries  could  only  arise  from  a 
misunderstanding  of  my  account  of  aspectual  representations.  Aspectual 
representations are creative, non-trivial representations of anything at all. They do not 
have proper objects, and they are only relevant as comments on the PROPERTIES of 
a representation. Aspectualness relates to WAYS of mentally entertaining contents 
rather than to contents themselves. The particular way in which a story is told may 
well  be  a  possible  content  of  an  aspectual  representation.  Thinking  that  there  is 
nothing obviously aspectual in the Odyssey -and hence that it cannot be associated 
with poetic thought states- can only be seen as a case where ‘aspectual’ has been 
misinterpreted  as  applying  to  content,  rather  than  to  ways/  modalities.  The 
aspectualness of the Odyssey, a 19
th century realistic novel, etc resides in the creative, 
non-trivial way in which the artist ‘sees’ the story he wants to tell. What is mentally 
represented in an aspectual manner is the way in which such and such a story can be 
narrated, or the way in which such and such a character can be constructed. Some 
aspectual representation may involve the way a poet sees the flying of birds, another  
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the way an author sees character construction. There is no reason why the one should 
be a more suitable candidate for aspectual representation than the other. 
 
5.3. Art as distinct psycho-cognitive etiology 
The property (P) that makes a work of art the kind of object it is is a relational one. 
More specifically, it is a relation between an artwork and a certain type of mental 
state. This state is a poetic thought state. 
Artworks are, in this sense, etiological objects. The property that makes an 
artwork the kind of object it is is not part of the object’s perceptual or structural make-
up, but part of its etiology. As suggested by my example of Johnny’s ‘masterpiece’ 
and the argument I set out there, this etiology is not intentional in Fodor’s sense. 
Intentional etiology, I argued, can account for whether an object was intended as an 
artwork, whether it resulted from an action of trying to produce an artwork, but not 
whether it IS an artwork. 
What makes a work of art the kind of object it is, and distinguishes it from 
perceptually  and  structurally  indiscernible  ‘twin  events’,  is  the  artwork’s  psycho-
cognitive etiology.  
Artworks  and  their  ‘twins’  -mere  Brillo  boxes  and  Warhol’s  Brillo  Boxes, 
young Mendonca’s manifesto of boredom and his manifesto of boredom when I quote 
it verbatim in a poetry book- differ in that they have differential psycho-cognitive 
histories: the one is related to poetic thought states, while the other is not. The one is 
the ‘product’ of a poetic mind, while the other isn’t.  
To address Fodor’s concern about Greek pots, I would be inclined to say that 
if (conceivably) a Greek pot could be related to a poetic thought state, if it could have 
the sort  of psycho-cognitive history  we are interested in here, then this  particular  
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Greek  pot  would  not  be  a  mere  functional  object;  it  would  not  even  be  a  mere 
perceptually gratifying object: it would be a work of art.
53 It could thus happen that 
some Greek pots are works of art, while others -possibly the vast majority of them- 
are simply functional or perceptually gratifying objects. Which category a Greek pot 
belongs to does not depend on its having a practical or cultural function: if some, or 
perhaps all, Greek pots aren’t artworks, it is not ‘because they were intended to put 
(the Greek equivalent of) Brillo in’ (Fodor 1993: 46) but because they don’t happen to 
have the psycho-cognitive history, the relational essence, of a work of art.  
Now, because, as I suggested earlier, poetic thought states have evaluative 
content -in the sense that they involve a persistent aesthetic attitude towards, and 
assessment of, some aspectual representation-, artworks can be said to be etiological 
objects with an evaluative element.  
It follows from this that there cannot be such a thing as an artwork with no 
aesthetic value whatsoever. It is impossible for something to be an artwork in an 
essentialist sense but to be of no aesthetic consequence, precisely because aesthetic 
considerations  are  quintessential  to  an  artwork’s  relational  essence:  they  are 
indispensable  components  of  the  artwork’s  psycho-cognitive  history,  essential 
constituents, that is, of poetic thoughts.   
The idea that there can be artworks with no aesthetic value is a commonplace 
shared by many theorists, including Fodor (1993) and Danto (1981). It is possible, 
though, that this commonplace is simply a result of misunderstanding the implications 
of ready-mades -and other ‘problematic’ instances of artworks- for the notion of the 
aesthetic. The rationale typically followed by the non aesthetic thesis on art argues 
                                                
53 Kant, for instance, listed gardens as artworks (Freeland 2001: 46), and why not? If a garden 
is  created  in  such  a  way  as  to  relate  to  the  specific  psycho-cognitive  etiology  of  poetic 
thoughts, then it is art.   
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that, since there is  nothing  about  the physical properties of a Brillo box that  has 
aesthetic value, and since a Brillo box may well be put forward as a work of art, it has 
to be admitted that there can be works of art with no aesthetic value. This and other 
similar trains of thought are clearly flawed. Although Fodor and Danto -and other 
advocates of the non aesthetic view- propose a relational story about the essence of 
art, and therefore defend the idea that the property that makes an artwork the kind of 
object it is, is not part of the object’s perceptual or structural make-up, when it comes 
to talking about aesthetic value, they all of a sudden revert to the artwork’s perceptual 
and structural make-up! Although Fodor and Danto are telling us that the property 
that  makes  something  an  artwork  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  artwork’s  physical 
properties, they then assume that Brillo Boxes is of no aesthetic value whatsoever by 
pointing to the physical properties of this artwork, the physical properties of Brillo 
boxes. 
There  is  no  doubt  whatsoever  that  there  is  nothing  about  the  physical 
properties of a Brillo box that has aesthetic value. But if you accept a relational story 
about the essence of art, you shouldn’t necessarily be looking for aesthetic value in 
the physical properties of Brillo boxes in the first place. You should stick with your 
relational story and look for aesthetic value in the relational properties of the artwork: 
Warhol’s Brillo Boxes is an object with aesthetic value, not because of any of the 
physical properties of mere Brillo boxes, but because of the relation between Brillo 
Boxes  and  its  psycho-cognitive  history  -the  poetic  thought  states  with  which  it 
connects and from which it results. Aesthetic value is not to be found in the physical 
substance of Brillo Boxes but in the relation between Brillo Boxes and its psycho-
cognitive history.   
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To the extent that we respond to formal properties of an object per se, our 
response involves perceptual experience of a certain kind, but not aesthetic experience 
in a sense relevant to the philosophy of art. An object capable of causing nothing but 
perceptual/  sensory  experience  is  simply  a  ‘beautiful  mere  thing’,  a  perceptually 
gratifying object but not a work of art as such. In Chapters 6 and 7 I tackle the precise 
relation between perceptual/ sensory and aesthetic experience, but for now let us just 
say that for an object to cause aesthetic experience and be more than a ‘beautiful mere 
thing’, it must also relate to poetic thought states and be endowed with a psycho-
cognitive history specific to works of art. Even more interestingly, objects that are 
endowed with this psycho-cognitive history are aesthetically beautiful even if they do 
not happen to posses beauty as mere things: it is intriguing that ugly objects like 
urinals make beautiful artworks like the Urinal and some fine distinction between 
aesthetically and non aesthetically relevant notions of beauty if certainly called for 
there in. 
I would like to suggest that works of art can be divided into two categories on 
the basis of how they provide evidence of the poetic thought states to which they 
relate and, therefore, how they provide evidence of their aesthetic value. 
First, we can distinguish works of art that provide strong evidence of poetic 
thought states.
54 These are objects that did not exist prior to an agent’s having poetic 
thoughts. They came into existence as a result of a poetic thought-state, and were 
fabricated  as  a  result  of  the  artist’s  steady  aesthetic  focus  on  her  own  aspectual 
representations. Thus, their aesthetic value is strongly evidenced in their form, which 
provides the receiver with nuanced clues to the relation of the object to some poetic 
                                                
54 On the notion of strong and weak evidence and the notion of manifestness, see Sperber and 
Wilson 1995, Chapter 8, section 1.  
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thought  state.  This  type  of  artwork  does  not  have  ‘twins’,  i.e.  ‘mere  thing’ 
equivalents.  
Second, we can distinguish works of art that provide weak evidence of their 
aesthetic value. These are objects that existed prior to an agent’s relating them to 
poetic thoughts. They are the so-called ready-mades. This type of artwork has ‘twins’, 
‘mere thing’ equivalents. In fact, it was itself a ‘mere thing’ before it was linked by an 
agent to poetic thought states. Aesthetic value in ready-mades is weakly evidenced, in 
that their form provides the receiver with little or no evidence of the relation of the 
object to some poetic thought state, and so the assignment of this relation depends 
heavily on the receiver’s ability to arrive at it inferentially.  
 
The type of relational story about the essence of art that I am proposing here 
sheds  new  light  on  at  least  one  other  famous  case  of  indiscernibles:  the  relation 
between art and forgery. In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman (1976: 100) asks 
what could be the (aesthetic) difference between a Rembrandt painting and a perfect 
forgery,  assuming  that  the  forgery  is  indiscernible  from  the  original  in  every 
perceptual respect. The problem is interestingly puzzling, but not hard to solve. As 
Leonard Meyer (1983) and Mark Sagoff (1983) point out -and indeed there is strong 
introspective evidence for this- for some reason, as soon as the forgery is revealed, 
our  (visual)  experience  of  the  original  and  that  of  the  forgery  seem  qualitatively 
different, despite the fact that the two objects are perceptually indistinguishable.
55  
The answer to this problem, in my view, is pretty straightforward. To say that 
the property (P) that makes a work of art the kind of object it is is a relation between 
the artwork and a type of mental state we called a poetic thought, is to commit oneself 
                                                
55 Meyer’s (1983) attempt to resolve the problem by taking relational factors (i.e. factors 
beyond the perceptual make-up of the painting) into account seems to me pretty much in the 
right direction; however, his discussion is entirely pre-theoretical.   
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to the existence of an essence of art, a relational essence. It follows inter alia that 
there should be an essential difference between an artwork and a forgery: the original 
artwork and a perfect forgery are two essentially distinct objects, since they have 
distinct psycho-cognitive histories. Of the two, only the former stands in a direct
56 
causal relation to poetic thought states, and thus, only the former has the specific 
psycho-cognitive history of a work of art. The reason our experiences of original and 
forgery seem qualitatively different as soon as the forgery is  revealed, is that  we 
therefore  notionally  disentangle  (un-relate)  the  forgery  from  the  specific  type  of 
psycho-cognitive history that would allow it to be art. A forgery is not the result of 
poetic thought processes, but the result of an action of copying that makes it exactly 
the object it is: a forgery.  
Meyer and Sagoff’s addition of the word ‘visual’ in front of ‘experience’ does 
not  change  our  explanation  in  any  interesting  way.  Perception  does  not  function 
independently of conceptual cognition. It is the interaction between perceptual and 
conceptual  cognition  that  enables  a  bundle  of  undifferentiated  2-dimensional 
projections on the human retina to be conceptualised as this object or that one. It is 
conceptual cognition -and more specifically the addition to the receiver’s cognitive 
environment of new information about the distinct psycho-cognitive etiologies of the 
two objects- that makes the one object ‘seem’ an artwork and the other a forgery. The 
two objects are differently conceptualised and hence, given the feedback between 
perceptual and conceptual cognition, lived through as if they yielded distinct visual 
experiences.  
                                                
56 It is important to mention the direct nature of the causal relation between the original 
artwork and its psycho-cognitive history. The forgery too has a causal relationship to the 
original poetic thought state, though an indirect one: it wouldn’t exist, if the original thought 
state hadn’t existed.  
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To commit oneself to a relational essence of art as a case of specific psycho-
cognitive etiology makes it possible to draw a further distinction: between art and 
simulacra of art or pretend art. In our story, intending something as an artwork or 
wanting  it  to  be  recognised  as  an  artwork  is  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  this 
something to BE an artwork. While anything at all can in principle be art, so long as a 
poetic mind can entangle it with a poetic thought state, not everything actually is art. 
It might well be an object that purports to be art, is put forward as art but nevertheless 
IS NOT art.  
Similarly, the fact that an audience treats something as an artwork does not 
necessarily make this something an artwork either. What an audience treats as art is a 
sociological rather than ontological matter. It concerns how an object is seen rather 
than -I’ll borrow the expression from Anne Furlong- the ‘thingness’ of the object. An 
object may thus BE a work of art but nevertheless not be recognised as such by an 
audience. Similarly, an object may NOT BE a work of art but nevertheless be treated 
as art by an audience. How audiences decide whether something is an artwork is not a 
question of ontology but of recognition/ categorisation. It is not a question of what 
something IS but a question of how human beings identify/ categorise it as the kind of 
object it is.
57 
                                                
57 A possible story about how certain artifacts are recognised/ categorised as art -which I 
stress once again is quite separate from claims about the ontology of the object- may involve 
a  so-called  ‘prototype  detector’.  We  may  treat  art  as  a  fuzzy  set  involving  a  continuum 
ranging from more or less prototypical cases to borderline cases -take for instance aphorisms: 
are they poetry or philosophy?-, and to cases of misrepresentation. It is a fact about human 
conceptual organisation that the less prototypical an exemplar, the more difficult it is for an 
individual  to  categorise  it  with  conviction  (Barsalou  1987).  The  value  of  this  fact  for  a 
philosophy of art is twofold: first, it highlights our propensity to form artistic canons: what 
else is a canon but a relatively stabilised prototypicality scale? Second, it explains why less 
paradigmatic  exemplars  -e.g.  ready-mades-  were  at  first  harder  to  categorise  as  art  with 
conviction and became the subject of so much debate.   
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This confusion between ontology and recognition seems to persist throughout 
contemporary  writings  on  the  philosophy  of  art.  Peter  Lamarque  (2007:  45),  for 
instance, suggests in passing:  
 
The  “being”  [of  an  art  object]  -the  principal  condition  of  its  essence-  is 
determined at least in part by the way the object’s identity is conceived […] it is 
an object under a description (…).
58  
 
 
But  the  way  an  object  is  conceptualised/  conceived  of  is  clearly  a  matter  of 
recognition, and thus quite separate from the ‘being’, the ontology, of the object. To 
understand how this works, think of the following analogy: until very recently in 
human history black people were in various social contexts treated and perceived as 
sub-humans, or even animals. Does the fact that black people were perceived as 
animals make them animals? Black people were essentially/ ontologically human 
beings then no less than they are now. What the socio-historical context makes black 
people be perceived as does not affect what black people essentially ARE. The socio-
historical context results for one reason or another in black people’s being perceived 
as animals; however, even while they are being perceived as animals, black people 
ARE essentially human beings.  
Despite appearances, art is not an unstable object. The same object can be 
perceived as art in one period, social framework or artworld context and as non-art in 
another, but this does not mean that art is unstable as an object, or that ‘art is entirely 
subjective’. This superficial instability does not have any bearing on what art IS; it 
only has implications for what art is perceived as. Artworks are part of the human 
cognitive environment. Just like any other type of input, artistic inputs are thus always 
automatically perceived, assessed and (sometimes) interpreted within a given context. 
                                                
58 My translation from Greek.  
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We can speak of artworks being perceived differently in different contexts. We can 
speak of artworks being embedded in one context or the other; but we can never speak 
of artworks as being context-less. Contexts are made up of externally (perception-
driven) or internally (memory-driven) evidenced assumptions (Sperber and Wilson 
1995: 38-46,  137-142).   The  context can be said  to change when  the  salience  or 
accessibility of these assumptions alters, or new assumptions are added and old ones 
abandoned.  The  reason  my  responses  to  an  artwork  (Aphrodite  of  Melos)  might 
change when I move through space looking at it from different angles, or when I 
move through time looking at it from the vantage point of different socio-political and 
historical frameworks, is not that the artwork itself changes, but that the context in 
which  the  artwork  is  being  received  -  the  salience  or  accessibility  of  certain 
assumptions - has altered. Aspects of the artistic event have changed, not the artwork 
per se. 
Pinning down essence is not a purely metaphysical matter. The key feature of 
Putnam’s claims about essentialism in nature, for instance, is that an object’s essence 
(biological/  chemical  structure,  etc.)  enables  humans  to  make  correct  predictions 
about its behaviour in different circumstances. It is possible that the essence of a work 
of  art  yields  predictions  in  similar  ways.  In  any  case,  our  notions  of  the  artistic 
condition and poetic thought have not fallen like manna from the skies. They bring 
together into a single framework ideas and intuitions that have been floating around in 
either literary theory or the philosophy of the arts for the best part of a century. They 
give a possible insight into what it means for art to be self-reflexive. They account for 
Danto’s intuition that some ‘transfiguration of the common-place’ into the non-trivial 
is crucial for art. They assign intentional realism a different -non essentialist- part in 
the ontology of art. They capture ways in which the artistic mentality is distinct from  
 
 
120   
the ordinary mentality and other (non-artistic) types of creativity, and suggest that the 
mental objects that are responsible for the distinctness of the artistic condition (poetic 
thought states) are metaphysically and psychologically real. What this analysis claims 
seems almost crudely self-explanatory. To slightly rephrase Hesse, one can be a poet, 
but not become one.
59 
 
5.4. Implications for linguistic pessimism  
A patient with undiagnosed heart disease sees her doctor and reports as recurring 
symptoms -amongst others- a biting pain in her chest and a feeling of pressure in her 
stomach. The patient’s account of what she experiences in the form of symptoms is 
very far removed from any explanatory description of the actual goings on in her body 
that a medical account would produce. Is the patient wrong? Or is she perhaps lying? 
From her point of view, her account is as correct and truthful as we can reasonably 
expect it to be. Her account is not one of actual goings on in her body, but rather, an 
impressionistic description of the sensory consequences of these goings on, that the 
patient experiences as such and such symptoms. In other words, the patient does not 
describe bodily facts in themselves, but rather their, let’s say, phenomenology; the 
way in which these facts present themselves to her senses/ experience.  
A poetic thought state is an amalgam: it is a compound state made up of 
psychological components that inform and complement and ‘feed’ each other through 
complex  retroactive  relationships.  When  a  poet/  artist  reports  her  agony  for 
expression, she is in fact reporting a symptom. Her report is truthful and correct to the 
extent  that  it  is  only  an  intuitive  and  impressionistic  description  of  the 
                                                
59 The claim is not that the ability for poetic thought, and consequently art, is fully innate. The 
claim is that the ability is not wholly the result of training. Some feedback must be assumed 
between natural ‘learning instincts’, or ‘maturational paths’ which are triggered and further 
developed by certain types of experience.  
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phenomenology  of  the  actual  goings  on  in  her  mind, although  it  is  incorrect and 
untruthful  if  taken  to  be  an  explanatory  description  of  the  actual  goings  on 
themselves.  
In  this  chapter,  I  have  tried  to  argue  for  the  distinctness  of  the  artistic 
mentality -at least, in terms of its capacity to hold poetic thought states. I take this to 
mean that, when a poet refers to the ‘inadequacy of language’ or speaks of her ‘agony 
of expression’, she is referring, in the first place, to something far more complex and 
interesting than when the same statement is made in the idiom of the folk mentality, 
and  in  the  second  place,  to  something  far  more  complex  and  interesting  than  an 
impressionistic description could ever indicate. The impressionistic description of the 
‘struggle for  expression’ intuitively captures part of the phenomenology of poetic 
thought  states  -part  of  the  ‘symptoms’  with  which  poetic  thought  states  present 
themselves to the poet’s/ artist’s experience. However, strictly speaking, it cannot but 
downplay  the  actual  cognitive  goings  on,  let  alone  the  complex  informational 
relations between them, that bring these symptoms to light.  
The next chapter will consider the engineering of at least one of these actual 
goings  on:  it  will  focus  on  aesthetic  experience  and  discuss  the  struggle  not  for 
‘expression’, as it has been commonly thought of, but for aesthetic value.  
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Chapter 6 
Is Art a mistake? (Part 1) 
On the content of aesthetic experience 
 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Suppose that a strange alien object has landed on earth, an object nothing similar to 
which has ever been seen before. Suppose that you have been assigned the task of 
understanding  the  nature,  function  and  origins  of  this  object  and  the  sort  of 
intelligence that could have created it. I am quite confident that in the solitude of your 
laboratory one of the first things you would do is carefully observe the object. Then 
what do you do? Looking at the object as a complete functional whole will not take 
you very far. It is only a matter of time before you start handling the object, observing 
its articulation, breaking it down into its components.  
To try and tackle the evolutionary origins of art in just one step -a step from 
environmental  pressures  to  the  end  product  we  call  ‘art’  evolving  as  a  direct 
adaptation to such pressures- is to be in a position as crude as thinking that you can 
safely hypothesize on the nature, function and origins of the strange alien object by 
merely looking at it. Let  me  rephrase. A common mistake  in recent evolutionary 
scenarios on the origins of literature and art is that authors aim to explain the human 
susceptibility for art without even having bothered to lift the strange object in their 
hands, let alone observe its articulation into crucial functional components.
60 
                                                
60 There are interesting exceptions, of course. Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999: 15-51), for 
instance,  seem  aware  that  an  understanding  of  the  complex  surface  structure  we  call  art 
requires an investigation of the components that build up its deep structure, hence their effort 
to break it down into an array of neurological correlates.   
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Another question we might ask ourselves is, why treat art as an adaptation at 
all? Not many have asked themselves this question, and that is mainly why I find 
Pinker’s (2007: 169-171) attempt to bypass this mistaken view of the evolutionary 
function of fiction quite interesting. His account is worth quoting: 
 
The throbbing question about fiction from an evolutionary viewpoint is what, if 
anything, it is for. I believe that most people misunderstand the question, and in 
How the Mind Works I tried to clarify it. Having been embroiled in scores of 
discussions on the topic since then, I've found that almost everyone connected 
with  the  arts  (including  music,  literature,  and  painting)  believes  that  it  is 
important to show that art is an adaptation, that there is good evidence that art is 
an  adaptation,  and  that  the  function  of  art  is  some  version  of  bringing  the 
community together. I think all three beliefs are false, and that ultimately they 
may damage this nascent field. (…) I sense that most people involved with the 
arts want them to be an adaptation because they feel it would somehow validate 
or  ennoble  the  arts  -perhaps  even  protect  them  against  budget-conscious 
politicians seeking to cut them from school curricula. Part of the problem is an 
ambiguity in the word itself. In the common vernacular, "adaptive" is a good 
thing; it means "healthy, clever, well-adjusted." In the biologist's technical sense, 
though, it refers only to a trait that evolved because, compared to alternative 
versions  of  the  trait,  it  increased  the  rate  of  reproduction  of  an  organism's 
ancestors. Biological adaptations need not be praiseworthy by human standards. 
Quite  the  contrary.  As  Symons  has  pointed  out,  a  willingness  to  commit 
genocide may very well be an adaptation, whereas the ability to read almost 
certainly is not. The arts could be evolutionary by-products, and be among the 
most  valuable  human  activities  for  all  that.  To  demonstrate  that  X  is  an 
adaptation, one can't simply show that people like doing X, or that good things 
happen when people do X. (…) Instead, one has to show (…) that X, by its 
intrinsic design, is capable of causing a reproduction-enhancing outcome in an 
environment  like  the  one  in  which  humans  evolved.  (…)  Example:  Why  do 
people crave sweets? Bad answers: because sweets give people pleasure; because 
eating sweets makes them feel satisfied; because eating sweets communally (at 
birthday parties, dates, and so on) brings people together. Better answer: because 
sugars  contain  accessible  energy  (a  fact  of  chemistry),  because  the  fruits  of 
certain plants are rich in sugar (a fact of botany), because primates evolved in 
ecosystems with fruit-rich plants (a fact of paleoecology). Ergo, a drive to find 
and consume sweets would have provided an ancestral organism with energy, 
which is a prerequisite to reproduction. With other putative adaptations, different 
fields  might  provide  the  relevant  engineering  analysis:  robotics  for  motor 
control, reproductive biology for sexual drives, Mendelian genetics for kinship 
emotions, game theory for cooperation and competition. What about the arts? 
We can immediately see that any supposed function that appeals only to the 
effects we observe post hoc in people won't cut it. (…) Appealing to this logic, I 
proposed that many of the arts may have no adaptive function at all. They may 
be by-products of two other traits: motivational systems that give us pleasure 
when we experience signals that correlate with adaptive outcomes (safety, sex,  
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esteem,  information-rich  environments),  and  the  technological  know-how  to 
create  purified  and  concentrated  doses  of  these  signals  (such  as  landscape 
paintings, erotica, or hero stories). 
 
 
To  highlight  another  crucial  set  of  mental  goings  on  that  could  be  held 
responsible for what poets and artists experience as a ‘struggle for expression’ –and, 
hence, a set of mental goings on that are crucially related to linguistic pessimism- we 
need to understand where art comes from, what kind of action it is and which aspects 
of it has made it so integral across human cultures. Let us leave Pinker, enter our 
laboratory and start dismantling our strange alien object into its crucial and telling 
details.  
 
6.2. Aesthetic experience and pleasurable sensory response 
There  is  one  articulatory  component  that  is  more  revealing  about  the  nature  and 
origins of art than the end product of art itself could ever be. But let’s take things from 
the beginning.  
Let  us  agree  first  that  there exist  pleasurable  sensory  experiences:  that  is, 
sensory experiences that elicit rewarding and hence, pleasurable bodily reactions in 
the  organism.  The  stimulus  that  triggers  the  sensory  experience  and  pleasurable 
reaction can be either external or internal: perceptual processes, it seems, respond not 
only to objects themselves, but also to mental representations of objects. The fact that 
mental representations, or in other words internally caused stimuli, activate the senses 
appears  relatively  uncontroversial;  it  has  been  shown,  for  instance,  that  auditory 
perception is activated during silent reading,
61 which suggests that the brain reacts to 
                                                
61  The  famous  initial  studies  by  Seidenberg  1985  were  about  the  role  of  phonological 
processing in reading, but there’s been a lot since on more general auditory perception during 
reading, and the effect of alphabetic versus non-alphabetic orthographic systems e.g. ‘What  
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the  internal  representations  of  words/  sounds  in  the  mind  as  if  they  were  proper 
perceptual input.  
To have a pleasurable sensory experience is to be in a certain bodily state. The 
organism experiences that state without necessarily also representing it mentally as 
pleasurable, or without evaluating it in any positive way. All that is required is that 
the organism is simply in a certain bodily state, which is such that it is pleasurable. 
The organism need not be able to reflect on, let alone name the state. In the first place, 
humans seem to have many more concepts than words, and many of these concepts 
will always remain unlexicalised (Sperber and Wilson 1998). In the second place, the 
state  need  not  be  mentally  represented  at  all.
62  Presumably  there  is  indeed  an 
empirical connection between having a pleasurable experience and, say, setting up a 
goal of bringing it about again, but this does not entail a further connection between 
having a pleasurable experience and representing it as such. For instance, a simple 
organism which has an experience with pleasurable effects may simply set up an 
action plan whose goal is to bring about the repetition of that experience, without ever 
representing it as ‘good’ or ‘worth having’. Ιt may be that having a goal of bringing 
the experience about again amounts to representing this future experience positively, 
but even this latter type of representation is not necessary for an organism to be said 
to have a pleasurable bodily experience. 
                                                                                                                                       
the reader’s eye tells the mind’s ear: Silent reading activates inner speech’, by Abramson and 
Goldinger (1997).  
62 Tye (2006 and forthcoming) launches a series of arguments against the possibility of non 
representational phenomenal experience. I hope that the brief train of thought followed above 
shows that Tye’s position is not entirely uncontroversial. My claim here is not that sensory 
and phenomenal experiences cannot be mentally represented but that it is not necessarily 
mentally represented. The debate is more central to the philosophy of mind than aesthetics, 
and I will not pursue it further. All I want at this point is to explicitly adopt the view that there 
is a fundamental layer of experience, a sensory layer, which can exist independently of and 
prior to any kind of mental representation of that state -be it conceptualisation, lexicalisation, 
ory evaluation.   
 
 
126   
It is worth noting that there are two possible ways of interpreting the relation 
between a sensory experience and the pleasure it causes: (a) a pleasurable sensory 
experience is one that causes pleasure; (b) a pleasurable sensory experience is one 
that includes the pleasure it causes -i.e. a complex state with lots of internal causal 
relations. In talking of pleasurable sensory experience from now on, I will assume that 
we are referring to (b). In any case, the point to keep in mind from all this is that 
humans are capable of pleasurable sensory experiences, and may set up action plans 
for bringing about the repetition of an experience and its pleasurable effects, without 
ever having mentally represented either the experience itself as pleasurable or the 
action of bringing it about. 
It  is  fairly  uncontroversial  that  at  least  two  types  of  pleasurable  sensory 
experiences must have been positively selected in the process of evolution, since they 
are linked to two fundamentally life preserving activities: food consumption
63 and 
sexual intercourse. An organism whose senses reward her with pleasure every time 
she flirts, mates or eats is more likely to actively seek flirting, mating and eating than 
a similar organism who does not get any feedback/ reward from performing these 
activities. This type of pleasurable sensory experience is therefore clearly adaptive: it 
is possible that we are hard-wired to be rewarded with pleasurable sensory effects 
when we interact with a mate, have sex or satisfy hunger, because being so rewarded 
confers  a  clear  evolutionary  advantage  in  terms  of  survival  and  reproductive 
success.
64  
                                                
63 Or, more plausibly, consumption of food that was beneficial to an organism and capable of 
providing it with the appropriate nutrients.  
64 I like the way Tye (2006: 16) phrases it:  
 
(…  )  nature  wired  into  us  (and  many  other  creatures)  value-tracking  detectors,  B 
detectors, that enable us to track value in a primitive way and thereby to behave in a 
fashion most conducive to our survival.   
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It  is  not  hard  to  come  up  with  a  convincing,  if  speculative,  evolutionary 
explanation  of  how  this  disposition  (Sperber  1996:  67)  for  adaptive  pleasurable 
sensory experience might have given rise to a susceptibility
65 to types of pleasurable 
sensory experience that do not have adaptive value (i.e. do not fulfil the evolutionary 
function for which the disposition was positively selected). To quote Sperber (1996: 
67):  
 
Homo sapiens, for instance, has a disposition to eat sweet food. In the natural 
environment in which the species developed, this was of obvious adaptive value 
in helping individuals to select the most appropriate nutrients. In the modern 
environment  in  which  sugar  is  artificially  produced,  this  brings  out  a 
susceptibility to over-consumption of sugar, with all its well-known detrimental 
effects. 
 
 
To  take  a  simple example,  when  sand  runs  through  our  fingers,  we experience  a 
pleasurable bodily sensation, and indeed, one that we tend to prolong or repeat over 
time. However, it is unlikely that the human disposition for sensory pleasure was 
originally  selected  by  evolution  to  enable  us  to  enjoy  such  experiences  as  sand 
running through our fingers.  
 
It  has  often  been  observed  that  stimuli  which  do  not  fall  into  the  proper 
domain of a trait (i.e. the set of stimuli for which the trait was initially selected) may 
nevertheless by mistake start activating this trait. When we look at the sky, the face 
recognition module in our brain may become activated, allowing us to quickly and 
easily  spot  face-resembling  configurations  in  the  clouds.  Although  such 
configurations activate the face recognition module as much as actual faces do, we 
cannot reasonably assume that the proper functions of this module include spotting 
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‘faces’  in  the  sky.  These  cases  are  generally  referred  to  as  false  positives
66,  and 
involve the application of some ability to an extended range of stimuli (the actual 
domain of the ability) that do not fulfil the function for which this ability was initially 
selected by evolution (the proper domain of the ability):  
 
pleasurable sensory experience 
 
 
                        adaptive                                                          non adaptive  
                                                                                              (false positives) 
 
 
According  to  Tooby  and  Cosmides  (2001:  8),  the  problem  that  has  persistently 
bedevilled  evolutionary  psychologists  is  that  ‘involvement  in  the  imaginative  arts 
appears to be an intrinsically rewarding activity, without apparent utilitarian payoff’. 
In their paper ‘Does beauty build adapted minds? Toward an evolutionary theory of 
aesthetics, fiction and the arts’, Tooby and Cosmides (2001: 10-11) comment:
  
 
The anomaly posed to evolutionary psychologists by the arts (and pretend play) 
can  now  be  stated.  Our  species-typical  neural  architecture  is  equipped  with 
motivational and cognitive programs that appear to be specially designed to input 
fictional experiences and engage in other artistic activities (…). Yet the evolved 
function or selective benefits that would favour the evolution of such adaptations 
remains  obscure.  Natural  selection  is  relentlessly  utilitarian  according  to 
evolution’s  bizarre  and  narrow  standards  of  utility,  and  does  not  construct 
complex  neural  machinery  unless  that  machinery  promoted,  among  our 
ancestors,  the  genetic  propagation  of  the  traits  involved.  So,  why  are  these 
neurogenetic programs built in to human nature? 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, acceptable answers are down to three: 
 
1. The human engagement in fictional experience, pretend art and other aesthetic 
activities are the functional products of adaptations that are designed to produce 
this engagement [,] therefore (…) [contributing] to the survival and reproduction 
of our hunter-gatherer ancestors, even though we do not presently know how.  
 
                                                
66 Many thanks to Deirdre Wilson for turning my attention to false positives.  
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2. The human engagement in fictional experience, pretend art and other aesthetic 
activities  is  an  accidental  and  fuctionless  byproduct  -a  susceptibility-  of 
adaptations that evolved to serve functions that have nothing to do with the arts 
per se. According to this hypothesis, engagement in the arts is like catching a 
disease or becoming addicted to drugs. It is not something that humans were 
designed to do, but something they are vulnerable to. Or as W.H. Auden put it, 
‘Poetry makes nothing happen’. 
 
3. The psychological basis of these activities is the result of genes that spread by 
chance during evolution. (We consider the cognitive and motivational features 
related  to  aesthetic  experience  (…)  to  be  too  well-organised  and  reliably 
developing to be explicable as chance fixation of neural alleles, and will not 
consider this hypothesis further.)   
 
 
In this analysis, I will argue that false positive triggers of pleasurable sensory 
experience provide us with a compelling line of argument in favour of the second 
hypothesis, the side-effect or by-product hypothesis. It seems to me, though, that there 
are two questions an evolutionary approach to art would have to answer. The first 
question  is,  what  made  possible  the  human  ability  for  aesthetic  experience,  and 
consequently, the human ability to produce, enjoy and appreciate art? I will argue that 
the  ‘false  positive’  scenario  convincingly  answers  this  first  question.  The  second 
question -which I see as palpably distinct from the first- is, how did this particular 
human ability eventually give rise to one of the most successful and enduring human 
cultural achievements? In trying to answer this second question, I will argue that the 
side-effect hypothesis and the functional hypothesis (i.e. the first hypothesis in the 
quote from Tooby and Cosmides) are not mutually exclusive. As long as we treat the 
side-effect hypothesis as designed to explain what made aesthetic experience and art 
possible for humans, and the functional hypothesis as designed to explain why -unlike 
with other similar false positives- humans set up action plans for bringing about the 
repetition of aesthetic experiences on such a scale that art gained its present cultural 
status, the two hypotheses seem compatible. In line with that, in later sections I will 
try to suggest a possible set of worthwhile effects that exposure to art and aesthetic  
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experience can be seen as triggering. This would explain why both human societies 
and  the  individual  mind  have  repeatedly  returned  to  the  action  of  art,  despite  its 
seemingly non-functional and non-utilitarian nature.
67 
 
I  began  this  line  of  argument  by  saying  that  there  is  one  articulatory 
component that is more revealing about the nature and origins of art than the end 
product of art  itself could ever be. This  component is aesthetic experience. Since 
antiquity, the intuition that sensory experience is somehow tightly interwoven into the 
fabric  of  art  underpins  all  relevant  discussion  in  aesthetics.  The  very  word 
‘aesthetics’,  chosen  by  ancient  philosophers  to  pick  out  the  particular  strand  of 
enquiry whose domain was the concept of beauty and the nature of art, originates in 
the  ancient  Greek  word  ‘aestheseis’,  meaning  ‘the  senses’.  It  is  time,  I  think,  to 
interweave  intuition  with  argument  and  propose  that  there  can  be  no  adequate 
discussion of the nature and origins of art without a prior explanatory understanding 
of the notion ‘aesthetic’. And in turn, there can be no explanatory understanding of 
the  notion  ‘aesthetic’  without  an  adequate  discussion  of  the  precise  role  that 
perception and the senses play in it. 
Aesthetic experience, I want to suggest, is a side-effect or by-product of the 
disposition for adaptive sensory pleasure. Moreover, it is a side-effect which applies 
specifically to art. The stimuli that trigger aesthetic experience fall into the actual 
domain of the human ability for pleasurable sensory experience, but are not part of its 
proper  domain.  It  follows  that  aesthetic  experience,  just  like  the  pleasurable 
experience of having sand running through one’s fingers, belongs to a range of false 
                                                
67 Incidentally, an artwork may have a utilitarian purpose. In the previous chapter, I argued 
that the presence or absence of a practical function is not the factor that determines whether or 
not an object is a work of art.  
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positives that trigger sensory pleasure without having any positively selected adaptive 
value.  
 
pleasurable sensory experience 
 
 
                                      adaptive                                              non adaptive  
                                                                                              (false positives) 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                            aesthetic experience 
To make the generic claim that aesthetic experience is a refined case of non 
adaptive sensory pleasure is to commit oneself to each of the following sub-claims:  
 
a)  that aesthetic experience is non adaptive,  
b)  that aesthetic experience is pleasurable, and  
c)  that aesthetic experience is a type of sensory experience.  
 
I am committed to all three of them. Claim (a) suggests that aesthetic experience is a 
side-effect/  by-product  of  evolution,  and  therefore  indicates  an  area  of  overlap 
between aesthetic experience and other realms of human experience that also happen 
to be by-products of evolution. Claim (b) suggests that aesthetic experience triggers 
the reward system of the brain, and therefore indicates an area of overlap between 
aesthetic experience and other realms of non adaptive human experience that also 
happen to do the same. Claim (c) suggests that aesthetic experience is primarily a 
sensory  type  of  experience,  and  therefore  indicates  an  area  of  overlap  between 
aesthetic  experience  and  other  sensory  experiences.  Finally,  claims  (b)  and  (c) 
together suggest a possible line of explanation for the strong intuition that aesthetic 
experience is somehow tightly interconnected with human sexual instincts. According  
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to  this  line  of  argument,  aesthetic  experience  is  closely  related  to  the  human 
disposition for sexual pleasure, by virtue of being a non-adaptive variety of precisely 
such  adaptive  and  positively  selected  types  of  pleasurable  sensory  response.  This 
scenario  allows  us  to  account  for  the  strong  intuition  that  there  is  a  significant 
connection between art and sex, without nevertheless committing ourselves to the 
claim that art is a direct product of sexual selection.
68 
Having suggested these three ways in which aesthetic experience in my view 
overlaps with other areas of experience, we now need to find at least one critical 
cutting  point  that  could  set  aesthetic  experience  apart  from  other,  non-aesthetic 
instances of human sensory pleasure. In simpler terms, we need at least one crucial 
parameter  that  would  explain  the  strong  introspective  evidence  that  the  kind  of 
sensory pleasure we take from, say, a soft breeze is somehow crucially similar to, but 
at the same time, crucially distinct from the type of sensory pleasure art gives us.  
The idea that aesthetic pleasure is of a different order from sexual, gustatory 
or  other  generic  types  of  pleasurable  sensory  response  has  been  around  in  the 
philosophy of art for a number of centuries, and there have been various suggestions 
about what this difference may be due to, or whether it is likely to be identifiable or 
describable at all. A more recent strand of enquiry concerns the extent to which 
evolutionary considerations could help to bring such crucial difference to light. Here 
is a comment from Dutton (2003: section 6): 
 
While  evolutionary  psychology  may  have  a  capacity  to  shed  light  on  the 
existence  of  art  and  art’s  persistent  qualities,  it  cannot  pretend  to  explain 
everything we might want to know about art. In particular, there is an aspect of 
Kant’s aesthetics that ought to be borne in mind when discussing evolutionary 
                                                
68 Miller (2000) and Dutton (2003 and 2008) have been developing a sexual selection account 
in which art is treated as an indicator of fitness and general intelligence. 
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psychology  in  an  aesthetic  context.  Kant  distinguished  what  he  called  the 
agreeable from the beautiful. The agreeable are the straightforward subjective 
sensations of things that we  like in  direct experience: the taste of sweet, for 
example, or the colour blue. The pleasurable experience of such sensations, Kant 
held,  contains  no  intellectual  element:  it  is  a  brute feeling,  often  seeming  to 
satisfy a desire (such as hunger), and as such must be carefully distinguished 
from the experience of the beautiful, in which the imagination combines with 
rational understanding in the experience of an imaginative object. For Kant, the 
disinterested experience that characterizes the proper regard for art is cut off 
from desires -the beautiful object is contemplated or observed, it is not used or 
consumed.  Works  of  art,  especially  of  fine  art,  therefore  engage  the  higher 
faculties, and the pleasures they afford are of a different order than sexual or 
gustatory sensations of pleasure.  
 
(…)  This  is  not  a  distinction  many  evolutionary  psychologists  have  fully 
appreciated. (…) They leave no room here for any distinctions between pleasures 
directly implicated in the satisfaction of desires and the contemplative pleasure 
historically identified as aesthetic and artistic. 
 
(…) This is not to say that even in these areas evolutionary psychology might not 
have important things to tell us. Our responses to deep and complex works of art 
layer rich meanings and values that may be difficult to disentangle. (…) Even if 
it  is  never  able  to  offer  a  completely  satisfactory  general  theory  of  art, 
evolutionary  psychology  has  the  potential  to  contribute  significantly  to  a 
philosophical understanding of art and its effects. These contributions are only 
beginning to be grasped and developed. 
 
 
Ι now want to grapple with this long-standing question and consider in more 
detail in what respects aesthetic pleasure may be of a different order from other 
generic types of pleasurable sensory response. I shall then try and link this discussion 
with the false positive account outlined above.  
Pleasurable sensory experience results directly from, and is therefore directly 
caused  by,  interaction  with  objects:  the  pleasurable  sensation  of  sand  running 
through  my  fingers  results  directly  from  the  object  ‘sand’  and  my  physical 
interaction with it: 
 
Object (e.g. sand)   Pleasurable sensory experience 
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Αesthetic  experience  does  not  work  in  that  way.  Αesthetic experience  is  a  more 
complex type of pleasurable sensory experience, which is specific to art and is linked 
to the particular kind of object a work of art is.  
In  the  last  chapter,  I  argued  that  works  of  art  are  objects  with  a  distinct 
psycho-cognitive etiology. They are caused by a complex art-specific type of mental 
state that I have called a poetic thought state. To give a quick reminder, a poetic 
thought state is a metarepresentational state that involves a complex and retroactive 
feedback  relationship  between  an  agent  -the  artist-  who  has  a  novel,  creative  or 
‘aspectual’  mental  representation  of  an  object  and  a  steady  reflective  focus  of  a 
certain  kind  towards  this  representation.  I  have  specifically  suggested  that  the 
creator’s/ agent’s focus towards her representation is of an aesthetic sort:  
 
 
                                
                                                                                                                                          
            Initial object                                                                      Aesthetic attitude  
        (e.g. Campbell’s soup tin) 
 
 
Novel object/ mental entity in the artist’s mind 
(e.g. ‘Campbell’s soup’) 
 
 
Works of art are objects which result from, and are therefore etiologically 
linked to, this type of mental state. Because of their etiological histοry, works of art 
are essentially distinct objects. Αesthetic experience is specific to such objects and 
such objects alone.  
Before seeing what exactly this amounts to, here is another claim that I’d like 
to commit myself to. In existing philosophical debate, aesthetic value, experience 
and response are typically discussed in relation to the reception end of art. I want to  
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turn this theoretical canon upside-down and treat aesthetic experience as no less a 
quintessential component of artistic production too. Αesthetic experience, I would 
like to propose, is as central to the production of art as it is to its reception, equally 
and similarly present in the mechanisms of artistic response and in the mechanisms 
that make art possible within the individual mind.  
The  claim  has  implications  of  two  sorts.  It  assumes  -and  there  is  strong 
introspective evidence for this- that in creating a work of art, the artist experiences a 
type of sensory feedback that is essentially the same as the one the audience gets 
when receiving a work of art. In other words, the first person to take pleasure from 
an artwork is its producer. If this assertion is justified (and I am personally convinced 
that it is), it would bring artistic production and reception together under a single 
mechanism which revolves crucially around a single, common ability for aesthetic 
response.  
In my view, shifting the theoretical focus to the production end of art may 
prove more illuminating about the nature of aesthetic experience than investigation 
of the reception end has so far been/ I will therefore look first at aesthetic response as 
an occurrence within the individual mind, the artist’s mind.  
Ready-mades  have  traditionally  been  treated  as  raising  some  of  the  most 
puzzling issues in contemporary art, bedevilling philosophers for nearly a century. 
To my mind, though, this seemingly problematic category of artworks is actually 
more useful in noetic experiments, and often more illuminating for issues in aesthetic 
philosophy, than manufactured artworks could ever be. 
In ‘The Transfiguration of the Commonplace’, Danto (1981) famously asks 
what makes a ready-made -e.g. a Campbell’s Soup by Andy Warhol as opposed to a 
perceptually indistinguishable Campbell’s Soup tin on the shelves of a super market-  
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a work of art. I have already suggested an answer: its psycho-cognitive etiology, of 
course. Campbell’s Soup is an existing object out there in the world. Campbell’s 
Soup is clearly irrelevant to a philosophy of art. An agent -say, Warhol- sees this pre-
existing object in a certain creative way: he has an aspectual representation of that 
object. Immediately, and just by virtue of talking about representations, we move 
from the domain of physical real world objects to a new domain, that of mental 
entities: the mental entity ‘way in which Warhol sees the object’ is itself a novel 
object. In Chapter 5, I have suggested that such mental entities may be relevant to a 
theoretical  understanding  of  human  creativity,  but  are  not  yet  relevant  to  a 
philosophy of art. Up to this point, our agent is still in a pre-artistic condition: he is a 
naïve creator of novel mental objects, capable of creative thinking of a certain kind, 
but, strictly speaking, not yet capable of art. For the psycho-cognitive state our agent 
is in to be properly described as an artistic condition, our agent must stop being 
oblivious of the novel object he has mentally formed, and somehow start steadily 
responding to this object.  
My  claim  is  that  the  nature  of  this  response  is  essentially  and  crucially 
aesthetic: that what happens there and then in the individual mind is basically the 
same thing that happens when we stand in front of a painting, read a poem or listen 
to a string quartet. Our agent has a steady aesthetic attitude towards his own novel 
and creative mental representation of some initial object, and in my view, to say that 
an agent has an aesthetic attitude is to say -amongst other things which I will try to 
tackle later in my discussion- that our agent draws pleasurable sensory experience of 
a particular kind from steadily focusing on his creative mental representation. By 
virtue  of  being  embedded  in  such a  psycho-cognitive  configuration, and  with an  
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agent’s aesthetic focus firmly fixed on them, creative mental representations of this 
sort become -or at least behave as- aesthetic objects. 
 
 
 
                                
                                                                                                                                          
            Initial object                                                                      Aesthetic attitude  
        (e.g. Campbell’s soup tin) 
 
 
Novel object/ mental entity in the artist’s mind 
(e.g. ‘Campbell’s soup’) 
                                                
 
Aesthetic object 
 
 
The rationale for my approach starts from strong introspective evidence that 
when I work on a poem, when an idea for a poem pops up in my mind, when I 
experience  words  in  the  mind  -a  kind  of  phenomenal  consciousness  that  poets 
experience in the production phase-, my senses respond to it in exactly the same way 
as when I read or recollect somebody else’s poem. From my ‘mind’s eye’ to the 
sense of touch to –most important, in my view- my ‘mind’s ear’, my perceptual 
attention  is  wholly  directed  at  these  novel  goings-on  inside  my  mind/  brain 
rewarding me continuously with sensory pleasure. It seems to me (and this is so far 
only an intuitive claim) that the type of sensory pleasure I experience is qualitatively 
the same -i.e. has similar properties linked to the same underlying mechanisms- as 
the pleasure I instantaneously get from reading Elytis’ ‘Journal of an unseen April’ 
or  looking  at  Picasso’s  ‘Woman  in  a  red  armchair’.  I  take  this  as  preliminary 
evidence that on both the production and the reception side of art, we are in fact  
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dealing  with  a single,  common  type  of  pleasurable  sensory  experience.  It  is  this 
particular type of sensory experience that in my view captures better than anything 
else the so far fluid notion of ‘the aesthetic’.  
According to this account, aesthetic experience occurs in both production and 
reception. In production terms, aesthetic experience is a metarepresentational state
69 
which takes place more often than not below the level of consciousness, and which 
inter alia involves an agent having a specific type of pleasurable sensory response to a 
novel, creative mental representation of his own (an aspectual representation). The 
pleasurable nature of this response is an immediate kind of reward which, at least 
partially and at a very rudimentary level, explains the agent’s remaining in, enjoying 
and seeking to find himself again in this particular type of metarepresentational state. 
Rather fine-grained, complex practical reasoning relations (which certainly deserve 
further  investigation)  between  the  novel  mental  entity  and  the  agent’s  aesthetic 
response to it and continued focus on it result -sometimes progressively, some times 
instantaneously- in the physically observable object in the outside world we refer to as 
an ‘artwork’. The physically observable artwork can be seen as a realisation of the 
novel mental entity when it bears at least some minimal resemblance to the mental 
entity initially conceived.  
We could contrast art with the practical reasoning processes involved in theory 
formation. Theory formation often begins with a mental flash and ends up with a 
concrete instantiation that bears very little resemblance to the initial idea. The mental 
flash/ initial novel mental representation is in a sense a place holder for the final 
                                                
69 As mentioned above, the notion of metarepresentation must be taken here in a rather weak 
sense. The creator has an attitude of a certain kind to a creative mental representation of her 
own. This attitude need not itself be a representation in the strict sense, need not be properly 
conceptual or reflective. In the last chapter, I spoke of ‘intuitive awareness’. All that is needed 
is for the agent/ artist to be intuitively aware of having a creative mental representation. In 
that case, she can be said to metarepresent this mental representation, but in a very weak 
sense.  
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object (theory) which, however, must be somehow minimally related to that initial 
flash  -even  by  antithesis/  contradiction-  for  it  to  be  reasonably  perceived  as  a 
realisation of it. The relation between initial conception and final object should be 
regarded  as  interactive,  with  the  initial  goal/  intention  shifting  in  the  process  of 
instantiation, binding with other goals, being affected by chance or context etc. 
 
 
 
                                
                                                                                                                                          
            Initial object                                                                      Aesthetic attitude  
        (Campbell’s soup tin) 
 
 
                                    
                                                      Novel object/ mental entity 
                                                ‘Campbell’s soup’ = aesthetic object 
                                             
 
 
                                          
      Retroactive practical reasoning relations result in a physically observable object in the world: 
 
 
 
                                                   Novel physical object/ Artwork 
                                                 Campbell’s soup = aesthetic object 
 
 
 
In reception, the order of events is in some sense reversed, although reception 
should not in any case be seen as just production in reverse. The sense in which the 
order of events is ‘reversed’ is that reception takes as its starting point the end-point 
of production: the physically observable object in the world, the artwork. However, 
this  raises the question of  whether aesthetic experience at the reception end is a 
response to the artwork, understood as the physical object per se. I want to claim that  
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first appearances are deceptive, and that aesthetic experience
70 is not a response to 
the artwork as a physical object per se, but rather a response to the artwork as a 
physical manifestation of some novel mental entity.  
Thus,  when  we  walk  in  the  Tate  Modern  section  ‘Minimalism’  and  are 
pleasantly  caught  by  the  red  glow  emanating  from  Donald  Judd’s  copper  box 
(Untitled, 1972),
71 we are only having a pleasurable sensory experience of a generic/ 
non-aesthetic sort. We would find ourselves getting the same pleasurable sensory 
feedback  even  if  the  object  in  question  was,  say,  a  copper  water  tank  in  our 
neighbour’s garden. So long as the water tank had the same configuration of shape, 
colour, texture, line and dimension, our senses would respond it in pretty much the 
same way.
72 The physical nature of artworks suggests that they too, just like any 
other physical entity in the world, may well cause pleasurable sensory experience of 
a generic kind. What I am arguing is that works of art can also cause a more refined, 
second order type of pleasurable sensory experience, aesthetic experience, which is 
specific to them and them alone.  
These two layers of experience are not separate from one another: generic 
pleasurable sensory experiences are put at the service of the aesthetic. In producing a 
work of art, an artist, sometimes sub-attentively and sometimes consciously, weighs 
the physical aspects of the resulting object and the way our perception may respond 
to it. The physical aspects of the artwork are to a greater or lesser degree embedded 
within some -possibly vague and intuitive- intention of achieving such and such an 
aesthetic  experience.  This  point  applies  equally  to  ready-mades.  What  physical 
                                                
70 At this point we are focusing on aesthetic experience at the reception end. 
71 The artwork is an open copper tank whose inside has been painted red by the artist. 
72 To keep the line of argument as clear and simple as possible, I deliberately ignore any 
issues having to do with the location/ installation of an artwork in space. Although they are 
definitely central to our sensory response to a work of art, it is not necessary to consider them 
for the present purposes of my discussion. All I want to show here is an interesting distinction 
between a generic sensory response to some object and an aesthetic response.  
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aspects of a Campbell’s soup tin made it a better candidate for Warhol’s conceptual 
artwork than, say, a tin of Green Giant corn? How do the different physical aspects 
of  Duchamp’s  Urinal  -a  ready-made  porcelain  urinal-,  as  compared  with  a 
transparent  yellowish  urinal made out of resin by another  artist, ultimately serve 
rather distinct aesthetic experiences? 
I have already suggested that a pleasurable sensory experience of the generic 
(non-aesthetic) kind involves an agent and a direct pleasurable sensory response by 
this agent to some internal or external object: say, a caress or the memory of a caress. 
It follows from our discussion so far that aesthetic experience is inherently different 
from generic types of pleasurable sensory response, in that it is not direct. Aesthetic 
experience is not possible without the mediation of some intervening consciousness. 
It is a sensory response, not to objects per se out there in the world, but to the 
particular way in which objects have been seen by an intervening mind -our very 
own,  in the case of production, or  somebody else’s, in the case of reception.  In 
having an aesthetic experience, we in fact respond to the way something has been 
seen, to evidence about a novel entity formed in an agent’s mind.  
Thus,  aesthetic  experience  is  not  a  direct  response  to  physical  objects  in 
themselves. It is rather a response to a relation between physical objects and mental 
representations. To have an aesthetic experience is to participate unwittingly in a 
game  of  metarepresentation.  Pleasurable  sensory  experience  of  the  generic  kind, 
being  a  direct  response  to  the  physicality  of  things,  does  not  require  a 
metarepresentational  capacity,  even  in  the  weakest  sense  of  metarepresentation. 
Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, would not be possible for a creature that 
does  not  have  theory  of  mind,  or  more  specifically,  the  ability  to  metarepresent 
mental states. Such a creature would only respond to works of art incidentally, at the  
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basic level of generic pleasurable sensory response, when physical aspects of works 
of  art  positively  caught  its  perceptual  attention.  Pre-theoretical  intuition  strongly 
suggests that this is nowhere near the way in which human beings respond to and 
experience artworks.  
It follows that merely perceptually gratifying objects
73 cannot cause aesthetic 
experience.  To  say  that  we  experience  ‘aesthetic  pleasure’  in  interacting  with  a 
merely  perceptually  gratifying  object  is,  in  my  view,  to  use  the  term  ‘aesthetic’ 
catachrestically: our experience may be both sensory and pleasurable, but it is not 
strictly speaking aesthetic. Merely perceptually gratifying objects lack the sort of 
relational essence, the specific psycho-cognitive etiology, that makes an object a 
work of art. This suggests that merely perceptually gratifying objects are experienced 
in  a  direct  way,  just  like  any  other  physical  object  that can  incidentally  give  us 
sensory pleasure. The way they are experienced is not mediated by an agent’s novel 
mental  object/  way  of  seeing  an  object,  and  therefore  does  not  involve 
metarepresentation. It is the object per se that we respond to, not the aspectualness of 
the object. When a perceptually  gratifying object -say,  a Greek pot-  is for some 
reason  experienced  in  a  mediated  way,  then  this  object,  as  I  argued  in  the  last 
chapter, should have the relational essence, and hence the status, of an artwork.  
I now want to suggest that the first step towards a well articulated aesthetics 
and  a  comprehensive  philosophy  of  literature  is  to  disregard  artistic  canons.  An 
                                                
73 The term ‘merely perceptually gratifying objects’ is the standard way in the philosophy of 
art to refer to objects that elicit sensory or perceptual pleasure without meriting the status of 
artworks. However, the notions of ‘sensory’ and ‘perceptual’ are distinct in non-trivial ways. 
A  perceptual  process  is  normally described  in  cognitive science  as one that takes  a  non-
conceptual  representation  as  input  and  delivers  a  conceptual  representation  as  output.  To 
describe  an  experience  as  perceptual  therefore  suggests  that  there  are  conceptual 
representations being activated, if not actually accessed. To talk of an experience as sensory, 
by  contrast,  seems  to  allow  for  the  possibility  that  not  much  is  going  on  in  the  way  of 
conceptual activation. For ease of understanding, I have continued to use the term ‘merely 
perceptually  gratifying objects’ but I’d like to note here that I take it to refer to ‘merely 
sensorily gratifying objects’.   
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aesthetics founded on a canon, be it the western or any other one, is an aesthetics 
emerging from convention. So long as our theories resort to sociologically driven 
conceptions and truths by agreement, they will fail to offer an explanatory account of 
what makes a certain object art. It is of little interest to me whether an ekfrasis
74 is 
conventionally categorised as literature/ art. In essentialist terms, an ekfrasis was no 
more than an exercise in elaborate discourse, with no causal relation to the genuine 
poetic  thought  states  that  underlie  literature/  art.  An  ekfrasis  can  cause  generic 
sensory response, but not aesthetic experience. Similarly, I would feel very confident 
in describing certain instances of design and architecture, in works, say, by Santiago 
Calatrava or Tadao Ando also as eliciting aesthetic experience, in that they exhibit 
the etiological properties of poetic thought states.  
In  the  following  sections,  I  shall  say  a  bit  more  about  the 
metarepresentational nature  of aesthetic experience, with a  view to showing how 
artworks make possible a meeting of minds. Let me note in passing that an aesthetic 
response to the way a certain object has been seen by its producer -to evidence about 
a novel creative entity formed in an agent’s mind- need involve neither verbatim 
reproduction  of  that  entity  nor  identity  of  thoughts.  It  is  possible  that  in  the 
production process, the producer is also doing a little bit of interpretation, switching 
back  and  forth  between  his  own  viewpoint  and  that  of  an  -ideal?-  audience. 
Similarly, in the reception process, the receiver/ interpreter is certainly doing part of 
the production herself, drawing on background assumptions which certainly include 
assumptions  about  an  existing  or  hypothetical  producer’s  mental  states.  Work  in 
pragmatics and cognitive anthropology in the last 20 years, for instance, suggests that 
transmission  of  information  necessarily  involves  transformation  of  information: 
                                                
74 Α short-lived genre of late antiquity that involved exhaustive description of important sites, 
buildings, artworks etc.  
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‘recall is not storage in reverse, and comprehension is not expression in reverse’ 
(Sperber 1996: 31). The mind is not a mere duplication device, and an audience 
should not be seen as a passive recipient but rather as an active agent, who shares 
responsibility with the producer by making his own inferences and bringing his own 
sets of background assumptions to bear in the construction of experience. This may 
give us some insight into Dewey’s (1935) intuitive claim that:  
 
to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. And his creation must 
include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent… 
Without an act of recreation the object is not perceived as a work of art. 
 
 
A final note of clarification. My choice of a ready-made as the starting point 
for  this  discussion  may  have  left  you  with  a  question  mark  about  how  a 
metarepresentational model of aesthetic experience could apply to works of art that 
lack an everyday perceptually indiscernible equivalent. However, the story need not 
be any different. In my view, the case of ready-mades is highly illuminating, precisely 
because it makes the dichotomy between mere objects, on the one hand, and novel 
representations/ ways of seeing an object, on the other, rather easy to grasp: a tin of 
Campbell’s Soup and what Warhol sees in a tin of Campbell’s Soup are two clearly 
distinct objects. I would be inclined to say that this dichotomy applies equally to 
objects that do not have pre-existing everyday equivalents, although it may not be as 
easy to see. The main difference is that in this second type of case, both the initial 
object and the novel way of seeing that object involve mental representations.  
To understand how this works, imagine a place holder ‘…’ for where the 
initial object was in our previous schema:  
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           ‘…’           ‘I’m bored  
                                                                                   like a tree’                                                        
       Place holder                                                           Aesthetic attitude  
 
 
 
 
 
Novel object/ mental entity 
 
 
This place holder ‘…’ is waiting to be filled with whatever novel representation pops 
up in the creator’s/ artist’s mind, as distinct from what the agent sees in it. A naïve 
agent of novel representations may experience words in the mind. Remember young 
Mendonca  from  our  discussion  in  the  last  chapter?  The  boy  forms  a  novel 
representation, say, ‘I’m bored like a tree’, but does not see anything in it. He simply 
bypasses it and forgets it. The representation ‘I’m bored like a tree’ in itself, without 
an agent’s ‘gaze’ towards it, without an agent’s awareness of the ways in which it is 
novel and creative, is nothing but a mere object, a Campbell’s soup tin on the shelves 
of  a  supermarket,  completely  irrelevant  to  a  discussion  on  either  the  nature  of 
creativity or aesthetics. Only in the second part of our schema, where the creator’s 
mind comes up with a novel mental entity, does the configuration start becoming 
relevant for an understanding of creativity. In this latter part of the schema, the same 
initial object ‘I’m bored like a tree’ is seen in a certain way; it is experienced by our 
agent as the novel and creative representation it is. It has thus become the mental 
product of a non-naïve agent. The third part of the schema is constant for both ready-
mades and manufactured artworks: the agent has an inter alia pleasurable sensory  
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response, a response of an aesthetic kind, to what he sees in his own creative mental 
representation ‘I’m bored like a tree’. 
 
6.3 Modes of aesthetic experience. A case from attention blindness. 
It is a beautiful day. You sit outside by the sea, feeling something nice for a while, not 
realising that you feel something nice, that what you feel is because of the breeze, or 
even that there is a breeze. As a result of the vast capacity of the human mind to 
process internal and external stimuli that may never be brought to conscious attention, 
for a while you are experiencing a kind of attention blindness: a fact, although highly 
manifest in your cognitive environment, is only sub-attentively monitored.  
The point I’d like to focus on in this particular instance of attention blindness 
is that, for the shorter or longer period that the breeze remains unavailable to your 
consciousness, your senses nevertheless respond to it, producing a pleasurable bodily 
feeling. It can be presumed, then, that, for as long as the source of this pleasurable 
feeling  remains  unavailable  to  cognition,  the  rewarding  sensory  feedback  the 
organism is experiencing results from some other type of effect.
75 In discussing the 
motivations for the thesis of nonconceptualism
76, the philosopher Michael Tye (2006: 
12-16) lends us a few more pertinent examples:  
 
I begin with the case of perceptual experiences with an evaluative character. 
Suppose you are walking towards the Plaza Hotel in New York and just before 
you get there, you encounter a large quantity of vomit on the side-walk. You are 
appalled, of course. (…) The vomit smells bad to you. In so doing, it elicits in 
you an olfactory experience directed on the vomit and its odor. Your experience 
represents the odor of the vomit as bad. But it does not just represent the odor of 
the  vomit  as  bad  simpliciter.  It  represents  the odor  as  bad  in  a certain  way, 
                                                
75 Later on, I will introduce the notion of perceptual effect, and discuss how conceptualisation 
may play a part in deepening (pleasurable) sensory experience.  
76 Roughly  speaking,  the general  nonconceptualist thesis  claims  that experience  can  have 
nonconceptual  content,  content that is independent  of  thoughts. An  extreme  conceptualist 
thesis, conversely, would claim that all experiences must activate concepts and/ or sentences 
in the language of thought.  
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namely as foul. Your experience, then, has an evaluative content. It represents 
the vomit and its odor as having a kind of negative value, as being foul. 
 
Must one have the capacity to think a thought into which the concept FOUL enters 
in order for something to smell foul to one? Surely not.  (…) In this connection, 
it is worth noting that new born babies react to Q-tips dipped in sulphur and held 
beneath their noses by grimacing and turning away. The obvious explanation for 
their doing so is that sulphur smells foul to them. But that surely does not require 
that they already have the concept FOUL. They may well be built so as to acquire 
the concept FOUL via such encounters, but they do not have the concept the first 
time something smells foul to them. A plausible hypothesis, then, is that the 
experience of something’s smelling foul has a nonconceptual representational 
content.  
 
Consider the other side of  the  coin  for a moment.  A  child as young  as  two 
months, upon tasting a little chocolate, typically behaves in a way that signifies 
that he/she wants more. (…) Why? The answer is that chocolate tastes good. (…) 
the  child’s  gustatory  experience  represents  a  certain  taste  and  the  child 
experiences that taste as good. The taste is experienced as good by the child in 
that the child undergoes an overall experience which represents the presence of 
the taste in the mouth and represents it as good. Intuitively, this is not a cognitive 
response. It does not require its subject to posses evaluative concepts.  
 
 
Tye  then  goes  on  to  discuss  an  important  connection  between  the  amygdala  and 
emotional  experience.  In  processing  information  via  subcortical  pathways,  the 
amygdala allow for faster transmission than is found in the cerebral hemispheres, 
within  which  conceptual  thought  and  decision-making  occur.  It  is  this  speed  of 
transmission that permits us to begin to respond to dangerous stimuli before we even 
fully know what the stimulus is, with obvious survival value of course. Imagine a rat 
that would have to take the time to form a whole sequence of thoughts before acting 
in the face of a cat about to pounce. Compare this later rat to another one that is wired 
to feel fear automatically in response to certain large moving shapes. The difference 
in survival probabilities is tangible. If the experience of fear can occur without its 
subject possessing the concepts DANGEROUS/ THREATENING etc, then on Tye’s version  
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of nonconceptualism, some emotional experiences should be said to have robustly 
nonconceptual (evaluative) contents. 
77 
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999: 32) refer to a similar case -a type of face 
agnosia- in patients with damage in the inferotemporal cortex. This case involves 
emotional  rather  than  perceptual  sub-attentive  activation,  but  provides  a  relevant 
example of unconscious mental processes: 
 
(…) the SCR is a direct measure of the amount of limbic (emotional) activation 
produced by an image. It is a better measure, as it turns out, than simply asking 
someone how much emotion he feels about what he is looking at, because the 
verbal  response  is  filtered,  edited,  and  sometimes  censored  by  the  conscious 
mind -so that your answer is a ‘contaminated’ signal. Indeed there are patients 
with damage to the inferotemporal cortex who cannot consciously recognise their 
mother, yet will still register a larger SCR to her face than to unfamiliar people 
(…). 
 
 
The idea that it is possible to experience rewarding sensory feedback from 
sub-attentively monitored or predominantly sensory occurrences without significant 
engagement of conceptual cognition is plausible. It may be that this is not how we 
experience sensory responses most of the time. It may also be that sensory inputs, 
even subconscious ones, automatically trigger some minimal degree of conceptual 
activity, which may not, however, have enough expected effects to attract and hold 
the  attention.  On  a  spreading  activation  model,  sensory  processes  give  some 
                                                
77  Earlier  in  my  discussion,  I  have  explicitly  adopted  the  view  that  to  have  a  sensory 
experience is to be in a certain bodily state, without necessarily having any representation of 
the state you are in, and without consciously or subconsciously evaluating this state. The 
view that pleasurable sensory experience by definition involves representing the object in a 
positive way is one possible engineering solution, but it is not necessary that it’s the only 
one. A child may ingest an object, which gives rise to a taste, which causes an affective 
reaction,  which  triggers  a  heuristic  for  ingesting  similar  objects  when  available.  This, 
however, does not necessarily involve representing the taste as good. As Deirdre Wilson 
pointed out to me (P.C. 10.04.09), ‘this raises interesting issues about the relation of Tye’s 
points to the notion of ad hoc/ non-lexicalised concepts, though. Maybe what Tye has in 
mind is what we might describe as non-lexicalised propositional states’. 
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automatic  initial  degree  of  activation  to  conceptual  processes,  which  may 
nevertheless  get  extinguished  pretty  quickly  through  lack  of  reward.  It  could  be 
argued, then, that conceptual cognition is ‘engaged’ in this weak sense by all sensory 
activity, although it may not reach the level of consciousness. Still, the point I am 
trying  to  make  remains  untouched.  With  some  slight  exaggeration,  it  seems 
reasonable to assume that there is a pure sensory mode in which sensory inputs can 
elicit sensory responses which do not involve conceptual activity, at least not in the 
robust  sense  of  engaging  central  thought  processes  and  activating  conceptual 
representations/ sentences in our language of thought.  
 
Sensory mode 
 
Unattended pleasurable sensory response 
E.g. attention blindness, orgasm etc.  
The experience causes sensory pleasure but does not necessarily involve conceptual 
activity in the robust sense of activating conceptual representations or sentences in our 
language of thought.   
 
Now  I’ll  tell  you  what  Ι’d  do  if  I  were  ‘Basic  Instinct’s’  Nick  Curran 
(Michael Douglas) having fabulous sex with Catherine Tramell (Sharon Stone): I’d 
keep telling myself ‘I’m having sex with Catherine Tramell! I’m having sex with 
Catherine Tramell! I’m having sex with Catherine Tramell!’. Pleasurable sensory 
experience can become conceptualised, reflected upon, mentally represented. After 
feeling something nice for a while without realising that it’s because of the breeze, or 
even that there is a breeze, a thought may occur to you which brings to conscious 
attention  both  the  perceptual  fact  in  question and  the  fact that  you  are  having  a 
sensory response to it: ‘Aahh… the breeze… it’s nice…’.
78 Introspective evidence 
                                                
78 There is a question about how this sentence/ thought comes to conscious attention; whether, 
as it were, there was no conceptual activation at all before, and the sentence/ thought just pops 
up, or whether there was a lot of conceptual activity going on under the surface, and attention  
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suggests that conceptualisation reinforces the pleasure we get from sensory inputs, 
hence  the  propensity  to  repeat  to  oneself,  when  hypothetically  having  sex  with 
Catherine Tramell, that one is having sex with Catherine Tramell. The engagement 
of central thought processes intensifies pleasurable sensory experience. 
  
Conceptualised or Perceptual mode 
 
Conceptualised pleasurable sensory response. 
The experience has been recognised, mentally represented and become available to 
consciousness:  ‘…the  breeze feels  nice’.  The mode  is  termed  ‘perceptual’  on  the 
ground that perception takes a sensory representation as input and gives a conceptual 
representation as output. Here, the input gives a significant/ non-minimal degree of 
activation to conceptual processes, which apparently have enough expected effects to 
attract and hold the attention. 
 
Finally,  needless  to  say,  as  soon  as  the  fact  that  one  is  having  a  certain 
pleasurable sensory response becomes available to consciousness, it can at any point 
provide  input  to  spontaneous  inference  processes  through  which  contextual 
implications (Sperber and Wilson 2008: 23-26; Sperber and Wilson 1995: 152) may 
potentially be drawn:  
 
Conceptual mode 
 
Conscious pleasurable sensory experience is properly reflected upon and, like any 
conceptual  representation,  gives  some  initial  degree  of  activation  to  potential 
implications. 
 
I  will  return  to  these  matters  later  and  consider  them  in  the  light  of  the 
Relevance-theoretic notion of cognitive effect. For now, I will keep the discussion 
deliberately quite pre-theoretical and just underline a number of significant points. In 
all three cases, from the one where a certain phenomenon -e.g. the breeze- causes me 
                                                                                                                                       
gets automatically allocated to this one when it activates enough expected effects to be the 
most relevant available input. 
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a pleasurable feeling that escapes my attention, to one where the same fact becomes 
available to my consciousness through a simple recognition ‘…the breeze feels nice’, 
to one where the phenomenon lends itself to proper reflection, the experience I am 
having  -the  feeling  caused  by  a  nice  breeze-  is  a  sensory  one.  Having  a  sensory 
experience should not be taken to exclude the possibility of a parallel engagement of 
conceptual cognition, and the parallel engagement of conceptual cognition, in turn, 
does not falsify the claim that the experience in question is sensory.  
I now want to apply this claim to aesthetic experience. Seen as a type of 
pleasurable sensory response, aesthetic experience may also be  obtained in these 
three modes: 
 
Sensory mode of aesthetic experience 
 
 
In the sensory mode, on this account, an aesthetic experience would involve sensory 
pleasure but no conceptual representations or sentences in the language of thought. 
Music,  for  instance,  can  easily  be  experienced  in  a  way  that  resembles  attention 
blindness. Think of all the times you have found yourself in a place where there is 
music  playing  but,  having  completely  forgotten  it  is  there,  you  pay  little  or  no 
attention to it. Your senses, though, respond to it, giving rise to pertinent sensations. 
You may suddenly find yourself feeling relaxed, or being inexplicably agitated, and 
only then realise that it is because of the music. On the production side, consider what 
happens  when  a  composer  experiences  the  musical  equivalent  of  phenomenal 
consciousness, i.e. when a melody pops up in her mind. We can realistically enough 
imagine a case where a melody pops up in the mind, but the fact that it has popped up 
in the mind and that one is having an aesthetic response to it remains unavailable for a 
shorter or longer period. Note, also, that in the case of music, the novel mental entity  
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in the composer’s mind is in every respect a sensory phenomenon: it is just sound in 
the mind. 
It is a legitimate question whether a response of this purely sensory sort is 
indeed  aesthetic,  or  whether  the  idea  that  aesthetic  experience  involves  a 
metarepresentational attitude to/ focus on the object suggests that the experience only 
starts being aesthetic when it has been at least sub-attentively reflected upon. I have 
already suggested that I take metarepresentation in the rather weak sense of intuitive 
awareness. In listening and responding to music in an attentionally blind mode, an 
individual  certainly  experiences  the  object  perceptually,  responding  to  it  as  a 
physical object per se. But at the same time, the response must certainly involve an 
aesthetic component: it is an aesthetic response, albeit a sub-attentive one, in the 
sense that the sound the individual responds to in an attentionally blind fashion is not 
a natural sound, but rather the creation, the product of a mind.  
On the production side, when a composer has a sub-attentive sensory response 
to a melody that has popped up in her mind, she is responding to a novel mental entity 
in pretty much the same way that we respond to music when we have not realised or 
have completely forgotten it is there. She is attentionally blind to the novel entity in 
her mind, or to the fact that she is having a sensory response to it, but this should not 
rule  out  the  assumption  that  the  response  nonetheless  exists.  In  both  cases,  the 
resulting experience is aesthetic: it is a response to the creation of a mind rather than 
to the physical properties of an object per se. In both cases, aesthetic experience is a 
predominantly sensory phenomenon.   
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                                ‘sound’                                                     
                                                                                     Aesthetic attitude to the 
mental entity in her own mind  
 
 
 
Novel mental entity in the composer’s mind 
 
 
Conceptualised or perceptual mode of aesthetic experience 
 
 
In the conceptualised/ perceptual mode, the stimulus of an aesthetic experience has 
become at least minimally available to consciousness: in reaction to a melody popping 
up in her mind, the composer has a conscious response ‘Hmm, that’s nice. I like it’.  
 
 
Conceptual mode of aesthetic experience 
 
 
In the conceptual mode, the stimulus is properly reflected upon, allowing for masses 
of cognitive implications to be potentially drawn from it. The creator focuses on and 
constantly returns  to the novel entity in her mind; this may give rise  to complex 
feedback relations between aesthetic response to one’s own novel mental conception 
and gradual modifications of this conception. In all three cases, the experience is of a 
sensory sort. Although conceptualisation and conceptual effects are far more involved 
in  the  way  we  respond  to  works  of  art  than  to  other  perceptual  stimuli,  the  fact 
remains: aesthetic experience is sensory experience.  
In this chapter I have tried to introduce an empirically tractable account of 
aesthetic experience as a special case of (non adaptive) sensory response. In the next  
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chapter (Is art a mistake, Part 2) I’ll take from where we have just left to propose an 
evolutionary scenario on the origins of literature and art. In discussing extensively the 
role of aesthetic experience in the kind of action literature/art is, I’ll try and gesture to 
the possibility that much of what a poet refers to as ‘agony of expression’ is in fact 
agony for aesthetic achievement.  
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Chapter 7 
Is Art a mistake? (Part 2) 
On the origins of art  
 
 
 
7.1. Perceptually driven actions: art and perceptual effect. 
In  a  discussion  on  the  nature  of  sensory  response,  and  ultimately  on  art  and  the 
content of aesthetic experience, the relationship between perceptual and conceptual 
facts is not a question of either-or. Perceptual and conceptual facts are co-present in 
aesthetic  responses,  tightly  interconnected  by  complex  and  interesting  retroactive 
relations. What takes priority over what, though, is a matter whose importance we 
should not understate. It may seem that I am investing too much in too little -and 
indeed the point I am deliberating may be subtle -but it is by no means secondary. 
Pinning down aesthetic experience as a fundamentally sensory fact is a means to an 
important end: my aim is to construct an argument against interpretationalism. 
Interpretationalism  -which  I  would  regard  as  one  of  the  five  evils  of 
contemporary  literary  study  (along  with  applicationalism,  historicism, 
overtheorisation and unquestioning acceptance of intellectual authority) has plagued 
poetics and literary theorising for the best part of a century. The 20
th century begins 
with unparalleled enthusiasm, as literary and fine art communities unite forces, and a 
new era in both the practice and theory of art gets under way. It is a mystery how an 
adventure  that  began  with  the  most  compelling  arguments  for  a  view  of  art  as 
significant  form  as  opposed  to  significant  content  ends  with  the  full  weight  of 
theorising -at least on the literary side- falling entirely on meaning and interpretation.  
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The fact that one of the functions of language is to provide rich, nuanced evidence
79 
of the producer’s meaning offers one possible explanation for the huge vulnerability 
that  the  study  of  literary  art  has  shown  to  interpretationalism,  as  compared  with 
approaches emerging from the study of other artforms. Otherwise broad and diverse 
domains  of  enquiry  such  as  poetics  are  now  being  progressively  narrowed  into 
disciplines  whose  sole  aim  is  the  study  of  literary  interpretation.  The  view  that 
stylistic choice is ultimately at the service of interpreting is one of the few meeting 
points  between  competing  trends  such  as  functionalist  (e.g.  Halliday  1971)  and 
cognitive stylistics (e.g. Clark 2009). And, finally, the claim that the end of literary 
response (in the teleological sense) is interpretation does not appear to strike anyone 
as odd. Experience and the senses have been discarded. Meaning is all that theory 
thinks of. Two years ago, I had the honour to meet and discuss with the Greek poet 
Maria  Laina.  I  will  quote  her  verbatim:  ‘Poetry  is  primarily  for  the  ear’.  Thank 
goodness not everyone has lost their mind. 
Interpretationalism  involves  treating  the  experiential  as  subordinate  to, and 
ultimately at the service of, the conceptual: to seeing the experiential dimension of art 
as  a  means  to  achieving  such  and  such  interpretations.  In  other  words, 
interpretationalism is based on the assumption that art is conceptually driven, and -
with a degree of exaggeration that is in some sense legitimate- that finding the raison 
d’etre of a work of art comes down to trying to exhaust the inexhaustible question of 
what Campbell’s Soup means. But then again, to deny that art has any conceptual 
content  is  way  off  the  mark  too.  I  want  to  strike  a  balance  between  these  two 
                                                
79 I will quote Sperber and Wilson (2008: 87):  
 
(…) a language provides an unbounded repertoire of evidence of the speaker’s meaning, 
evidence that can be as nuanced, as complex, as richly structured as the speaker likes. 
Non-verbal kinds of evidence are much more limited. With language (and only with 
language) people can communicate about anything they can think about, whether they 
can point to it or not, imitate it or not, and they can do this with endless refinement.   
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extremes, and put conceptual and perceptual aspects of art into what seems to me their 
proper place.  
Let us start thinking about this relationship by reflecting on two disorders: one 
an eating disorder, and the other a sexual disorder. In watching a recent documentary 
on obesity, I noticed something interesting in the way participants talked about their 
propensity for ‘comfort eating’. It seemed that the source of pleasure in these cases 
was  not  the  food  itself as  a  material  object,  nor  the  perceptual  pleasure  it  yields 
through  its  taste,  smell  and  presentation  -i.e.  the  gustatory,  visual  or  olfactory 
experience it can give rise to. Participants would often eat to the point of being sick: 
to the point, that is, of not only losing any sense of food-related perceptual pleasure, 
but of actually experiencing disgust. They seemed to crave not so much the sensory 
pleasure as the thoughts, memories and associations that food could conjure up in 
them.  
Interestingly, in another documentary I found that a sexual disorder known as 
‘sex addiction’ works in pretty much the same way. On first hearing the term, I had 
the  false  impression  that  ‘sex  addiction’  involves  a  constant  craving  for  sexual 
satisfaction and pleasure. Far from it: sexually addicted individuals, usually women, 
often do not experience any sensory pleasure or satisfaction when having sex, rarely if 
ever have an orgasm, and frequently fall victim to sexual abuse (including rape), but 
are nevertheless not in the least discouraged from pursuing their addiction. The reason 
being that sexually addicted individuals find pleasure in sexual intercourse not as a 
game of bodies and senses but from the thoughts that the act of having sex conjures 
up in them: ‘He likes me’, ‘I am beautiful’, ‘I am not alone’, ‘Men find me desirable’, 
‘I still have it’.   
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In both disorders, part of the problem seems to be excessive dependence on a 
certain activity -eating or sexual intercourse. Another is somehow connected to what I 
hope you will agree is the odd situation of taking pleasure not from the physical 
aspects  of  the  activity  in  question  as  a  sensory  type  of  experience,  but  from  the 
thoughts, conceptual implications and modifications the activity brings about. What is 
this intuitive oddity down to? 
There are certain types of human action which are generally engaged in with 
the aim of bringing about pleasure of the senses. When, unusually, these actions are 
engaged in primarily because of the prospective thoughts/ conceptual implications 
they may give rise to, the behaviour seems to veer towards deviation or pathology: 
there must be something terribly wrong with me if what makes sexual intercourse 
pertinent  to me  is  not  so  much  getting  physical  pleasure  as  drawing  conclusions. 
Thinking thoughts and drawing conclusions may be seen as increasing the pertinence 
of a pleasurable sensory or perceptual experience for an individual, by simultaneously 
achieving cognitive relevance in the technical sense of Sperber and Wilson (1995: 
260-66). However, they cannot be legitimately regarded as either the main element of 
the experience or the driving force behind the associated action. We can therefore 
rephrase the introductory line of this paragraph more accurately by saying that there 
are certain types of human action whose driving force is perceptual pleasure. Humans 
set up action plans whose goal is to bring about the repetition of that very pleasurable 
sensory/  perceptual  experience.  I  will  refer  to  such  actions/  action  plans  as 
perceptually driven.  
Humans  have  extremely  rich  conceptual  lives  and  a  noteworthy  ability  to 
extend perceptually driven experiences into the realm of the conceptual. We can find 
ourselves  talking  about  food  for  hours,  comparing  recipes  and  techniques,  
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commenting  on  presentation,  or  exchanging  secrets  about  where  to  source  rare 
ingredients. Similarly, our sex lives are encircled with an incessant array of sexual 
fantasies,  social  taboos,  personal  inhibitions  and  rational  desires.  Still,  eating  and 
having  sex  are  both  perceptually  driven  actions.  Here  is  another  claim  I  want 
tocommit myself to: art as an action -i.e. as a complex phenomenon enabled by our 
disposition  for  pleasurable  sensory  experience  and  consequent  susceptibility  to 
aesthetic experience- should also be regarded as perceptually driven.
80 
Let us briefly recapitulate the claims made above, and then consider how the 
idea of a perceptually driven phenomenon relates to Neuroaesthetics, on the one hand, 
and the Relevance-theoretic notion of cognitive effect, on the other. We have agreed 
that the ability for sensory pleasure, which has obvious adaptive value, must have 
been positively selected in the course of evolution. We then turned our attention to 
sources of pleasurable sensory experience which could not reasonably have had an 
evolutionary function (e.g. sand running through one’s fingers) and decided that they 
fall  into  a  category  of  false  positives.  Our  account  then  proposes  that  aesthetic 
experience is a refined case of non-adaptive pleasurable sensory experience. At some 
point  in  evolution,  novel  mental  representations  of  a  certain  kind  (aspectual 
representations) joined the wide array of false positive triggers of pleasurable sensory 
experience.  The  individual  mind  would  have  started  responding  to  such  mental 
representations  in  a  way  that  closely  resembles  -but  is  not  identical  to-  generic 
pleasurable  sensory  experience.  The  crucial  difference  between  this  response  and 
generic  pleasurable  sensory  response  is  that  it  involved  and  presupposed 
metarepresentation in a broad sense. That is, it was not a direct reaction to an object 
(either external or internal), but a mediated reaction to the way an object was seen by 
                                                
80 Yet another interesting relation between art and sex.  
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some intervening consciousness, to an agent’s novel mental representation. This very 
first mediated/ metarepresentational type of pleasurable sensory response must have 
been the first ever occurrence of an aesthetic experience. It follows that the first ever 
occurrence of aesthetic experience was within the individual mind. This in turn would 
have been the starting point for the first ever process of artistic creation. Complex 
retroactive  relations  between  the  creator’s  aspectual  representations,  her  aesthetic 
response to them and their progressive realisation as a physically observable object in 
the world would have resulted in the first ever occurrence of the entity we call an 
‘artwork’.  
Artworks are public objects, shared public artefacts. They are made available 
for others to ‘view’. As such, we can speculate that they would also have functioned 
as  false  positive  triggers  of  pleasurable  sensory  experience,  eliciting  aesthetic 
responses in the first ever audience to encounter a strange object of that sort.
81 Our 
account thus starts with mental phenomena and ends in the realm of shared public 
representations, allowing for a series of possible hypotheses about the inter-individual 
story  of  art  and  the  macro-mechanisms  (Sperber  1996:  50)  that  enabled  it  to  be 
incorporated  into  and  propagated  as  part  of  the  process  of  human  cultural 
transmission. Which aspects of art have a bearing on its selection and propagation as a 
central part of human public life? What is it, about the particular type of action that art 
is,  that  led  to  artworks  being  amongst  humanity’s  most  successful  and  enduring 
cultural representations?  
 
                                                
81 Aesthetic experience, I have argued, is found in both artistic reception and production.  
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Adaptive pleasurable sensory experience 
 
 
 
Proper Domain        False positives triggering                     Non-adaptive types of 
                                                                                     pleasurable sensory experience  
 
 
                                                             amongst which                                            amongst which 
                                                               
        
                       Aspectual representations                         Aesthetic experience 
                               Functioning as false positives, they trigger                 within the individual mind 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
Complex  retroactive  feedback  relationships  between  someone’s  own  aspectual  representations  and  her 
aesthetic responses to them result in a physically observable and publicly shared object: 
 
                 Artwork 
  
 
 
Being  a  physically  observable  and  publicly shared  object,  the  artwork  provides  evidence  of  a  creator’s 
aspectual representations and functions as stimulus for  
 
                                  
 
 
                                                                                   Aesthetic experience 
                                                                                  in an audience  
 
                                                
  
 
 
162   
On the assumption that aesthetic experience is essentially sensory experience, 
we have seen that art must belong to a category of perceptually driven actions. If we 
are aiming at an explanatory account of aesthetic experience as an occurrence within 
the individual mind, we need to pin down what ‘perceptually driven’ amounts to in 
terms  of  the  organism’s  responding  to,  allocating  attention  to  and  returning  to  a 
certain phenomenon internal to the information-processing device. If we are aiming at 
an explanatory account of aesthetic experience as a response to the public stimulus we 
call an artwork, we need to pin down what ‘perceptually driven’ amounts to in terms 
of an organism’s responding to, maintaining attention on and repeatedly returning to a 
public stimulus.  
By  ‘public  stimulus’,  I  mean  a  phenomenon  external  to  the  information-
processing device, which the device processes as input. I take the notion of stimulus 
in its standard psychological sense, as ‘any modification of the physical environment 
designed  to  be  perceived’  (Sperber  and  Wilson  1995:  29).  Finally,  I  assume  that 
within  the  range  of  possible  modifications  of  the  physical  environment  that  may 
function as stimuli, there are cognitive modifications, and within the range of possible 
cognitive  modifications,  there  are  positive  cognitive  modifications  which  lead  to 
improvements of some sort: that is, to worthwhile effects (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 
109). The latter effects are mental and experienced by humans. 
To  start  speculating  in  more  concrete  terms  about  a  notion  of  effect 
appropriate to a philosophy of art, we shall now turn to Neuroaesthetics. Following 
the tradition of Gestalt psychology of the creative eye (e.g. Arnheim 1974), recent 
neurobiological accounts of art and the brain deserve their fair share of attention in 
debates  on  aesthetics.  The  prospect  of  a  working  interdisciplinary  collaboration 
between neurobiologists and literary/ artistic theorists has considerable potential for  
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helping  us  move  towards  a  substantive  philosophy  of  literature  and  art. 
Neurobiologists  offer  us  astonishing  insight  into  the  perceptual  dimension  of  art, 
translating  vague  intuitions  into  testable  empirical  claims.  Analytically  oriented 
thinkers  in  the  arts  and  humanities,  on  the  other  hand,  can  help  incorporate 
neurobiological research into an articulated theoretical and philosophical framework, 
design relevant experiments and evaluate the content and implications of results.  
 
I  have  already  identified  a  range  of  areas  in  which  neuroaesthetics  would 
greatly benefit from interdisciplinary research with the arts and humanities. Take for 
instance the interesting array of experiments conducted by the neurologist Semir Zeki. 
In  their  paper  ‘Neural  Correlates  of  Beauty’,  Kawabata  and  Zeki  (2004)  aim  to 
identify  specific  types  of  neuropsychological  activity  associated  with  positive  or 
negative aesthetic evaluations of paintings. However, Zeki and Kawabata set out with 
a rather problematic understanding of aesthetic evaluation in the first place. Subjects 
view  a  large  number  of  paintings  and  are  asked  to  classify  them  as  ‘beautiful’, 
‘neutral’  or  ‘ugly’.  They  then  view  the  paintings  again,  while  being  scanned  for 
specific and distinctive visual-brain activity. The design of the experiment skilfully 
avoids such traps as adopting debatable culture-specific or criticism-created canons/ 
standards of beauty. There is no pre-judgement of which paintings are beautiful or 
ugly: subjects themselves make the classification depending on individual background 
and subjective taste, thus allowing for inter-cultural and inter-subjective notions of 
beauty.  
Nonetheless,  the  experiment  still  suffers  from  a  serious  shortcoming.  The 
notion of beauty appealed to is ambiguous; and one of the two senses is not relevant 
for aesthetics. The notion of a ‘beautiful’ painting which is relevant for aesthetics is 
antonymous to the notion of a ‘bad’ painting, rather than an ‘ugly’ painting. To see  
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this, compare ‘ugly painting’ with ‘ugly poem’. What in the world could an ‘ugly 
poem’ be? It is only the notion of a ‘bad poem’ that contrasts in any useful sense with 
‘beautiful poem’. Peter Joel Witkin’s photographic art often focuses on appalling and 
disturbing  subjects,  producing  photographs  that  are  atrociously  ugly  in  terms  of 
content, but simultaneously remarkably beautiful as works of art. If I were asked to 
classify his photographs as either ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’, I would personally have to ask 
for clarification: I would want to know whether ‘ugly’ is actually intended to mean 
BAD, and whether my answer will be taken to relate to the particular photograph as 
content or as  work  of  art. This  confusion between  beauty of form  and beauty  of 
content persists throughout discussions in the philosophy of art (see, for instance, 
Zangwill 1998, 2002) and Kabawata and Zeki’s experiment runs into it head on. The 
notion of beauty relevant to aesthetics is formal beauty. In formal terms, ‘beautiful’ 
can only be contrasted with ‘bad’, not ‘ugly’, and because of this unfortunate detail, 
Kabawata and Zeki’s experiment as it stands is rather uninformative for a theory of 
aesthetics.  
I began this discussion wanting to bring into focus a very interesting piece of 
neuroaesthetic research by Ramachandran and Hirstein, ‘The Science of Art’ (1999). 
The authors summarise their aims in ‘The Science of Art’ as follows: 
 
We present a theory of human artistic experience and the neural mechanisms that 
mediate it. Any theory of art (or, indeed, any aspect of human nature) has to 
ideally have three components. A) The logic of art: whether there are universal 
rules or principles; b) The evolutionary rationale: why did these rules evolve and 
why do they have the form that they do; c) What is the brain circuitry involved? 
Our paper begins with a quest for artistic universals and proposes a list of ‘Eight 
laws of artistic experience’ -a set of heuristics that artists either consciously or 
unconsciously  deploy  to  optimally  titillate  the  visual  areas  of  the  brain. 
(Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999: 15-51) 
 
 
These ‘eight laws’ are: 
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1. The ‘peak shift effect’: ‘If a rat is rewarded for discriminating a rectangle from 
a square, it will respond even more vigorously to a rectangle that is longer and 
skinnier than the prototype’ (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999: 15). Super-stimuli 
excite  form  areas  in  the  brain  more  strongly  than  normal  stimuli;  this  is  the 
psychological phenomenon from which not only caricatures and cartoons must 
have sprung but also, in Ramachandran and Hirstein’s view, much of art.  
 
2. Perceptual grouping and binding: ‘The process of discovering correlations and 
of  “binding”  correlated  features  to  create  unitary  objects  or  events  must  be 
reinforcing for the organism -in order to provide incentive for discovering such 
correlations  (…).  Consider  the  famous  hidden  face  or  Dalmatian  dog  photo 
[initially seen as a jumble of splotches, once the Dalmatian is seen, its spots are 
grouped together -a pleasant ‘aha!’ sensation caused perhaps by activation of the 
limbic system by temporal lobe cortex].’ (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999: 21)  
 
3. The need to isolate a single visual modality before you amplify the signal in 
that modality. ‘Isolating a single area (such as ‘form’ or ‘depth’ in the case of 
caricature or Indian art) allows one to direct attention more effectively to this one 
source of information. (…) Additional evidence for this view comes from the 
“savant syndrome” -autistic children who are “retarded” and yet produce beautiful 
drawings. (…) this is because the fundamental disorder in autism is a distortion of 
the “salience landscape”: they shut out many important sensory channels, thereby 
allowing them to deploy all their attentional resources on a single channel (…). 
(Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999: 24-25) 
 
4.  ‘The  extraction  of  features  prior  to  grouping  -which  involves  discarding 
redundant information and extracting contrast- is also reinforcing. Cells in the 
retina, lateral  geniculate body (a relay  station in  the  brain)  and in the visual 
cortex  respond  mainly  to  edges  (step  changes  in  luminance)  but  not  to 
homogeneous surface colours; so a line drawing or cartoon stimulates these cells 
as  effectively  as  a  “half  tone”  photograph.  What  is  frequently  overlooked, 
though, is that such contrast extractions -as with grouping- may be intrinsically 
pleasing to the eye (hence the efficacy of line drawings). (…) [But] why should 
the process be rewarding in itself? We suggest that the answer once again has to 
do with the allocation of attention. Information (in the Shannon sense) exists 
mainly in regions of change -e.g. edges- and it makes sense that such regions 
would,  therefore,  be  more  attention  grabbing  -more  “interesting”-  than 
homogeneous  areas.  So  it  may  not  be  coincidental  that  what  the  cells  find 
interesting is also what the organism as a whole finds interesting, and perhaps in 
some circumstances “interesting” translates into “pleasing”. (Ramachandran and 
Hirstein 1999: 25)  
 
5. Symmetry. ‘Symmetry, of course, is also aesthetically pleasing (…). Since 
most  biologically  important  objects  -such  as  predator,  prey  or  mate-  are 
symmetrical (…) [symmetry may be geared] towards discovering “interesting” 
object-like  entities  in  the  world.  Intriguingly,  it  has  recently  been  shown 
experimentally  that  when  choosing  a  mate,  animals  and  humans  prefer 
symmetrical over asymmetrical ones, and evolutionary biologists have argued 
that this is because parasitic infestation -detrimental to fertility- often produces  
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lopsided, asymmetrical growth and development’. (Ramachandran and Hirstein 
1999: 27) 
 
6 & 7. The generic viewpoint and the Bayesian logic of perception. ‘[Our] visual 
system abhors interpretations which rely on a unique vantage point (…) it abhors 
suspicious coincidences. (…) A pleasing effect can be produced by violating this 
principle rather than adhering to it. For instance, there is a Picasso nude in which 
the improbability of the arm’s outline exactly coinciding with that of the torso 
grabs the viewer’s attention (…). (…) An object discovered after a struggle is 
more pleasing than one that is instantly obvious (…). (…) perhaps the struggle 
itself is reinforcing (…).’ (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999: 30) 
 
8. The last law concerns art as metaphor. In my  view, it is irrelevant to the 
present analysis and of a different order to the above suggestions; so I will not 
discuss it here.  
 
I  find  Ramachandran  and  Hirstein’s  perspective  very  exciting.  But  does  it 
really offer an explanation of either aesthetic experience or the complex phenomenon 
we  call  art?  I  would  be  inclined  to  say  it  does  not.  For  one  thing,  not  all 
Ramachandran and Hirstein’s laws are equally important. I’ll come back to this point 
later. For another, it seems to me that the most relevant of their laws are about the 
workings and causes of something quite different, which I will refer to as a perceptual 
effect. For now, let us agree on a preliminary definition of perceptual effect as a sub-
attentively achieved improvement in the mind/ brain’s perceptual organisation.  
The  main  thread  running  through  some  of  Ramachandran  and  Hirstein’s 
perceptual principles is sub-attentive improvement of certain functions of the visual 
mind/ brain which are either evolutionarily significant in themselves (e.g. perceptual 
grouping  and  binding),  or  attached  to  other  evolutionarily  significant  traits  (e.g. 
symmetry).  ‘Perceptual  grouping  and  binding,’  ‘extraction  of  features  prior  to 
grouping’ or the ‘peak shift effect’, for instance, seem to be integral to the perceptual 
mind/  brain.  We  can  assume  that  exposure  to  super-stimuli  such  as  cartoons, 
caricatures  and  works  of  art  triggers  the  reward  system,  and  results  in  what  we 
impressionistically experience as sensory pleasure, on the grounds that this exposure  
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somehow contributes to or improves/ reinforces the perceptual mind/ brain’s aptitude 
for such perceptual processes. The improvement may take a number of forms - from 
effectiveness in allocating attention to the speed with which a process is performed, 
etc- which it is not relevant to explore in the current analysis. In any case, possible 
sub-attentive improvement in the functioning of the perceptual mind/ brain cannot in 
any  way  be  seen  as  synonymous  with  or  equivalent  to  aesthetic  experience. 
Ramachandran and Hirstein hold (part of) the key to a question, but is not the question 
they think it is. If the sub-attentive perceptual improvement scenario is correct, it  
accounts for the pleasurable nature of some of our sensory experiences, which include 
aesthetic experiences. It opens up the possibility of unearthing a whole spectrum of 
processes which make certain objects and experiences intrinsically pleasing for the 
perceptual mind/ brain, and as such, concerns that set of sub-attentive ‘goings-on’ in 
the mind that might help explain why humans find aesthetic experiences rewarding 
enough to be worth attending to and revisiting/ repeating. 
As  neurobiological  research  on  perception  and  the  brain  rapidly  grows,  in 
years to come we are likely to be able to consider an enormous array of such sub-
attentive modifications, carried out not only by the visual brain but by the perceptual 
brain in general, and thus isolate specific causes of the pleasurable nature of aesthetic 
experience in ways broad enough to apply to all forms of human art. Towards the end 
of their paper, Ramachandran and Hirstein themselves (1999:49) acknowledge that 
they have only ‘identified a small subset of [such] principles. There are undoubtedly 
many  others’.  In  various  lectures,  for  instance,  Dan  Sperber  has  pinpointed  the 
activation  of  the  face-recognition  module  as  a  possible  sub-attentive  pay-off  that 
explains why masks are amongst the types of cultural artefact to occur in most human  
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cultures. Exploiting modules would be a good way both to attract the attention and to 
get the input processed at little cost.  
Another related line of investigation that I have been considering involves the 
idea that a decisive set of art-related perceptual effects could be associated with the 
Mirror Neuron function currently being explored at UCL by Patrick Haggard. The 
idea  here  is  something  along  the  following  lines:  having  spent  a  whole  evening 
mentally rehearsing your tennis forehand, the next day in the tennis match you find 
that  your  forehand  has  actually  improved.  Mirror  neuron  function  has  led  to 
improvement in a kinaesthetic area of performance without your engaging in actual 
bodily  activity  at  all.  It  is  likely  that  artistic  production  and  reception  involve  a 
diverse range of sub-attentive forms of mental-rehearsal enabled by the mirror neuron 
function,  thereby  improving  and  reinforcing  in  critical  ways  the  mirror  neuron 
function itself.
82 In any case, the notion of a perceptual effect provides a promising 
common ground for neurobiological and aesthetic research, and should be seen as one 
of the paradigmatic fields of enquiry in which interdisciplinary research could have 
fruitful implications both empirical and literary/ artistic domains. 
Another possible strand of future research might focus on the way in which 
sets of perceptual principles identified in one artform and mode of perception (e.g. 
visual art) might translate and apply to other artforms and modes of perception (e.g. 
dance and kinaesthetic perception); this research could be extended by considering 
whether,  and  in  what  ways,  these  principles  find  equivalences  in  the  area  of 
conceptual cognition. In my poems, to give you just one example, I tend to ‘encrypt’ 
                                                
82 Could the internal perceptual activity so characteristic of literature -mental imagery/ inner 
vision,  inner  hearing,  kinaesthetic  metaphors,  etc-  be  associated  with,  and  therefore 
reinforcing  of,  specific  mirror  neuron  functions?  Intuitive  reference  to  mental  rehearsal 
underlies  various recent papers on the  evolutionary  origins of literature  (e.g.  Boyd 1998, 
Pinker 2007) and this is certainly a domain of enquiry worth pursuing.   
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information that the reader can only uncover by ‘binding correlated features to create 
a unitary object’, to use Ramachandran and Hirstein’s way of putting it. In the poem 
Myasthenia Gravis I (Kolaiti 2007: 29) I write:  
 
Now I must learn from scratch to spell tears 
utter zeta and omega  
and walk in spite of all  
in the upright posture of humans.  
 
 
Zeta [Ζ] and omega [Ω] are letters of the Greek alphabet which I have not, however, 
selected at random. When they are considered separately and independently of each 
other, the line allows a possible interpretation in which someone is learning again 
from scratch things as basic as the alphabet of her native language. But the two letters 
can also be grouped together, in which case the reader will discover that they form a 
unitary  object:  the  verb ‘ΖΩ’ [I  live/ I  am  alive].  The grouping of these initially 
unrelated features allows a second potential, and deliberately ‘hidden’, interpretation 
involving learning from scratch what it means to be alive. I take this case as a clear 
cognitive  and  literary  equivalent  of  Ramachandran  and  Hirstein’s  principles  of  a) 
perceptual  binding  and  grouping  and  b)  object  discovery  following  struggle. 
Interestingly, the discovery that the two letters can also be grouped together to form a 
unitary object elicits a pleasing ‘aha!’ sensation, similar to that found in perceptual 
tests  like  the  ‘hidden-face  test’  or  ‘the  hidden-object  test’  mentioned  in 
Ramachandran  and  Hirstein  (1999:  21),  although  the  discovery  here  concerns  not 
perceptual but encyclopaedic features. 
In any case, the point is that if we wanted to pursue an account of artworks as 
just one among many cases of false positive triggers of pleasurable sensory response, 
the  question  we  would  sooner  or  later  find  ourselves  grappling  with  is,  why  did 
artworks  survive?  Why,  unlike  other  related  false  positives  such  as  sand  running  
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through  our  fingers,  did  artworks  become  the  successful  cultural  artefacts  they 
became? One line of answer must certainly relate to the wide and diverse range of 
effects that give artworks intrinsic value for the perceptual mind/ brain. The artist, to 
slightly rephrase Semir Zeki, explores the potential of the perceptual mind/ brain just 
as  the  scientist/  neurologist  does,  though  with  very  different  goals.  The  scientist/ 
neurologist seeks to understand, while the artist aims at pleasure.  
In line with the noetic/ mentalistic approach to art that I have so far taken, I 
would also like to suggest that an artist’s creative mental representations (aspectual 
representations) should be of as much intrinsic value to the perceptual mind/ brain as 
artworks themselves. As noted above, the first occurrence of human art was not in the 
first ever artwork (i.e. the first shared public representation of a certain type), but 
rather in the first ever aesthetic response to a private creative mental representation (a 
poetic  thought  state).  The  moment  a  human  being  became  able  to  respond 
aesthetically to a creative mental representation that was still the private property of 
her own mind, the specific kind of action that art is had just occurred.  
Before considering why artworks survived as enduring cultural representations 
across the human species, we should consider why poetic thought states survived as 
processes internal to the individual mind. What was it about this particular type of 
mental state that made it worth entertaining, attending to and seeking to revisit? For 
an artist, being in a poetic thought state, a state of constant aesthetic focus on one’s 
own  creative  mental  representations,  is  indispensable  and  intrinsic  to  her  specific 
mind  set.  In  my  own  case,  to  be  a  poet  is,  amongst  other  things,  to  make  huge 
investments  of  attention  and  processing  resources  in  my  own  aspectual  
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representations, which for the most part occur as words in the mind.
83 Fragments of 
phenomenal consciousness, half-forgotten or unfinished poems, flashes of inspiration, 
self-reflexive beliefs about poetry writing, memorised words or phrases from various 
communicative situations and registers, mental imagery, fragments of encyclopaedic 
knowledge and so on and so forth float at any one time in my mind, claim notice and 
consideration, and yield generous aesthetic payoff. If this payoff were limited, after a 
certain point my mind/ brain would find poetic thought states irrelevant: my sensory 
make-up apparently finds sand running through my fingers pleasing, but does not 
continue this activity or return to it with the regularity and constancy with which it 
returns to conceiving or elaborating on poems.  
Incidental pleasurable sensory responses account for energy allocation only to 
a certain rather limited degree. It follows that the type of payoff achieved by poetic 
thought  states  must  differ  from  those  achieved  by  other  false  positive  triggers  of 
pleasurable sensory responses. Poetic thought states, I want to claim, happened to 
give rise to nuanced mind/ brain-improving sub-attentive effects. These effects, which 
I have earlier referred to as perceptual effects, must have encouraged the mind/ brain 
not only to stay focused on poetic thought states, but also to return to them on a steady 
and recurring basis. In the previous chapter, I proposed a plausible set of features that 
might make a certain representation aspectual. Then I traced the connections between 
this  ability  and  a  whole  host  of  more  specific  sub-abilities:  e.g.  ‘to  see/conceive 
properties of objects, to break down objects into their components, to spot underlying 
or overarching structures of objects and their relations, to spot ‘telling details’, to be 
                                                
83  However,  other  types  of  creative  mental  conceptions  which  do  not  take  the  form  of 
aspectual representations are also integral to the production of art, and serve as objects of 
attentional  investment.  An artist  handles  a  vast  array  of  considerations in  developing  her 
work, from conceptual issues to how she manages and organises her material to issues of 
installation and presentation, etc. All these considerations are part of the practical reasoning 
process involved in art formation, and deserve a place in an explanatory model of art as an 
occurrence internal to the individual mind.   
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in rich, fine-grained and complex informational states of a perceptual, affective or 
conceptual sort, and so on’. Most of these properties have direct analogies to some of 
Ramachandran and Hirstein’s (1999) perceptual principles. This may be evidence that 
aspectual representations are sub-attentively mind/ brain improving, and thus help to 
explain why they are experienced by the mind/ brain as pleasing. The payoff that 
made  an  occurrence  internal  to  the  organism  (a  poetic  thought  state)  worth  the 
organism’s allocation of energy also channelled itself into an occurrence external to 
the organism, the physical artwork that provides evidence of this mental event. 
 
7.2. Perceptual effects and cognition  
 
Sperber and Wilson would say that in order to survive, cultural artefacts have to hold 
the attention and yield a good payoff for the processing effort required. Up to this 
point in my analysis, I have been doing my best to construct a notion of aesthetic 
experience that can stand independently of central thought processes, and a view of 
art as a perceptually driven action, an action that arose out of, and fundamentally is 
still geared towards, perceptual varieties of effect. Art is primarily about the senses. 
The  idea  has  long-standing  intellectual  precedents,
84  and  provides  a  knock-down 
argument against interpretationalism.  
So  far,  I  have  argued  that  aesthetic  experience  is  a  case  of  non-adaptive 
pleasurable sensory experience, characterised art as a perceptually driven action, and 
                                                
84 In But Is It Art, Tilghman (1984: 123) writes:  
 
When  Baumgarten coined  the  word 'aesthetics' he defined it as the  science  of 
perception,  a  science  that  was  intended  to  explain  our  understanding  and 
appreciation of art and poetry. (…) He was right (…) to focus his new discipline 
upon perception and to seek to find there the key to so much that is important 
about art. In the same tradition Heinrich Wolfflin described the task of the art 
historian as reckoning with the stages and development of what he called modes 
of vision. 
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discussed its relation to a possible set of neurologically real, mind/ brain-improving 
effects (perceptual effects). Finally, I have proposed that the range and diversity of 
perceptual effects associated with art may help to explain how this particular type of 
human action triumphed both intra-individually and culturally, while other sources of 
non-adaptive perceptual pleasure never achieved artefactual status, let alone cultural 
constancy. To fill in the rest of this story, we must start bringing conceptual cognition 
into the picture. We must look at how the sensory aspects of art interact with human 
cognitive abilities and the conscious, thinking mind. 
Aspectual  representations  are  phenomena.  They  occur  automatically  and 
involuntarily within the individual mind. Artworks are stimuli. A stimulus, as noted 
above,  is  a  phenomenon  designed  to  be  perceived.  Artworks  inherit  from  the 
properties of aspectual representations the capacity to cause the type of effects they 
cause. I have argued that perceptual effects constitute a plausible and neurologically 
real set of effects for the kind of object a work of art is. As a preliminary definition in 
the last section, we took a perceptual effect to be a sub-attentive improvement in the 
mind/ brain’s perceptual and neural organisation. In the postface to the 2
nd edition of 
Relevance  (1995:  265-6),  Sperber  and  Wilson  proposed  to  distinguish  ‘cognitive 
effects’,  which  may  or  may  not  be  worthwhile,  from  ‘positive  cognitive  effects’, 
which are cognitive effects worth having. I will distinguish perceptual effects from 
positive perceptual effects on similar lines; and from now on, when I use the term 
‘perceptual  effect’,  I  will  mean  ‘positive  perceptual  effect’:  that  is,  a  worthwhile 
modification, an improvement. 
Perceptual  effects  thus  defined  may  explain  energy  allocation  to  a  certain 
degree. It is plausible to assume that the perceptual mind/ brain finds a phenomenon 
or stimulus which is capable of yielding perceptual effects rewarding enough to focus  
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on and return to in a way that distinguishes artistic stimuli from all other false positive 
triggers of (non-adaptive) perceptual pleasure. I now want to elaborate on what I have 
previously said, and suggest that perceptual effects do not normally occur without 
some  minimal  participation  of  cognition.  It  seems  counter-intuitive  (at  least 
introspectively) to claim that artworks are normally experienced in the attentionally 
blind mode. I have slightly overemphasized the sensory end of things in order to 
counterbalance academic approaches which apparently fail to respond to or appreciate 
art for the kind of object it is: a sensory object.
85 
In the Relevance-theoretic framework underpinning this analysis, any attempt 
to account for the huge cognitive investments made in either poetic thought states or 
the  reception  of  artworks  solely  by  reference  to  perceptual  effects  would  be 
psychologically  unrealistic.  Cognitive  effects  must  come  into  the  picture,  and 
somehow  combine  with  perceptual  effects  to  explain  energy  allocation  in 
psychologically realistic terms. How can this be done while still remaining faithful to 
the  sort  of  aesthetics  pursued  throughout  this  analysis,  an  aesthetics  of  art  as  a 
perceptually driven action? 
If we could maintain the centrality of perceptual effects while allowing for 
some  minimal  degree  of  activity  on  the  cognitive  effect  side,  we  could  well  be 
looking at a model which is cognitive enough to explain attentional investments in 
psychologically realistic terms, but also sensory enough to allow for a view of art as a 
perceptually driven occurrence. A working hypothesis might be to develop a notion of 
minimal  cognitive  effect,  and  argue  that  perceptual  effects  automatically  activate 
minimal cognitive effects. In the following paragraphs, I’ll try and look in greater 
                                                
85 From a real life encounter: I was no more than seventeen, at an exhibition on the Russian 
avant-garde in the National Gallery in Athens, when a woman who was decent in every other 
respect rushed up to a Kandinsky, stuck her nose in it and pompously asked ‘and what does 
this black square mean?’  
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detail  at  the  precise  relationship  between  minimal  and  non-minimal  types  of 
activation of conceptual cognition in relation to perceptual effects, art and aesthetic 
experience. 
To provide a solid theoretical basis for the notion of minimal activation of 
conceptual  cognition,  let  us  first  briefly  go  through  the  three  types  of  contextual 
(cognitive) effect.  
In Relevance-theoretic terms, a phenomenon or stimulus can give rise to the following 
three types of cognitive effect:  
 
a) More or less strongly or weakly evidenced contextual implications which result 
from crucial interaction between new and old information used as premises in a 
synthetic inference process (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 109), 
 
b) strengthening of old assumptions by new information which provides further 
evidence for it (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 109),  
 
c) contradiction of old assumptions by new information which provides evidence 
against them and may lead to their abandonment or revision (Sperber and Wilson 
1995: 109) 
 
Could there be more ways of achieving cognitive effects than those so far 
widely discussed and used in Relevance theory? From the outset, Dan Sperber and 
Deirdre Wilson have occasionally gestured towards this possibility. For instance, in 
‘Truthfulness and relevance’ (2002: section 4), they write:
86 
                                                
86 There is also a brief reference to other types of cognitive effect (including reorganisation of 
knowledge) in Relevance (1995: 66).  
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Here  we  will  consider  only  one  type  of  cognitive  benefit:  improvements  in 
knowledge (theoretical or practical). This is plausibly the most important type of 
cognitive benefit. There may be others: improvements in memory or imagination, 
for example (although it might be argued that these are benefits only because they 
contribute  indirectly  to  improvements  in  knowledge;  better  memory  and 
imagination lead to better non-demonstrative inference, and therefore to better 
knowledge).  In  any  case,  for  our  present  purposes,  there  is  another  important 
reason for identifying cognitive benefits with improvements in knowledge (…). 
 
 
I would like to suggest that an aesthetic theory calls for an additional, minimal type of 
cognitive effect, which is worthwhile enough to the organism to justify the allocation 
of attention and to allow for the possibility that interaction with artworks over the 
course of a life-time may lead to cognitive benefits, and minimal enough not to bias 
aesthetic  experience too  strongly  towards  the  conceptual end.  Such  minimality  of 
effect can be said to depend on at least three parameters: a) the effect occurs at a sub-
attentive level, b) the effect involves modification of processes rather than of manifest 
conceptual assumptions and c) the result is not necessarily immediately worthwhile
87 
but may lead to gradual improvement, i.e. it may improve pertinent processes little by 
little over a life-time.  
A few clarifications are in order. In saying that minimal cognitive effects may 
lead to gradual rather than immediate improvement, I assume that such effects do not 
necessarily make the object relevant enough to be worth the individual’s attention at 
the  time,  but  may  help  it  to  achieve  relevance  to  the  individual  over  a  life-time. 
Presumably, some objects have effects that make them worth coming back to, and 
hence, probably worth preserving over a lifetime. These objects could be of any sort –
cultural, or even personal, as well as artistic. Note also that to place emphasis on 
minimal  cognitive  improvements  is not to suggest that  the  only improvements an 
                                                
87  As  Sperber  and  Wilson  have  stressed,  not  just  any  modification  counts  as  a  positive 
cognitive effect. For something to be regarded as a positive cognitive effect, the result should 
be an improvement.   
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artwork  can  potentially  achieve  are  minimal  ones.  Verbal  art  certainly  activates 
conceptual  cognition,  and  raises  at  least  the  sort  of  text-internal  expectations  of 
relevance needed for disambiguation, reference resolution, implicatures, etc. But in 
my  view,  this  is  a  contingent  fact.  If  aesthetic  response  to  an  artwork  involves 
perceptual effects, and an artwork is the kind of object that elicits aesthetic responses, 
then an object cannot be an artwork and not (at least in principle) elicit perceptual 
effects. Similarly, if my hypothesis that minimal cognitive effects are automatically 
activated by perceptual effects is correct, then an object cannot be an artwork and not 
(at least in principle) elicit minimal cognitive effects. By contrast, an object may well 
be an artwork and yet not elicit the standard non-minimal types of cognitive effect 
that make a phenomenon relevant enough to be worth the individual’s attention. Art, 
as an action that crucially involves aesthetic experience, is not necessarily related to 
cognitive effect in Sperber and Wilson’s sense, while it certainly seems necessarily 
related to perceptual and minimal cognitive effect. 
In  this  light,  I  would  like  to  propose  the  following  possible  instances  of 
minimal cognitive effect:
 88 
 
a)  improvement  (immediate  or  gradual,  over  a  life-time)  in  the  form  of 
increasing  accessibility  of  assumptions  and  accessibility  relations.  The  focus 
here  is  not  on  assumptions  themselves,  but  on  processes.  Perceptual  inputs 
activate and alter the accessibility of conceptual assumptions by making them 
manifest or more manifest. A possible hypothesis, then, is that certain perceptual 
aspects of works of art could be super-stimuli that improve accessibility and 
activation processes.  
                                                
88 There could, of course, be many more; here, I am only giving a starting point for a broader 
construal of positive cognitive effect.  
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b) improvement (immediate or gradual, over a life-time) in the form of altering 
salience of expectations. The rationale here is much the same as in (a). We are 
not  interested  in  the  conceptual  content  of  expectations  as  such,  but  in  the 
processes that alter activation patterns to make certain expectations more salient 
as a result of certain perceptual inputs.  
c)  improvement  (immediate  or  gradual,  over  a  life-time)  in  the  form  of 
optimising  memory  organisation  and  processes  of  storage  and  recall.
89  In 
Relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 150) stress the ‘crucial importance of the 
organisation of encyclopaedic memory in the pursuit of relevance. In fact, the 
relation between memory and relevance is so close that relevance theory might 
well shed new light on the organisation of memory itself’. In Explaining Culture, 
Sperber (1996: 74-75) proposes:  
 
Up to now, I have considered the role only of cognitive processes of formation of 
concepts and representations. Other cognitive processes, processes of storage and 
recall in particular (…) are no less essential to the explanation of cultural facts. 
(…) We can take it for granted that tales, myths and so on are optimal objects for 
human memory, or else they would have been forgotten. What is it about these 
narratives that makes them so memorable? What is it about human memory that 
makes it so good at remembering these tales? (…) In cognitive psychology, (…) 
there is growing body of research on the structure of narratives and its effect on 
memory, but little or no advantage is taken of anthropological expertise.  
 
 
The  idea  here  is  that  processes  of  storage  and  recall  are  central  not  only  to 
narratives -though it is easy to see why narratives are perhaps amongst the best 
exemplars of this type of minimal effect- but to all art. Bridging chunks and 
motifs  occurring  either  in  space  (visual  arts)  or  time  (say,  dance  or  music), 
identifying stylistic and thematic influences and other activities so characteristic 
                                                
89 Note here that (a) and (b) are also memory related, since they involve at least some re-
ordering of the Background/ the Εncyclopaedia.  
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of  art,  could  be  reinforcing  of  crucial  memory-driven  chunking  or  grouping 
processes.
90 
e) improvement (immediate or gradual, over a life-time) in the form of detector 
function. When we look at a Cycladic idol, this abstracted form is recognised as a 
MAN; when we look at a jumble of lines and splotches by Picasso, we eventually 
identify the disorderly concoction of shape and colour as a WOMAN IN A RED 
CHAIR. The effect again involves processes, improving the brain’s ability to 
detect and identify objects in conceptual terms. 
 
Since  at  least  some  of  the  cognitive  and  perceptual  effects  caused  by  an 
artwork must have been predicted, and hence intended by the artist in a weaker or 
stronger sense, effects can be said to elicit a ‘meeting of minds’, causing creator and 
audience  to  converge.  This  may  illuminate  my  earlier  claim  that,  in  having  an 
aesthetic response, an audience actually has a metarepresentational type of response: 
the  audience  responds  to  evidence  that  enables  at  least  minimal  convergence  of 
minds. As already said, this evidence may be stronger or weaker. The stronger the 
evidence, the smaller the responsibility the audience has to take for the inferences she 
draws about how a certain object has been seen by the artist -about the non-triviality, 
creativity and aspectualness of the artist’s mental representations as evidenced by the 
artwork. The weaker the evidence, the greater the inferential work to be carried out by 
the audience, and the greater the audience’s responsibility for any conclusions it may 
draw.  Conceptual  art  is  a  good  example  of  an  artwork  that  provides  very  weak 
                                                
90 In response to my suggestions on minimal cognitive effects Deirdre Wilson remarked (P.C. 
25.05.08) :  
 
All  three  types  of  improvement  are  on  the  effort  side.  Assuming  the  function  of 
perception, memory organisation, etc is to contribute to knowledge, and assuming the 
effect  is  genuinely  worthwhile,  it  should  be  possible  to  accommodate  them  in  the 
existing notion of positive cognitive effect, even though, as you say, the function of art 
itself may not be to contribute to knowledge.  
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evidence  of  an  aspectual  representation,  thus  leaving  huge  responsibility  on  the 
audience to decide what conclusions this evidence supports, what is non-trivial in the 
way the object in question has been seen, and the grounds on which convergence 
could be made possible. The weakness of the evidence it provides is perhaps the 
cognitive factor  behind Conceptual  art and Pop art being received by the general 
public as more ‘difficult’.  
Perceptual and conceptual effects are not competing notions. And they are not 
mutually exclusive. The relation between perceptual and cognitive/ conceptual effects 
is  the  same  here  as  elsewhere:  processing  a  perceptual  representation  provides 
evidence  for  -makes  manifest  or  more  manifest-  a  huge  array  of  conceptual 
assumptions, and can achieve relevance thereby. Or at least, provide evidence that 
improves conceptual processes, and thus contributes to relevance little by little over a 
lifetime. With cognitive effect construed in this very broad sense, it could be claimed 
that it is impossible for a positive perceptual effect to arise without providing input to, 
and  thus  giving  rise  to,  at  least  minimal  parallel  positive  cognitive  effects.  The 
definition of (positive) perceptual effect might then be rephrased as: substantial sub-
attentive improvement in the mind/ brain’s perceptual organisation, with automatic 
parallel minimal cognitive improvement. 
 
7.3. On distinctive teleology. 
As I have argued above, the accumulating evidence that literature is not a special 
linguistic object does not entail that literature is not a special object in any other 
interesting sense. In the previous chapter, I tried to defend the view that art has a 
distinct  essence  and  show  that  this  may  simply  be  of  some  other,  psychological/ 
cognitive rather than linguistic/ structural sort. Instead of looking at the end product  
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(the  literary/  artistic  object)  and  its  language/  structure,  Ι  shifted  the focus  to  the 
literary/ artistic event and its psycho-cognitive history. The notion of an event offers a 
suitably  global perspective on the phenomenon of art. Literary and artistic events 
involve an action with a distinctive etiology, which leads to some prototypical end 
product, which is expected to trigger some characteristic response. The aim of the 
present analysis was to try and pin down this characteristic response as an aesthetic 
response.  
What does it amount to in practical terms, though, for an event to be geared to 
triggering  some  characteristic  response?  Art  and  literature,  I  would  suggest,  are 
objects with a characteristic teleology.  
Mere utterances are objects designed to achieve cognitive effects. Poems, on 
the other hand, are objects designed to put an audience in a certain aesthetic state. 
They are there to be experienced aesthetically, and not merely interpreted. If they are 
interpreted,  it  is  in  the  course  of  and  for  the  purpose  of  being  experienced 
aesthetically. It may happen that mere utterances are so elegantly structured that they 
put the receiver into a state of aesthetic pleasure. They are still mere utterances, not 
poems, though, since they are primarily designed for some other purpose than to put 
an audience into a certain aesthetic state. 
There is room for analysis over what ‘being designed for’ actually amounts to. 
For an object to have some aesthetic function does not exclude the possibility of its 
having some other (utilitarian) function too. In the last chapter, I gave the example of 
Picasso creating Guernica to cover a damaged wall. Does the extra utilitarian function 
of  this  Guernica  eliminate  the  possibility  of  its  having  a  simultaneous  aesthetic 
function? And conversely, does the aesthetic function of this Guernica eliminate the 
possibility of its having a simultaneous utilitarian function? I think the answer is ‘No’.  
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Perceptual aspects of poetry -and these do not merely involve the physical 
dimension of the language used, i.e. its phonological and rhythmic aspects, but also 
the rich phenomenal resources exploited: the inner perception caused by a poem from 
inner vision to kinaesthesia to tactile or auditory imaging, etc.- contribute to the range 
of  conceptual  effects  potentially  brought  into  play,  and  these  in  turn  can  have  a 
feedback effect on the perceptual response, strengthening the impact of an aesthetic 
experience. If we are interested in the utterances used in poems, and the mechanisms 
by which they achieve their particular cognitive effects, we need a pragmatics. If we 
are  interested  in  why  these  utterances  are  there  –in  not  only  the  causal  but  the 
teleological sense-, we need an aesthetics. The raison d’etre of the kind of stimulus an 
artwork is, even a literary work with its conceptually rich linguistic medium, is not 
simply to achieve cognitive relevance: conceptual  effects in  art are just part of a 
bigger picture whose ultimate end is aesthetic experience. Thus, art is an action with a 
distinctive teleology: an aesthetic teleology.  
In my case, to experience the Victory of Samothrace aesthetically is to be in 
the same space with it and let it have a specific impact on me, an impact that results 
from my responding to the aspectualness of this stimulus and elicits a characteristic 
set of pleasurable sensory responses. At the same time, the artwork gives rise to a 
wide array of weak implications: ‘There is a silence in this work’, ‘I can hear the wind 
in the garments’, etc.
91 These effects have become manifest or more manifest as a 
result of my sensory experience of the stimulus; they then become inputs to further 
                                                
91 Interestingly, when in Louvre in 2006 and looking at the Victory, I caught myself thinking 
‘silence’. A few minutes later, a friend approached me and said ‘There is a silence in this 
work,  don’t  you  think?’.  It  was  an  exciting  concrete  example  of  the  kind  of  conceptual 
convergence  artworks  make  possible.  The  question  of  whether  these  conceptual 
representations are intended by the producer as implicatures or simply drawn by the viewer as 
implications makes little if any difference. In general, we can assume that some of these 
effects are intuitively or consciously predicted in the production process. Whether they are 
actually communicated in the sense of Relevance theory will be discussed briefly in a later 
section.  
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processes and feed back in to my sensory experience. Whatever I had been feeling 
prior to any conceptualisation, conceptualisation makes me feel it in a more refined 
and  sophisticated  way.  The  increased  intensity  and  sophistication  of  the  sensory 
experience I am having might in turn feed back into the conceptual response and 
enable me to draw further inferences, which enrich the sensory experience still more. 
In art, I would argue, it is not that perceptual elements are used as vehicles in the 
process of arriving at interpretations. It is that both perceptual and conceptual effects 
are used in arriving at experiences.  
The way this retroactive relation between conceptual and perceptual aspects of 
art is manipulated by the artist might deepen or limit the experience, or determine 
what realm of art we are in (e.g. representational art, abstract art, conceptual art, etc). 
Certain  genres  might  veer  more  towards  the  perceptual  (e.g.  Vorticism
92,  abstract 
painting, Lettrist poetry, etc). Other genres veer more towards the conceptual. Take 
philosophical poetry, for instance. If a philosophical poem merely achieved a certain 
range of conceptual effects, we wouldn’t be describing it adequately by calling it an 
artwork: we should simply be calling it philosophy. Suppose, now, that a work of 
philosophy is so elegantly written and structured that it cause pleasure not only in its 
content  but  also  in  its  style  and  organisation.  Plato’s  philosophical  dialogues 
definitely  fall into this category.  Does  the  incidental aesthetic pleasure  caused  by 
these philosophical texts make them artworks? Although this is obviously a borderline 
case, in my view, the texts-still do not exhibit either the etiology or the teleology of an 
artwork. They are objects whose etiological history is that of a work of philosophy. It 
just happens that this work of philosophy has been structured in such a way that it also 
causes  an  aesthetic  response.  The  fact  that  it  can  be  experienced  aesthetically  is 
                                                
92 Vorticism emerged in the early 20
th century, envisaged an art purified from meaning and 
invested on the dynamicity of movement and form.  
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incidental. Artworks, by contrast, are objects which do not cause aesthetic responses 
incidentally:  they  have  been  designed  to  cause  aesthetic  responses,  and  causing 
aesthetic responses is their primary function.   
If an object merely achieved a certain range of perceptual effects, we wouldn’t 
be describing it inadequately by calling it an artwork. In this case, we would simply 
be moving from one way of doing art to another: from nuanced, conceptually rich 
types of art to more formal and perceptually pure types. If an object merely achieved a 
certain range of cognitive effects
93, we would be changing category. The products of 
extreme perceptualism may be criticised as one-sided art, but nevertheless, they are 
art.  The  products  of  extreme  conceptualism,  on  the  other  hand  -that  is,  objects 
designed primarily to achieve cognitive effects- lack the teleology an object must 
have to be regarded as art, and should therefore be seen as belonging to a different 
ontological category. 
This claim is not uncontroversial. It has been suggested on the strength of the 
following  two  arguments,  for  instance,  that  a  non  aesthetic  theory  of  art  is  also 
possible: i) an object can be an artwork and yet have no aesthetic purpose, as in the 
case of propagandist or religious art; and ii) an object can be an artwork and yet be 
‘ugly’  (for  discussion  see  Zangwill  2002  and  2003).  My  response  is  that  a  non-
aesthetic theory  of art is not possible. I  have  already addressed (ii) in discussing 
Kabawata and Zeki’s experiment, where I argued that ‘ugliness’ (along with the sense 
of ‘beautiful’ which is the antonym of ‘ugly’) is not an aesthetically relevant property. 
In response to (i), I would point out that most discussions along these lines run into 
something like the following problem. The theorist classifies a certain object as an 
artwork by appeal to existing canons of art, or on the basis of superficial prototypical 
                                                
93 Amongst these we could include the typical examples of propagandistic and religious art.  
 
 
185   
resemblances  to  objects  we  (intuitively,  customarily  or  by  tradition)  recognise  as 
artworks. In other words, the theorist classifies an object as an artwork without having 
any  adequate  general  theory  of  what  makes  an  object  an  artwork.  The  object  in 
question is found to have no aesthetic purpose. The theorist then concludes that there 
exist artworks with no aesthetic purpose, since the object in question is an artwork 
and  yet  has  no  aesthetic  purpose.  However,  the  theorist  has  begun  her  analysis 
without  an  adequate  theory  of  what  makes  an  object  an  artwork.  It  is  therefore 
possible that the object in question, the object she took for an artwork, is not an 
artwork after all -and she cannot tell whether this object is or is not an artwork unless 
she first comes up with an adequate theory of what makes an object an artwork. It can 
therefore be argued that all our theorist has managed to show is that an object of 
which she doesn’t know whether it is an artwork or not, an object which may as well 
not be an artwork, an object she may simply have mistaken for an artwork, has no 
aesthetic purpose. Lacking an adequate theory of what makes an object an artwork, 
our theorist cannot say anything significant about whether artworks do or do not have 
an aesthetic purpose.  
In my analysis, by contrast, I have tried to start from a theoretical proposal 
about what makes an object an artwork. I have not taken for granted a half-understood 
term ‘artwork’, but have rather tried to spell out from scratch what an artwork may be 
and what it is that makes it an essentially distinct object. I have argued, convincingly, 
I hope, that artworks have distinct etiological history by virtue of being essentially 
related to a specific type of psycho-cognitive state (a poetic thought state). I have also 
claimed that there is good introspective evidence that an attitude of an aesthetic sort to 
the artist’s own creative mental representations is integral to poetic thought states. 
This in turn justifies the claim that an attitude of an aesthetic sort is integral to the  
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kind of action art is.
94 From this theoretical perspective, the claim that art has some 
characteristic aesthetic function or purpose seems to me to follow automatically.  
I have been arguing that artworks are not objects which are designed to say 
things, and which happen, in addition, to have such and such perceptual features and 
achieve such and such perceptual effects. Artworks are objects designed to have such 
and such perceptual features and achieve such and such perceptual effects so that they 
will trigger a certain experience in an audience. In the course of that, they may also 
say things, which feed back into the senses and deepen the aesthetic experience. To 
give another example of this retroactive feedback relation between perceptual and 
conceptual states, consider the following analysis by Arnheim (1974: 89):  
 
By connecting two or more spots through similarity, a painter may establish a 
significant visual movement. El Greco’s Expulsion from the Temple is painted in 
drab yellowish and brownish shades. A bright red is reserved for the clothes of 
Christ and those of one of the money changers, who bends down in the lower left 
corner of the picture. As the beholder’s attention is caught by the central figure 
of Christ, similarity of colour makes his glance sweep to the left and downward 
to the second spot. This movement duplicates the stroke of Christ’s whip, the 
path of which is emphasized further by the raised arms of the two interposed 
figures. Thus the eye truly performs the action that represents the main subject of 
the picture.  
 
 
Let us say that perceptual features of this painting -e.g. the mimetic way in which the 
audience’s eye is made to respond- achieve such and such perceptual effects, which 
elicit  a  basic  layer  of  aesthetic  response.  These  perceptual  features  also  help  to 
identify/ conceptualise the goings on in the painting in a way that yields a wide array 
of weak implications that combine to depict a scene, a mood, a theme etc. These 
implications  not  only  lead  to  a  convergence  between  the  minds  of  painter  and 
                                                
94 Similarly, I have not taken for granted the half understood term ‘aesthetic’, but rather tried 
to spell out a complete theoretical analysis of aesthetic response as a metarepresentational 
type of pleasurable sensory response, and thus go beyond what has been attempted in the past.  
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audience,  but  also,  and  crucially,  feed  back  into  the  perceptual  features  of  this 
painting: making  it  possible, for instance, to conceptualise the mimetic action the 
audience’s eye is made to perform as an action of Christ’s whipping, and to intensify 
the sensory impact and thus the aesthetic experience elicited by this painting.  
In Chapter 3, I looked at the extent of the phenomenal in our conceptual lives. 
Here, there is a sense in which I have started looking at the extent of the conceptual in 
our  phenomenal  lives.  The  relation  between  experience  and  meaning  becomes 
interactive  and circular:  the  experiential  interacts  with  the  conceptual, so  that  the 
experientially  enhanced  richness  of  the  conceptual  can  retroactively  contribute  to 
further  deepening  the  initial  experience.  In  art,  to  adapt  the  famous  empiricist 
doctrine,  nothing  is  in  the  mind  unless  it  is first  in  the  senses.  And  nothing  that 
reaches the mind through the senses makes this journey purely for the mind’s sake, 
but travels in order to be eventually channelled back to the source it arose from, the 
senses. Art sets out from phenomena, proceeds to thoughts, but eventually ends again 
in phenomena.  
To say that art is an action perceptually driven by design is to in fact to claim 
that art has aesthetic teleology. This raises the question of whether a stimulus with 
such teleology could be properly described as an instance of communication. In other 
words, is it correct to treat art as communication? Or, is communication really what 
art is?  
 
7.4. Is art ostensive inferential communication? 
Let us start by asking ourselves what sort of stimulus a work of art is. To that end we 
shall draw again on Sperber and Wilson. In discussing what makes a phenomenon 
relevant to an individual, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 153) note that:   
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A stimulus is a phenomenon designed to achieve cognitive effects. Relevance for 
a stimulus is thus the same as relevance for any other phenomenon (…). 
 
 
And relevance of a phenomenon is defined as follows:  
 
Relevance of a phenomenon (classificatory) 
A phenomenon is relevant to an individual if and only if one or more of the 
assumptions it makes manifest is relevant to him. 
 
Relevance of a phenomenon (comparative) 
Extent Condition 1: a phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent that 
the positive cognitive effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 265-6). 
Extent Condition 2: a phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent that 
the effort required to process it optimally is small. 
 
 
The next step is to define a more specific set of stimuli, ostensive stimuli: someone 
who  wants  to  achieve  a  specific  effect  should  be  expected  to  try  and  produce  a 
stimulus which will achieve just the intended effect at either the attentive or the sub-
attentive level.  When a child wants her parents to see she is distressed, the obvious 
course might be to cry in a manifestly sincere way, pre-empting the parent’s attention 
and  making  available  and  the  most  relevant  assumption  that  she  is  distressed. 
Ostensive stimuli, however, are stimuli used to achieve rather subtler cognitive effects 
than this. They are used to make an informative intention mutually manifest and to 
achieve  this  more  refined  goal  they  must  satisfy  two  conditions:  a)  attract  the 
audience’s attention and b) focus it on the communicator’s intentions:  
 
Ostensive inferential communication cannot achieve its effect sub-attentively; it 
necessarily  involves  the  construction  of  conceptual  representations  and  the 
mobilisation  of  central  thought  processes.  (…)  The  second  condition  that  an 
ostensive stimulus must meet is to focus the attention of the audience on the 
communicator’s intentions. That is, the assumption that the stimulus is ostensive 
must be both manifest enough and relevant enough to lead to optimal processing. 
This condition is generally met by stimuli which both pre-empt the attention and 
are irrelevant unless treated as ostensive stimuli. This is clearly true of coded 
signals  used  in  ostensive  communication,  linguistic  utterances  in  particular,  
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which unless treated as ostensive stimuli, are mere irrelevant noises or marks on 
paper. It is also true of non-coded ostensive stimuli.  
 
A non-coded ostensive stimulus may be an ordinary bodily movement, with little 
intrinsic relevance, made with artificial -and attention arresting- rigidity (…) The 
best ostensive stimuli are entirely irrelevant unless they are treated as ostensive. 
Consider  a  case  where  an  intrinsically  highly  relevant  stimulus  is  used  -or 
misused- ostensively: say, somebody who is believed to have her arms paralysed 
mimics the act of driving. Here, the fact that she can move her arms would be so 
much more relevant than anything she might have wanted to communicate that 
her informative intention might well go unnoticed. (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 
152-153)  
 
 
Art  is  not  yet  another  case  of  ostensive  inferential  communication  and 
artworks  are  not  ostensive  stimuli,  although  they  may  well  be  used  to  make  an 
informative  intention  mutually  manifest.  They  can  be  embedded  within  an  act  of 
ostensive  behaviour  -e.g.  ready-mades-  or  designed  and  manufactured  in  order  to 
carry out an act of ostensive behaviour -e.g. manufactured artworks-, but at the same 
time these artistic stimuli have: 
  
a) essentially distinct psycho-cognitive etiology, which sets them ontologically 
apart from all other non-artistic stimuli, and  
b) characteristic teleology, by which I mean that, as noted above, the function or 
purpose of an artwork is not simply to achieve cognitive relevance.  
 
The ontological distinctness of artworks suggests that although the discipline 
of pragmatics can shed considerable light on how communication and a meeting of 
minds may be achieved through art, art needs a dedicated theoretical discipline, a 
philosophy of literature and art, to deal with it in its entirety. I have also suggested 
that artworks are stimuli of intrinsic perceptual pertinence
95 to the organism because 
of the perceptual effects they achieve. So, even when they are intended to make an 
                                                
95 I am using the word ‘pertinence’ rather than ‘relevance’ because the effects alluded to are 
not robustly conceptual.  
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informative  intention  mutually  manifest,  artworks  should  be  seen  as  atypical 
exemplars  of  ostensive stimuli  in that  they  have  intrinsic  value,  perceptual  value. 
They  are  pertinent  to  the  organism  independently  of  whether  they  make  any 
conceptual assumptions manifest or not.  
 
7.5. Is art a mistake? 
I shall begin by quoting Tilghman (1994: 123-124):  
 
This  concern  with  the  development  of  visual  perception  and,  by  analogy, 
auditory perception is natural for people such as Wolfflin and Morelli who 
were working in the history of the visual arts of drawing, painting, sculpture, 
and architecture, but Baumgarten had restricted his concern almost entirely to 
poetry and it is not at all obvious that beyond a certain point perception has 
much to do with poetry in any interesting way. (…) If the aesthetic character 
of poetry is to be one with that of the visual arts, the connection is going to 
have to be made in more subtle and unexpected ways. I certainly would not 
argue for any general theory of the aesthetics of poetry and much less for any 
broader program seeking to bring both poetry and the visual arts under some 
still wider common theory. 
 
 
I hope to have argued convincingly that a general theory of aesthetics may 
after all be possible. An account of aesthetic experience like the one I have pursued 
here  can  be  applied  to  every  single  art  form,  from  music  to  fiction,  and  from 
installation  art  to  the  cave  paintings  of  the  Neanderthals,  thus  allowing  for  a 
generalised  theory  of  aesthetics  and  opening  the  way  for  a  broad  theoretical 
programme  that  brings  together  individual  art-forms  under  a  common  and  all-
embracing philosophy of art. 
A good reason to pursue such a generalised and all-embracing model is that by 
broadening our hypotheses to encompass all possible artforms, we are less likely to 
find  ourselves  being  carried  away  by  the  mistakes  that  sometimes  emerge  when 
theory and reflection are restricted to the particularities of individual artforms. One  
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form of art may be susceptible to weaknesses that some other form is immune to. As 
suggested  earlier,  the  rich  conceptual  content  of  language  has  entrenched 
interpretationalism far more deeply in the theory of literary art than in the theory of 
any other artform. Similarly, the emergence of conceptual art made the weaknesses 
of structural essentialism evident in the fine art camp nearly 60 years before they 
started coming to the attention of literary theorists. 
 
Is art a mistake? Yes, a beautiful one. Art emerged as the result of an error. 
Adaptive sensory pleasure started attaching itself to stimuli (false positives) that had 
not been positively selected by evolution. At some point in the course of evolution, 
phenomena internal to the human mind (aspectual representations) started behaving 
like false positives and triggering non-adaptive pleasurable sensory responses. In this, 
they were both critically similar to, and at the same time critically different from, 
other  false  positive  triggers  of  sensory  pleasure:  similar  in  that  the  organism’s 
response is of a sensory nature, and different in that the organism is not responding 
directly to an object, but to the way an object has been seen. The response is thus 
mediated and in some broad sense metarepresentational. This type of response is what 
I have called an aesthetic response.  
Art  started  out  as  an  intra-individual  adventure,  a  creative  private  mental 
representation  within  an  individual  mind.  I  have  argued  that  this  private  mental 
representation must have been favourable to the human mind to a degree that would 
justify the mind’s desire to return to and experience the sensory pleasure triggered by 
such representations again and again, constantly and repeatedly. The step from private 
mental  representations  to  the  first  public  artwork  was  just  a  matter  of  when,  not 
whether.  What  factors  lead  an  individual  to  express  her  creative  private  mental 
representations  (aspectual  representations)  in  the  form  of  a  public  physically  
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observable object is for anthropology and cognitive psychology to answer. For the 
present discussion, the crucial point is that artworks inherited, and continue to inherit, 
their intrinsic value for the perceptual mind/ brain from the properties of the particular 
creative  mental  states  to  which  they  are  causally  related.  Artworks,  just  like  the 
mental states from which they descend, are also objects that trigger this mediated/ 
metarepresentational  type  of  pleasurable  sensory  response  (aesthetic  response). 
Artworks are etiologically distinct objects with a characteristic teleolοgy. They have 
an essentially distinct psycho-cognitive history, of which aesthetic experience is a 
central component, and are associated with specific, and again aesthetic, teleology. 
For these reasons, artworks can be said to give rise to characteristic, art-specific types 
of effect and expected relevance. I have suggested that this array of sub-attentive 
mind/ brain-improving effects and the types of relevance they yield for an organism 
possibly explain the intra-individual (private) and inter-individual (public) success of 
art as an enduring human cultural representation. 
The evolutionary story  I have tried to develop is the story of how a false 
positive became incredibly successful in taking root within the individual mind and 
gradually  transforming  itself  into  one  of  the  most  characteristic  human  cultural 
representations. Over the years, the origins of art have been debated from nearly every 
possible  perspective  that  contemporary  anthropological  studies  have  provided  for 
explaining ‘how a cultural representation results from mechanisms at work in a given 
specific situation’  (Sperber 1996: 41).  Sociological, Structuralist and Functionalist 
models have dominated discussion in either the theory of literature or the philosophy 
of art for much of the 20
th century, but have failed to provide an adequate explanatory 
account of why human minds exhibit an ability and susceptibility for art, where are  
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came from, or why it became so important to human social functioning.
96 The new 
trend  of  Darwinian  criticism,  although  a  valuable  move  towards  exploring  the 
implications of evolutionary theory for a theory of literature/ art, has so far done a 
better job of explaining why art has the form it does, given the organisation of human 
cognition, than of making concrete suggestions about how art became possible for the 
human mind.  
That is not to deny the value of trying to explain why art has the particular 
features it does. In the end, it is almost a truism to say that it is who we are that makes 
art the kind of object it is, and it is the kind of object art is that makes us who we are.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
I would like to take us back to the noetic experiment in which a patient having a heart 
attack impressionistically describes his experience as a knife stabbing in his chest, or 
a frozen muscle in his back, and so on. The patient gives an accurate impressionistic 
report of his experience. However, his impressionistic description is not an adequate 
account of the actual goings-on inside his body. In this chapter, I have concentrated 
on the nature of art as a perceptually driven action and the crucial role that aesthetic 
experience plays in it. Art is teleologically distinct in that it is an action geared to 
eliciting aesthetic experience in an audience. I have also tried to show, through a 
series of examples and noetic experiments, that in the kind of action art is, aesthetic 
experience  is  not  incidental  but  primary.  Artworks  are  objects  designed  to  elicit 
aesthetic experiences. They are designed to give rise to sensory responses and achieve 
                                                
96 Sociological models of art lack psychological realism and have little explanatory value as 
regards either the micro-mechanisms or the macro-mechanisms of art. Functionalist models, 
although they themselves lack explanatory value, may nevertheless be an important addition 
to a cognitive theory of art. In the previous chapter I discussed in some detail the weaknesses 
of Structuralism in literary theory and the philosophy of art. 
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perceptual  effects.  In  doing  this,  they  may  also  incidentally  achieve  stronger  or 
weaker conceptual effects, but never the other way round. So long as an object is 
primarily designed to achieve conceptual effects, even if it incidentally happens to 
cause some perceptual effects too, it is not an artwork.  
The teleological distinctness of art has various implications for our discussion 
of linguistic pessimism and the expressive capacities of language. The first, and most 
important,  is  that,  since  art  is  an  action  primarily  geared  to  eliciting  aesthetic 
experience, the poet’s  impressionistic  report  of her  ‘struggle for  expression’ must 
certainly involve an element of failure  to describe the actual goings on in her mind. 
Yes, the poet’s medium -natural language- happens to be a nuanced, conceptually 
robust medium. And indeed, literary art is one of the conceptually richest art forms, 
allowing complex and richly structured meanings to be communicated. But it is still a 
form  of art.  And  as a form  of art,  even  literature  is  primarily  geared to  eliciting 
aesthetic experiences. I take this as evidence that the part of the poet’s discontent with 
language  and  her  intense  preoccupation  with  ‘expression’  is  connected  with  her 
inability to describe the actual goings on inside her mind.  
However,  I  suspect  that  a  good  deal  of  what  the  poet  experiences  and 
impressionistically  reports  as  a  ‘struggle  for  expression’  is  in  fact  a  struggle  for 
aesthetic  achievement.  The  poet  works  on  her  aspectual  representations,  trying  to 
move successfully and satisfactorily from these private mental entities towards the 
production of a publicly shared object (artwork). Her effort to ‘speak the contents of 
her mind’ is then something much broader and more complex than a mere effort to 
communicate  meaning.  This  publicly  shared  object  must  be  an  adequate  physical 
realisation  of  the  creator’s  aesthetic  response  to  her  own  creative  mental 
representations; moreover, it must be realised in such a way as to elicit in an audience  
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aesthetic experiences of a similar sort. The complex retroactive relationship between 
the artwork as an aesthetic object which becomes progressively realised through a 
circular process of being fed by, and then feeding back into, the poet’s creative mental 
representations, is the primary struggle in an artist’s creative life. A struggle far more 
complex, critical and representative of the kind of action art is than any other. The 
poet  is  correct  in  reporting  an  internal  battle  for  ‘expression’;  it  is  just  that 
‘expression’ in this case must be interpreted in the broadest sense. Part of linguistic 
pessimism should then be taken as a truthful impressionistic report of mental goings-
on  that  have  not,  however,  as  such  been  adequately  described.  For  more  than  a 
century, both literary and folk theorists have been taking a heart attack for a chest 
being stabbed by a knife. 
  
 
 
196   
Chapter 8 
Interdisciplinarity: some epistemic concerns on literary and art theory  
 
 
Comedian (shouts): ‘The whole world should unite!’ 
Audience (shouts): ‘Yeees!’ 
Comedian: ‘Who against?’ 
 
8.1 Influential statements that do not state what they have been taken to state 
Perhaps one of the most widely debated issues in aesthetics is an ontological one 
(Danto 1981, Tilghman 1984, Fodor 1993, Wittgenstein 2001). Simply expressed, the 
ontological enquiry in aesthetics asks what makes an object a work of art. In the 
various sub-domains of aesthetics, one encounters much narrower varieties of this 
question: literary aesthetics, for instance, asks what makes a verbal object a work of 
art. 
The resemblance of this latter question to Jakobson’s influential statement on 
linguistics and poetics is striking. In his seminal ‘Closing statement’ at the Indiana 
conference in 1958, Jakobson suggests: 
 
Poetics deals primarily with the question, ‘What makes a verbal message a work 
of art?’ (…) [T]he main subject of poetics is the differentia specifica of verbal art 
in relation to other arts and in relation to other kinds of verbal behaviour (…) 
(1958/ 1996: 10). 
 
 
I hope you will agree with me that the question Jakobson is raising in this statement is 
one about the ontology of the literary work of art. And if that is so, his statement 
seems to be rephrasable as: ‘Poetics deals primarily with [a] question [which is central 
to literary aesthetics]’.   
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Is Jakobson really putting forward the idea that the domain of poetics fully 
overlaps and should be seen as synonymous with literary aesthetics? Since nothing 
else  in  his  ‘Closing  Statement’  strongly  suggests  so,  the  only  other  reasonable 
explanation we are left with is that Jakobson is guilty of a tiny slip in terminology: 
although in his paper he uses the term ‘poetics’, what he actually seems to have in 
mind in using this term would be more adequately described as ‘literary aesthetics’.  
Let us follow his analysis a bit further. Jakobson (1958/ 1996: 17) assumes 
that there is an ‘indispensable feature inherent in [the language of] every piece of 
poetry’. This necessary feature is termed the poetic function and defined as follows:  
 
The  poetic  function  projects  the  principle  of  equivalence  from  the  axis  of 
selection into the axis of combination. (1958/ 1996: 17) 
 
 
To  clarify  a  little:  in  structural  linguistic  terms,  the  ‘axis  of  selection’  involves 
paradigmatic  relations  (i.e.  relations  among  intersubstitutable  vocabulary  items), 
while  the  ‘axis  of  selection’  involves  syntagmatic  (i.e.  sequential)  relations. 
Ordinarily,  if  one  wants  to  refer  to  a  child,  one  selects  from  a  paradigm  of 
semantically similar nouns like ‘child’, ‘kid’, ‘youngster’, ‘tot’. In Jakobson’s view, 
this selection is produced on the basis of equivalence, or, in other words, on the basis 
of systematic similarity and dissimilarity at the semantic level (defined in terms of 
relations  such  as  synonymy  and  antonymy).  The  difference  between  an  ordinary 
linguistic  object  and  an  object  that  fulfils  the  poetic  function  -the  ultimate 
manifestation of such an object would, of course, be the poem- is that in the latter, the 
combination of terms into a syntagmatic sequence is also produced on the basis of 
equivalence. Hence, ‘in poetry and to a certain extent in latent manifestations of the 
poetic function’, syllables, phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, even whole sentences,  
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are all combined on the basis of linguistic similarities and dissimilarities, symmetries 
and asymmetries:  
 
Without its two dactylic words the combination innocent bystander would hardly 
have become a hackneyed phrase. The symmetry of three disyllabic verbs with 
an identical initial consonant and identical final vowel added splendour to the 
laconic victory message of Caesar: Veni, vidi, vici.  
 
Jakobson’s  approach  is  clearly  geared  to  finding  inherent  (linguistic) 
properties  that  would  make  it  possible  to  draw  an  essential  distinction  between 
ordinary  linguistic  objects  and  linguistic  objects  that  count  as  art.  Would  it  be  a 
mistake to conclude that what Jakobson is exploring in his ‘Closing Statement’ is in 
fact  an  ontological,  literary-aesthetic  subject?  Jakobson’s  ‘Closing  statement’,  the 
statement most frequently referred to and quoted in the second half of the 20
th century 
as illuminating the relation between linguistics and poetics, does not really say much 
about this relation. Jakobson’s paper makes no general proposals about how the then-
emerging discipline of linguistics might interweave with poetics/ literary theorising, 
but is rather focused on something much narrower: Jakobson is a structuralist, and as 
a structuralist, he assumes that the property that makes a certain object literature/ art is 
an inherent, structural, and hence linguistic property; he is therefore quite reasonably 
interested in how the emerging discipline of linguistics could be used to unearth this 
ontological property.  
Jakobson’s  ‘Closing  Statement’  is  without  doubt  amongst  the  three  most 
serious attempts in the 20
th century to address the matter of the essence of literature/ 
art; but still, the point remains: if Jakobson’s statement illuminates anything, it is 
certainly not the relation between linguistics and poetics but that between linguistics 
and ontology/ aesthetics. The issue here is not in the slightest Jakobson’s choice of  
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terminology. We could overlook the decision by a theorist of his calibre to refer to 
aesthetics using the more generic term ‘poetics’. What is harder to overlook, though, 
is  that  for  nearly  five  decades,  Jakobson’s  paper  has  nevertheless  been  widely 
accepted in literary studies as one of the most ambitious statements on linguistics and 
poetics  -despite  the  fact  that  in  terms  of  its  actual  content  the  paper  makes  only 
marginal  contributions  to  anything  like  the  relationship  between  ‘linguistics  and 
poetics’ as such-, while hardly ever having been referred to for what it actually is: one 
of the three most serious existing proposals on the essential distinctness of literature 
and art.  
The way Jakobson’s paper has been read and received is partly indicative of 
what it means to do literary/ art theory in the present day. All it takes is a theorist of a 
certain -unquestionable- calibre to write an essay on virtually anything, call it, say, 
‘Closing Statement on Linguistics and Poetics’, and then watch it being systematically 
referred to and quoted for nearly half a century as the most illuminating statement on 
Linguistics  and  Poetics.  How  many  of  the  theorists  who  quoted  and  referred  to 
Jakobson’s statement actually read it? How many of the theorists who actually read it 
understood what it is about? How many of the theorists who read the theorists who 
read  and  quoted  Jakobson’s  statement  without,  nevertheless,  understanding  it 
suspected that Jakobson was being quoted without having been understood?  
The uncritical way a harmless slip in terminology in Jakobson’s discipline-
shaping  statement  was  taken  up  and  recapitulated  for  half  a  century  is  a  rather 
revealing illustration of the inherited circularities and confusions not only of the best 
part of contemporary literary study, but of the best part of literary/ artistic enquiry in 
general. Such inherited confusions vary in their severity and implications. Some, like 
the  one  I  started  this  discussion  with,  emerge  from  weaknesses  in  established  
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practices in the discipline, but do not really have any further serious implications: the 
fact that Jakobson’s statement is about something significantly different from what it 
has been taken to be about may indicate a worrying lack of critical understanding in 
contemporary  literary  theorising,  but  it  is  not  to  blame  for  this  lack  of  critical 
understanding having arisen in the first place. Other confusions, like the one I am 
about to discuss, seem to be having more serious, discipline-shaping  effects. My next 
example comes from the relatively new paradigm of stylistics. 
In Jean Jacques Weber’s (1996: 3) overview of ‘contextualized’ stylistics -to 
choose  a  random  example-  stylistic  labour  is  subdivided  into  ‘applied’  and 
‘theoretical’.  The  so-called  ‘applied’  strand  is  taken  to  involve  a  wide  array  of 
applications  of  stylistics  to  pedagogical  tasks  (e.g.  foreign-language  teaching  or 
reading and writing skills), and all remaining analytical activity is categorised under 
the cover term ‘theoretical’.  
It  can  be  shown,  however,  that  what  contemporary  stylistics  treats  as  a 
distinction between ‘application’ and ‘theory’ can in fact more adequately described 
as a distinction between two different types of application: let us call them first order 
and second order application.  
So-called ‘theoretical stylistics’ could be more adequately described as a case 
of first order application, since the standard practice in theoretical stylistics at the 
moment is to adopt the theoretical vocabulary and machinery of other disciplines such 
as functional linguistics, cognitive linguistics, etc and then apply them in interpreting 
a specific literary text or describing a literary genre. Theoretical stylistics does not 
draw  on  its  interface  with  other  disciplines  with  a  view  to  enriching  its  own 
theoretical  repertoire,  illuminating  old  literary-theoretical  questions,  or,  more 
crucially, bringing about retroactive effects upon the source-theoretical framework by,  
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say,  advancing,  modifying  or  cancelling  some  of  its  existing  assumptions.  Being 
essentially a form of critical practice theoretical stylistics borrows theory from other 
domains and uses it to facilitate a process of literary interpretation.  
Alongside  theoretical  stylistics  being  essentially  an  applied  form  of 
investigative practice, a problem of a different order emerges when theory sometimes 
happens  to  be  borrowed  from  other  domains  without  sufficient  prior  critical 
assessment. During the discussion at a recent Linguistics and Poetics conference of a 
paper  that  investigated  metonymic  language  in  Shakespeare,  using  the  cognitive 
linguistic  framework  of  Panther  and  Mendoza,  I  raised  the  following  question: 
‘Having studied Panther and Mendoza’s theory of metonymy closely, I have come to 
realise that their approach has a very serious defect: their definition of metonymy is so 
broad that it eventually covers a range of dissimilar phenomena, many of which could 
be  better  described  as,  say,  metaphors,  narrowings,  etc.  Your  analysis  of 
Shakespeare’s  metonymic  language,  hasn’t  just  borrowed  Panther  and  Mendoza’s 
framework but also inherited its problems: for instance, you treat as metonymic a case 
like ‘knife’ for ‘enemy’, which indeed seems to be a metonymy, and simultaneously, 
a case like ‘man’ for ‘courageous man’, which seems, however, more like concept 
narrowing than metonymy. How would you respond to this criticism?’ In response to 
my question, I got the following answer: ‘I treat such cases as metonymies because 
Panther and Mendoza treat them as metonymies. If Panther and Mendoza’s definition 
of metonymy is problematic, as you suggest, this is something I cannot respond to. I 
didn’t produce this definition, I am only using it to discuss Shakespeare’. 
The weak variety of causal/ logical relationship that holds in any case between 
theory and application in the arts and humanities, makes it possible for ineffective 
theories to still be effectively applied. Unlike the natural sciences, where efficient  
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application  is  directly  dependent  upon,  and  hence  confirms  the  adequacy  of,  the 
theory -build your dwelling on the wrong sort of mechanics and it will fall on your 
head- in the arts and humanities, the success of an application is often unmotivated by 
the theory. It is this characteristic of literary/ artistic thinking that allows a somewhat 
odd collection of applications of theory of all sorts to be successful qua applications, 
although the theories employed are partially or wholly inadequate. The stylistics paper 
mentioned above, for instance, was a perfectly adequate application of what can be described, 
though, as an inadequate theory of metonymy.
97 
Nothing that is true of this process in disciplines like theoretical stylistics is 
not also true of most other multidisciplinary attempts in contemporary literary and art 
study. Theoretical stylistics is just one amongst various instances in contemporary 
literary and art study that go to show one and the same thing: theoretical endeavours 
in either the contemporary literary or art-theoretical world have started employing 
investigative  practices  in  which  the  distinction  between  ‘application’ and  ‘theory’ 
emerges as largely debatable, while theorising in any robust sense of the term is for 
the most part absent.  
 
8.2. Interdisciplinarity and Theory in literature and the other arts 
To attempt to articulate theory within literary and arts study in the modern day is in a 
sense to plead for genuine interdisciplinarity. It has been pointed out repeatedly that 
literature/ art is not an autonomous object; and indeed, any theoretical domain that 
hopes to take on literature/ art as the global fact it is should not be anything less than 
an inter-discipline. 
                                                
97 Similar examples can be found across the whole spectrum of recent literary/ art study, with 
inadequate theories being adequately applied to anything from architectural projects to setting 
up fine art exhibitions.  
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However, this statement can be interpreted in two different ways. First, the 
literary/ art event cannot be addressed by one discipline alone without being seriously 
diminished. A century ago, literary scholars would generally acknowledge the non-
autonomous nature of the literary object, but at the same time, they could not be 
accused of theoretical misconduct for not using interdisciplinary explanatory tools, 
simply because there weren’t any. Today, there is no excuse. Alan Richardson (1998: 
39) makes a number of pertinent comments:  
 
Scholars of the future age may well find amusement in the pretensions of one 
English professor after another to solve the riddles of human agency, subject 
formation, language acquisition, and consciousness, with little or no awareness 
of the spectacular developments in psychology, linguistics, philosophy of mind, 
and neuroscience that form the central story of Anglo-American intellectual life 
from the 1950s to the present. (…) The cognitive neurosciences have emerged as 
(…) [the] most exciting and rapidly developing interdisciplinary venture of our 
era.  That  this  remains  news  to  many  working  in  literature  departments  has 
already become something of an embarrassment; it will steadily prove more so.  
 
Second, and more critical, adequate literary/ art theorizing should be expected 
to have retroactive effects on theories produced in the full range of disciplines -and 
particularly empirical disciplines- with which it interacts. It is hard to imagine how 
else it could be. Hard to imagine, for instance, that theorizing within the Philosophy 
of  mind  (on  the  issue  of  mental  architecture  for  example)  could  have  major 
implications for Pragmatics by raising questions such as ‘How does Pragmatics locate 
within the broader architecture of the mind?’, but theorizing within Pragmatics would 
not have retroactive effects on the Philosophy of mind. The very minute Pragmatics 
contemplates the ‘mental location’ of our pragmatic mechanisms, theory within the 
Philosophy of mind is instantaneously affected. This, if nothing else, is a first-rate 
example of a genuine interdisciplinary relationship.  
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Interdisciplinarity, as I use the term here, involves a reciprocal, bi-directional 
relationship  between  two  disciplines,  such  that  theory  and  practice  in  the  one 
discipline can, at least in principle, have a direct bearing on theory and practice in the 
other, and vice versa.  
Lacking  a  proper  theory  of  its  own,  literary/  art  study  has  so  far  been 
borrowing from anthropology, linguistics, psychology and the many other human-
scientific domains that have entered the game of inter-blend in the last fifty years, but 
without  necessarily  considering  whether  it  could  or  should  give  something  back. 
Many theorists have viewed this uni-directional game as the only realistic possibility 
for  literary/  art  study,  and  dismissed  the  idea  of  genuine  interdisciplinarity  as 
unattainable, particularly when the other side of the inter-blend involves cognitive 
domains. In discussing cognitive literary studies, for instance, T. E. Jackson (2002: 
177-178) comments:  
 
As far as I can tell, this dialectical relationship (…) cannot be the case with 
cognitive literary studies because the originating theory cannot, even in principle, 
be  recursively  affected by  the  investigation.  An  application  of  that theory  to 
literature may well change something of our understanding of literature, but it is 
difficult to see how the interpretive practice can possibly change the theory.  
 
Jackson’s pessimism is justifiable, and to some extent correct, as long we stay 
committed to essentially reductionist views of the scope and implications of literary 
and art study. Note how Jackson explicitly refers to ‘our understanding of literature’ 
as ‘the interpretive practice’. The equation of ‘our understanding of literature’ with 
the  act  of  interpretation  has  become  so  deeply  entrenched  in  the  contemporary 
theoretical  consciousness  that  it  is  drastically  reducing  the  otherwise  broad  and 
diverse scope of literary theorizing.  As soon as  we  depart from  such reductionist  
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equations, it will become much easier to see that genuine interdisciplinarity is both 
possible and necessary for a meaningful and constructive theory of literature and art.
98 
The bi-directionality of the interdisciplinary relation, as I have presented it 
here, raises two parallel questions. The first is how pertinent scientific enquiry can be 
of  use  to  literary/  art  studies.  And  indeed,  most  contemporary  literary  and  art 
paradigms have been drawing on scientific enquiry in one way or another.  
The  second  question  arises  only  on  the  assumption  that  literary/  artistic 
theorizing can retroactively affect theory in other disciplines, and this may explain 
why, although equally important for any worthwhile notion of interdisciplinarity, it 
has not received the same amount of attention. This question reverses matters and 
asks  how  (theoretical)  literary/  art  studies  can  be  of  use  to  pertinent  scientific 
enquiry.  The  cognitive  neuroscientist  Mark  Turner  (2002:  17-18)  proposes  one 
possible line of answer:  
 
Scholars of literature and art are highly attuned to the intricate workings 
of creativity, invention, language, visual representation, and the construction of 
meaning.  They  offer  superb  and  illuminating  examples  that  often  make  the 
intricacies of mental operation somewhat easier to see. They have well-trained 
intuitions about the intricacies of  mental  and linguistic phenomena, and they 
have ideas about meaning and form. These intricacies and these ideas have, for 
the most part, not yet penetrated cognitive neuroscience's field of vision. They 
are  part  of  what  scholars  of  literature  and  art  have  to  offer  cognitive 
neuroscience.  
 
                                                
98  The  possibility  of  interdisciplinarity  in  theoretical  literary/  art  study  has  also  raised 
reservations  of  a  different  sort.  I  suspect  that  T.E.  Jackson  echoes  such  reservations  in 
claiming that: ‘(…) although (…) theories can of course be disputed, only objections arising 
either from the same kind of scientific disciplinary practices or from relevant philosophical 
grounds will have the epistemological weight to affect the theory’ (2002: 166). Traditional 
theorists  are  concerned  that,  as  soon  as  literary/  art  theorizing  starts  using  investigative 
methods or addressing questions that will give it the ‘epistemological weight to affect theory’ 
in  other  disciplines,  the  resulting  investigative  practice  simply  will  not  be  literary/  art 
theorizing any more.   
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Another  line  of  answer  suggests  that,  while  it  is  one  thing  to  claim  that 
scholars of literature/ art have a lot to offer other disciplines, it is quite another to 
claim that literature/ art as an investigative object has a lot to offer.
99 So, is there 
anything about literature/ art -anything beyond their institutional specifics- worthy of 
singling out and pursuing as the subject matter of a dedicated theoretical discipline?  
In  recent  years,  this  question  has  arisen  with  unprecedented  urgency.  The 
emergence  of  conceptual  art,  and  the  use  of  existing  objects  (ready-mades)  as 
artworks in the fine-art world, made it increasingly clear that the claim that art is 
formally and structurally distinct can no longer be rationally defended. It was very 
soon afterwards that linguistics, pragmatics and cognitive science put the particulars 
of literary language under thorough inspection, only to demolish any remaining hopes 
of the formal and structural distinctness of literature. The claims of the New Criticism 
and Formalism with which the 20
th century began collapsed under the pressure of 
compelling evidence to the contrary: literature/ art is not a distinct structural or formal 
object. Yet, in my view a more generic question remained: is literature/ art a distinct 
object  at  all?  In  Chapters  5,  6  and  7,  I  tackled  this  concern  in  much  detail  and 
sketched possible answers. Here, I will provide a rough outline of how the essential 
distinctness of literature/ art relates to the types of retroactive effect that literary/ art 
theorising may have on other disciplines:  
 
                                                
99 Turner (2002: 17-18) has an interesting comment to make at this level as well:  
 
the  theory  of  blending,  interesting  to  cognitive  neuroscientists  because  conceptual 
blending has been shown to operate throughout everyday thought, language, and action, 
arose almost entirely from the study of literary and inventive linguistic expressions.  
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1) Literary studies in the last fifty years have been dominated by an ‘anti-universal’ 
stance  (see  Kiparsky  1987)  which  denies  the innateness  of  literary  language  -and 
indeed of language itself- and instead regards it as a by-product of cultural training. I 
reject the view of literature/ art as a mere institutional fact. As Paul Kiparsky (1987: 
195) has eloquently shown, the ability to produce and appreciate literature is innately 
determined  and  universal  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  A  universalist  approach  to 
literature assumes that literary language is at least partly a product of our language 
faculty, and is thus governed by the same rules that govern language itself. It also 
assumes that despite cultural variation, literary language occurs in more or less the 
same ‘formats’ across the species, and is an indispensable aspect of our innate pre-
disposition to acquire language. The same goes for art in general. Art occurs in more 
or less the same ‘formats’ across the species, and its emergence should be seen as 
indispensably connected to the evolution and function of universal intra-individual/ 
cognitive mechanisms.  
2) It took nearly a century to gather the evidence that now forcefully brings into 
question  the  doctrine  that  literary  language  is  the  product  of  a  separate  capacity, 
distinct from the capacity for natural language. Four theorists, in particular, can ‘be 
held  responsible’  for  the  collapse  of  this  doctrine  (for  similar  suggestions,  see 
Kiparsky 1987). The first is undoubtedly Chomsky, whose programme on universal 
grammar eliminates any possibility of literary language being governed by rules that 
fall outside the scope of our language faculty. The second is Jerry Fodor (1983), 
whose work on mental modularity suggests that the perception and parsing of literary 
language employs exactly the same perceptual and parsing devices as non-literary 
language.  The  third  and  fourth  are  Sperber  and  Wilson  (1995),  whose  relevance-
theoretic pragmatics shows that both literary and non-literary language are understood  
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by use of the same interpretive strategies, are governed by the same communicative 
principle and locatable on a single continuum between literal and metaphorical use.  
Given the evidence we have available today, it is very easy in a way to dismiss 
the claim that literature is linguistically distinct as inadequate or simplistic. For the 
early 20
th century, though, claims about the uniqueness of literary language were truly 
revolutionary.  Eminent  literary  figures  like  Eliot,  Pound,  Breton,  and  Blanchot 
insightfully attacked the then dominant ‘poetics of convention’ and tried to replace it 
with  an  essentialist  ‘poetics  of  causation’:  i.e.  a  poetics  motivated  by  inherent 
properties of the literary object rather than by mere institutional and social agreement. 
It is a contingent fact that they looked in the wrong direction, i.e. that they tried to 
find these inherent properties in the language of the literary text. Their ultimate aim of 
producing an essentialist literary theory is still as valid today.  
Readopting  this  aim  with  the  interdisciplinary  theoretical  means  we  have 
available today is bound to radically change our view of the nature of literature and 
art. In this analysis, for instance, we have already found that there does exist a single 
and common property of literariness/ essence of art running through all art forms and 
literary  genres,  but  that  it  is  not  of  the  kind  so  far  envisaged.  We  have  already 
suspected that the recognition of a certain object as literature/ art depends crucially on 
our prototype detector and involves some weak sense of metarepresentation. We have 
managed to peel apart perceptual beauty from aesthetic beauty. We have succeeded in 
separating the ability to recognise or categorise an object from the essence of the 
object itself, thereby separating the sociology of art from its ontology/ metaphysics.  
3) The evidence accumulating for nearly a century that literature/ art is not distinct at 
a formal or structural level was indeed compelling, but do not eventually entail that 
literature/ art is not distinct in any other interesting sense.   
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4) This distinctness, we have shown, is of a psychological/ cognitive rather than a 
formal  or  structural-  nature.  Instead  of  looking  at  the  literary/  art  object  and  its 
‘language’, we have shifted the focus to the literary/ art event, the particular kind of 
action that art is, and its psycho-cognitive structure. The literary text, and generally 
the work of art, is an end-product. The literary event, on the other hand, offers a more 
global  perspective  on  the  phenomenon  of  art.  Literary  and  art  events  involve  a 
characteristic action, which leads to some prototypical end-product, which is expected 
to trigger some characteristic response.  
5) If literature/ art is distinct as an object in at least one interesting sense, then it 
cannot fall entirely within the scope of some other existing discipline (say, linguistics 
or pragmatics), and it should be the subject of a dedicated literary/ art-theoretical 
discipline.  
6) Finally, -to return to the question that triggered this whole discussion- if literature/ 
art is indeed distinct as an object, and I hope I have argued convincingly that we have 
good reasons to assume that it is, then its investigation should a priori be expected to 
have  potential  retroactive  effects  upon  other  disciplines:  being  a  distinct  object 
amounts to being able to highlight issues and questions in all related disciplines in a 
way no other object can.  
 
8.3. Theory vs pre-theory  
What possible forms may an up-to-date dedicated literary/ art-theoretical discipline 
take?  Some  workable  varieties  of  literary/  art  theorizing,  it  seems,  are  already  in 
place. Early 20
th century literary scholarship -in the writings of T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound 
and the Russian formalists, for instance- set up an ambitious programme addressing  
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important theoretical questions in philosophically sophisticated ways. Reviving and 
re-addressing this agenda in the light of the radical advances in the cognitive sciences 
in the last 30 years is a viable and sensible step.  
Now more than ever, the literary theorist and philosopher of the arts has a vast 
repertoire  of  sophisticated  descriptive  and  explanatory  tools  to  choose  from  in 
tackling  questions  which  are  traditionally  at  the  heart  of  literary/  artistic  enquiry, 
while engaging in a fruitful dialectics with other disciplines. It is in the very nature of 
the literary/ art event to excite some curiosity about human mental processes or old 
objects  out  there  in  the  world  that  in  some  way  or  other  relate  to  the  facts  of 
production  and  reception,  or  even  the  fact  of  just  being  a  work  of  art.  Literary 
theorists, aesthetic philosophers and practising artists have traditionally contemplated 
the  intricate  workings  of  the  subconscious,  the  nature  of  creativity,  the  interplay 
between  language  and  thought.  They  have  raised  questions  about  the  limits  of 
expression, the nature and role of intentions, the machinery of affect. Highly self-
reflexive  as  a  process,  literature/  art  gives  rise  to  empirical  intuitions  and  pre-
theoretical  ideas  about  production,  an  aspect  of  the  literary/  art  event  admittedly 
neglected  by  both  philosophy  and  linguistics.  Moreover,  as  an  internally  caused 
creative activity, literature/ art raises genuine questions about inspiration, causation, 
consciousness and free will. Here is an amazing fact that literature does not share with 
any other non-literary genre: without deliberation, without being able to explain how 
or why, like a true ‘appearance of the muse’, literature causes itself in a beautiful, 
mysterious, uniquely human way. These are just a few of the questions about which 
an updated literary/ art theory should have something to say.  
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So far, I have been talking about theory in an undifferentiated sense. Now, I 
would like to talk briefly about literary and art Theory, and contrast ‘Theory’ with 
‘pre-theory’.
100  
Twenty or so years since Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/1995) was first published, one can now clearly see from the viewpoint temporal 
distance provides that the reluctant reception of the theory in literary departments -
even  departments  that  were  forward-thinking  enough  at  the  time  to  have  studied 
Gricean Pragmatics - had little to do with the specific suggestions of the theory per se 
and more with the deeply entrenched indisposition of some literary scholars towards 
the cognitive paradigm.  
Nigel Fabb and Alan Durant’s (1987a: 10-13) analysis of how the tensions 
between functionalism and cognitivism have haunted contemporary linguistics hits the 
nail on the head. The story is old and familiar. The aversion to the cognitive paradigm 
itself has very little to do with the specific proposals of cognitivism per se, and more 
with its departures from and implications for well-established ideas about society, 
culture,  religion,  and  the  human  being  itself.  Kuhn’s  (1996:  23)  assertion  that 
‘paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors 
in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognise as 
acute’  comes  across  more  as  wishful  thinking  about  some  ideal  world  than  as  a 
realistic depiction of what leads to fluctuations in the fortunes of theories in the actual 
scientific  world.  Chomsky  (1976:123-134)  presented  a  more  realistic  picture  by 
showing  how  ideological  prejudice  rather  than  reason  was  responsible  for  the 
commercial success of the more romantic Empiricism over the more scientifically 
sound and far better evidenced Nativism.  
                                                
100 For clarity, I will stick with the convention of using a capital ‘T’ when referring to theory 
in this latter sense.   
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Relevance was a significant epistemic step. Amongst other things, Relevance 
broadened the range of explanatory mechanisms available to the humanities, allowing 
for phenomena to be accounted for in psychologically realistic terms as opposed to 
being  merely  described.  It  replaced  pre-theoretical  discourse  with  tractable 
Theoretical principles, revived long-forgotten questions in a surprisingly wide range 
of other disciplines and made pragmatics one of the most influential interdisciplinary 
ventures  of  our  times.  Heavily  drawing  on  the  paradigm  of  the  natural  sciences, 
Relevance attempted a leap from pre-theory to Theory by producing an investigative 
language compatible with the scientific method.  
A  Theory  compatible  with  the  scientific  method  may  be  described  as  a 
complex  articulated  body  of  thought  geared  to  answering  questions  or  explaining 
regularities in a given domain. A Theory purports to make true claims, and to make a 
true claim you have to touch the (real) world. Truth is not a property either of objects 
or of states of affairs in the world, but a property of thoughts. It involves a particular 
type of correspondence between thoughts entertained as true descriptions of the world 
and the states of affairs they describe. A Theory is tested by testing its implications
101. 
Thus, a Theory is a step towards truth -or more simply, a Theory is substantiated- to 
the extent that its implications are both testable and true: 
 
If the Theory (T) is correct, it should follow that P 
Here’s some evidence that P 
P supports my Theory (T) and suggests that T’s claims are possibly correct 
 
Or, on the contrary:  
                                                
101  Van  der  Henst  and  Sperber’s  ‘Testing  the  cognitive  and  communicative  principles  of 
relevance’  (2004),  discusses  in  more  detail  how  theories  are  tested  by  testing  their 
implications.  
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If the Theory (T) is correct, it should follow that P 
Here’s some evidence that P is not the case 
P supports a Theory (T2) that is incompatible with my Theory (T) and suggests 
that T’s claims are possibly incorrect.
102 
 
And, finally, scientific theories are non-demonstrative. The truth of their implications 
is  typically  not  guaranteed  by  the  truth  of  the  premises,  but  merely  made  more 
probable.  In  this  light,  a  Theory  can  be  seen  as  a  complex  body  of  articulated 
assertions  subject  to  constant  modification  and  revision.  Synchronically  and 
diachronically,  a  Theory  is  constantly  assessed  and  modified  in  the  direction  of 
increasing effectiveness and simplicity, i.e. in the direction of maximising the number 
of true implications (and other cognitive effects) and achieving these effects more 
elegantly. 
I shall leave the discussion of Theory pending for a moment to briefly discuss 
one other sense in which the contrast between theoretical adequacy and commercial 
success may also be relevant to the current account. The last 4 chapters of this thesis 
gesture in the direction of a new, action-based approach to the philosophy of literature 
and art. But one particular aspect of this model comes with a relatively high risk of 
attracting negative commercial prejudice. In recent talks, my proposals have often 
been  met  with  the  reasonable  response  that  ‘all  people  are  creative,  and  not  just 
outstanding  artists  or  scientific  geniuses’.  In  the  light  of  at  least  half  a  century’s 
scientific developments, I take that to be an obvious truth. From Chomsky’s work on 
the human linguistic capacity  to emerging research in  new fields such as  Lexical 
Pragmatics, the last century can indeed be uncontroversially regarded as the century 
                                                
102 To adhere to Chomsky’s view that facts themselves do not disprove theories; theories 
disprove other theories.  
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of ‘creativity’. The explosion of cognitivism, amongst other things, underlined and 
highlighted  the  plasticity  and  flexibility  of  the  human  mind  to  the  point  where 
‘creativity’ has now become a mark of the mental. Thus the claim that all people are 
creative is obviously true, if ‘creative’ is taken in this broad, generic sense.  
However, as I  will  argue  later on, there may also be  other  ways  of being 
creative, which are more specialised and distinctive in terms of both their nature and 
the processes they involve. These latter types of creative thinking can be seen as 
specific to certain types of action, such as the type of action that Art is. I will claim 
that not everyone is creative in these specialised ways. On the contrary, this type of 
creativity seems to be a property only of certain types of mind, and might be more 
accurately described as an ‘inclination’ or ‘talent’. Even though not all the minds that 
have this talent go on to pursue literary careers, -indeed, far from it- and even though 
not everyone in literary history who has pursued such a career necessarily had this 
talent, the fact remains that this specialised type of creativity is not a property of all 
human  minds.  It  may  be  that  all  human  minds  possess  one  specialised  type  of 
creativity  or  other,  but  not  all  human  minds  possess  each  specialised  type  of 
creativity. In a strict interpretation of his famous comment, Picasso was wrong:  not 
every child is born a painter and then grows out of it. 
An account like the one I pursue may appear to some to have a rather elitist 
tinge. It is at odds with the view that democracy and equality presuppose that all 
people  are  the  same. Certainly,  anyone can  be trained to create a poem,  or more 
accurately, a convincing simulacrum of a poem. Anyone can be trained to create an 
object that prototypically resembles a poem, but not everyone should be regarded as 
capable  of  producing  an  actual  POEM.  Granting  Art  a  certain  aetiological/  causal 
distinctness suggests that humans can be categorised as ‘talented’ or ‘not talented’ and  
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this may be hard to digest.
103 The aim of a theory is neither to relieve nor to flatter, 
but to tell the truth; and often, the truth is anything but flattering or relieving. Thus the 
model outlined in this thesis starts off with a significant commercial disadvantage. 
Now, back to where we left off. With the notion of what it means to make a 
Theory having changed for good, the process of updating literary/ art theorising will 
require a lot more than simply taking literary and art-theoretic questions and pursuing 
them using interdisciplinary methods. In addition to finding the right questions and 
exploring their overlap with those of other disciplines, the contemporary theorist will 
also have to reflect carefully on what would be an adequate way of discussing these 
questions.  
I am not one of those who propose the total elimination of pre-theoretical 
discourse and its replacement by adequately Theoretical language. Proposals of this 
sort  fail  to  grasp  the  importance  of  the  contributions  pre-theoretical  thinking  has 
made, and must continue to make, to human intellectual development. So I am not 
suggesting  that  the  way  to  modernise  literary  theory  by  developing  a  genuinely 
theoretical strand within poetics is to create a by-product of Relevance Theory (or, 
indeed,  a  by-product  of  any  other  candidate  interdiscipline).  Literary  theory  and 
philosophy of art are long standing paradigms; they have their  own  characteristic 
discourse and their own contributions to make to human thought. The challenge is to 
let literary theory and philosophy of art be the variety of thinking they are, but also to 
see how this variety of thinking can be partially modified to produce a more up-to-
date and genuinely interdisciplinary theoretical discourse.  
                                                
103 It’s pretty standard in cognitive science to distinguish between ‘general abilities’ (shared 
by all normal individuals) and ‘talents’ (which are much less widely distributed). This is 
another point on which the study of poetic/ artistic abilities could contribute to cognitive 
science. 
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I shall return to this point shortly. For now, let me stress that what literary 
theory and philosophy of art could gain from a collaboration with pragmatics does not 
stop  at  purely  epistemological rewards.  A  common thread that  runs  through most 
recent  work  in  stylistics,  for  instance,  no  matter  how  diverse  the  theoretical 
affiliations  of  the  author,  is  a  universal  discontent  with  the  simple,  fixed,  binary 
oppositions of the so called ‘Bi-planar’ or ‘Code model of Communication’, and a 
parallel desire to locate stylistic enquiry within pragmatics  (Leech, J. 1983, Fabb & 
Durant 1987b: 229-237, Kiparsky 1987: 185, Fowler 1996: 199-200, Toolan 1996: 
121-124).  In  addition  to  the  text  -which  has  almost  monopolised  the  attention  of 
stylistics in the last fifty years-, readers and their cognitive environment must now 
also be taken into account.  
There has never been a literary/ art theory without an underlying theory of 
cognition  and  communication.  Relevance-theoretic  pragmatics  provides  a  good 
example of what investigative discourse within literary theory and the philosophy of 
art could in part be like, and an advanced and far reaching theory of communication 
that both disciplines can certainly do with.
104 In a healthy interdisciplinary dialectics, 
Relevance  theory  should  also  have  various  rewards  to  reap  from  interaction  with 
literary and art-theoretic domains. In the past, some professed advocates of the theory 
have seemed to suggest that Relevance theory holds all the answers. It doesn’t, and 
the exchanges should go both ways.  
                                                
104 In addition, Relevance-theoretic pragmatics is an exemplary interdiscipline. Understanding 
the issues Relevance theory discusses could thus provide the contemporary literary theorist 
with immediate insights into the questions and advances of the many disciplines with which 
Relevance theory interacts.  
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8.4. (Deontic) Epilogue 
Contemporary research in literature and the other arts has managed to incorporate and 
apply in a variety of ways the theoretical contributions of empirical disciplines, and 
has also explored new ways in which thinking about literature and the arts can be 
socially  or  practically  useful.  But  this  should  not  obscure  the  lack  of  genuinely 
theoretical output, and, more importantly, the lack of retroactive effects on the source 
disciplines. To return to the main point of this final chapter: genuine theoretical and 
interdisciplinary  practices  are  a  necessary  step  towards  restoring  the  breadth  and 
ambition of literary and art-theoretical fields. The questions are out there. We just 
need to rise to the occasion.  
 
 
8.5. We talk the talk, but can we walk the walk? Or (Actual) epilogue. 
For many decades, in the Arts and Humanities we have been flattering ourselves by 
euphemistically describing as ‘interdisciplinary’ intellectual outputs that are no more 
than multi-disciplinary: outputs that indeed refer to and are relevant for more than one 
discipline, but at the same time do not require any essential interaction or merging 
between the disciplines involved. The multi-disciplinary thinker doesn’t have to make 
compromises. He speaks the theoretical language he would speak anyway. He uses 
the established conventions and methods of the paradigm he belongs to. He carefully -
though not always deliberately or consciously- avoids any trickling or merging of one 
paradigm  into  the  other.  Although  the  intellectual  calibre  of  this  work  is  not 
necessarily questionable, its interdisciplinary status definitely is. 
I want to claim that for an interdisciplinary relation to be genuine, at least two 
conditions would have to be fulfilled. First, there is a condition of retroactiveness of 
effects:  intellectual  activity  in  the  one  discipline  should  be  expected  to  have  
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retroactive effects on intellectual activity in the other, and vice versa. Second, there is 
a condition of methodological merger: interdisciplinarity is not simply a matter of 
sharing topics, but of merging methods and mind-sets. Genuinely interdisciplinary 
projects  can  then  be  nothing  less  than  hybrid  projects,  organically  incorporating 
varieties of thinking from across the spectrum of the disciplines involved. Anything 
short of that would be multi-disciplinary but not interdisciplinary.  
When it comes more specifically to interactions between literary/ artistic and 
empirical domains, this raises the question of whether, in the current state of human 
intellectual affairs, genuine interdisciplinarity is achievable at all. This particular kind 
of interdisciplinary practice poses specific intellectual challenges and raises a distinct 
set  of  practical  and  theoretical  problems:  a  merger  between  literary/  artistic  and 
empirical domains requires not only an overlap of disciplines but also, and crucially, a 
crossing of paradigms. Often, when talking about interdisciplinary merger between 
the empirical and literary/ artistic paradigms, theorists favour the so-called ‘different 
languages  metaphor’;  thinkers  in  these  different  domains  are  typically  seen  as 
speaking  different  languages.  It  is  metaphors  like  this  that  make  hugely  intricate 
problems look like manageable ones.  
The difficulties in the relationship between the empirical and literary/ artistic 
paradigms  do  not  arise  simply  from  the  fact  that  they  use  distinct  theoretical 
languages.  It  is  more  a  case  of  their  having  diametrically  different  characteristic 
mind-sets. Moreover, it is at least a genuine possibility that the specific relationship 
between these two mind-sets is reversely analogous, or competing: for every literary/ 
artistic element you add, you lose an empirical one, and for every empirical element 
you drop, you may gain a literary/ artistic one. If you are really fond of the ‘different 
languages’ metaphor, then imagine a situation where the more you speak the one  
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language,  the  more  your  aptitude  for  and  performance  in  the  other  is  severely 
diminished, and conversely.  
The  point  can  be  illustrated  with  an  analogy.  It  was  once  believed  that 
professional ballet dancers should not cycle regularly.
105 In order to perform, ballet 
dancers rely on a strong turned-out leg position. Ballet training develops lower body 
muscle groups in a way that strengthens this position. Cycling, on the other hand, 
although it builds the same lower body muscle groups as ballet, does it in exactly the 
opposite -parallel- leg position. The stronger the parallel leg position becomes, the 
more  the  turned-out  position  weakens,  and  along  with  it  the  dancer’s  ability  to 
perform to standard. In many respects, the relationship between literary/ artistic and 
empirical mind-sets is like that between turned-out and parallel leg positions, between 
cycling  and  ballet.  More  importantly,  the  relation  between  leg  position  and 
characteristic activity is neither conventional nor arbitrary: dancers do not walk, stand 
or train in the turned-out leg position because that’s just what they fancy doing. They 
are justified in doing so, because of the nature of their characteristic activity. Her 
typical mind-set is the literary/ artistic thinker’s turned-out leg position: it is crucial in 
enabling  her  to  perform  those  intellectual  ‘steps’  that  are  necessary  for  her 
characteristic activity. 
To  say  that  empirical  and  literary/  artistic  domains  involve  diametrically 
different characteristic mind-sets in a competing relationship is to imply that in order 
to create genuinely interdisciplinary collaborations between them, for every inch of 
ground gained by the literary/ artistic mind-set, an inch of ground must be given up by 
the empirical one, and conversely. Unlike the ‘different languages’ metaphor, where 
no serious compromises need be made, no paradigm-specific integrity tampered with 
                                                
105 I don’t know if sports science has now confirmed or disconfirmed this, but it is a good 
illustrative example.  
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and no disciplinary ground negotiated, the actual relationship between literary/ artistic 
and empirical mind-sets suggests that there are many compromises to be made, a lot 
of paradigm-specific integrity to be tampered with and much disciplinary ground to be 
lost.  
 
The 20
th century witnessed two interesting developments that critically relate 
to our discussion. The first is the breaking away from the Humanities of a set of social 
and cognitive scientific disciplines like linguistics and psychology. Over the last 40 
years, these disciplines have systematically identified themselves with the goals of the 
Natural Sciences (i.e. the search for empirically testable explanatory principles), and 
become increasingly independent from the practices of the Arts and Humanities. The 
second is the expansion of Academia and its growing claim to be the sole arena in 
which theoretical activity nowadays takes place. 
As a  result  of the first of  these  developments, it could be  argued  that the 
differences between literary/ artistic and empirical domains have now been blown out 
of  proportion.  It  has  become  increasingly  difficult  to  negotiate  a  merger  between 
literary/ artistic and empirical methods in an unbiased and unprejudiced way. As the 
philosopher Elizabeth Camp very nicely put it in a recent conversation, ‘different 
paradigms show intolerance towards different types of characteristic failure’ (P.C. 
21.12.2006).  In  empirical  domains,  for  instance,  failure  to  be  explicit  is  often 
considered a serious weakness, while for the literary/ artistic mind-set, thoughts are 
not always better for being explicit. The role of intuitive half-understood beliefs in 
literary/  artistic  thinking  should  allow  some  insight  into  why  vagueness  and 
opaqueness are not necessarily unsettling for a literary/ artistic mind. Literary/ artistic 
thinkers understand that the types of expression of thought they are keen on are not as  
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instrumental as those favoured by empirical thinkers, but at the same time appreciate 
that -perhaps just for this reason- they may yield insights that an explicit discourse 
would never be able to capture. The literary/ artistic thinker is, and must remain, an 
intuitive thinker: a thinker who assesses the importance of a thought on an intuitive 
basis and is confident about the accuracy of her assessment even when she admits that 
she only half-understands this thought or can only partially explicate it. Reflective 
beliefs  (Sperber 1997), it seems, beliefs that involve partially understood thoughts or 
thoughts that contain a partially understood constituent, play a central part in literary/ 
artistic thinking, yet in a way crucially different from and far more essential than 
some empirical thinkers tend to believe.
106 Take this as one amongst many possible 
indicative examples of why the intellectual output of the literary/ artistic paradigm 
might well be seen as susceptible to failure from a rigorously empirical viewpoint. 
The fact  that currently Academia  has  a monopoly  on  theoretical  activity  -
numerous artists and almost all literary theorists now work there, many journals and 
publishing  houses  have  strong  academic  links,  their  editors  are  academics, 
international  conferences  and  other  events  are  attended  solely  by  members  of 
academia, etc- increases the tensions. For one thing, the stereotypes and polarisations 
                                                
106 In discussing reflective  beliefs, Sperber  (1997:  67)  puts the weight  on  the  credibility/ 
authority of the source of the belief and therefore suggests:  
 
Reasons to hold reflective beliefs are provided by other beliefs that describe the source 
of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide explicit arguments in favour of the 
reflective belief.  
 
I  would  be  inclined  to  suggest,  though,  that  there  should  also  exist  intuitive  reasons  for 
holding half-understood beliefs: intuitive reasons for holding a half-understood belief should 
be seen as independent of the credibility/ authority of the source and dependent only on (pre-
rational) intuitions about the relative importance of the implications of the thought. Such 
beliefs  are  half-understood  but  not  strictly  speaking  ‘reflective’;  they  are  not  believed 
metarepresentationally  -because  a  credible  source  says  so-  but  intuitively.  The  pertinent 
intuitions we might or might not be able to rationalise, but this does not affect the relative 
importance of the implications of the thought. Reflective half-understood beliefs are indeed 
cases of bad literary/ artistic thinking, but they are not the same as intuitive half-understood 
beliefs.  
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associated  with  different  domains  are  now  entrenched  by  being  institutionalised 
within Higher Education settings. Students are often rewarded when they perpetuate 
them and are not always encouraged to question or look beyond them. They aspire to 
‘belong’ -to a department, a school, a university, a tradition of thought, a discipline, a 
tradition within a discipline, a paradigm, and so on. 
For another thing, the fact that most theoretical activity takes place in what is 
essentially an educational setting tends to prioritise those varieties of thinking and 
presentation that are best cut out for educational purposes: varieties of thinking, for 
instance, that allow monitoring of effort put in, progress, and performance, and modes 
of presentation that make marking easy. It is this particular variety of thinking and 
presentation that now puts good literary/ artistic thinking at a disadvantage. Academic 
settings produce an abundance of run-of-the-mill literary/ artistic pseudo-intellectuals.  
Different means to the same end: contemporary literary/ artistic thinking is 
losing its credibility in the eyes of the empirically oriented thinkers. The likelihood of 
empirical theorists becoming convinced that they too should give up some ground is 
therefore radically reduced. I recently took part in a very constructive workshop on 
the  pragmatics  of  poetic  communication,  along  with  a  handful  of  linguists, 
stylisticians and philosophers. It is interesting that, although the topic of the workshop 
fell clearly within the Arts and Humanities, two thirds of the papers presented, and 
almost  all  subsequent  discussion,  would  have  been  entirely  impenetrable  for  the 
average literature person. I was alarmed. Perhaps because the small group of invited 
scholars had a common background in similar fields, nothing in most of the papers 
presented suggested that the empirical thinker or the philosopher had gone the extra 
mile to explicate technical terms, spell out issues more comprehensibly, simplify the 
intricacy of the analysis, etc., to make her discussion more accessible or interesting to  
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a less empirically aware audience. At the end of the day, we might reasonably expect 
the majority of people who would be attracted by a published proceedings with the 
title ‘The pragmatics of poetic communication’ to be precisely that: a less empirically 
aware audience. Even more alarmingly, as I had come across some of the participants 
before, I happened to know that most of them are very enthusiastic about the prospect 
of interdisciplinary work between literary/ artistic and empirically oriented thinkers. 
In some cases, it seems, it just hasn’t crossed the mind of empirical theorists that 
interdisciplinarity may require generous compromises to be made on their part too. 
As long as empirically oriented thinkers dig their feet into the sand -no matter 
how much we fiddle with the practices of the Humanities- genuine interdisciplinarity 
cannot take off. If literary/ artistic thinkers simply contribute the topics and empirical 
theorists the method, we are back to where we started. The resulting type of thinking 
is multi-disciplinary, not inter-disciplinary, and certainly not interdisciplinary in the 
genuine and rich sense of a merging of methods and means. More worryingly, if the 
empirical  side are expecting  literary/  artistic  thinkers  to  cover  all  the disciplinary 
distance, then the result becomes highly problematic in a practical, if not an ethical, 
sense: you potentially put in jeopardy what the literary/ artistic individual is cut out to 
do best; you make a dancer cycle excessively.  
We cannot afford that. We cannot afford to take first-class literary/ artistic 
minds and turn them into mediocre empirical thinkers. If that’s what the pursuit for 
interdisciplinarity  is  likely  to  lead  to  in,  given the current  state  of  the theoretical 
world,  then  maybe  it  shouldn’t  be  attempted.  The  fact  remains:  genuine 
interdisciplinary collaborations are a methodological sine qua non for literary/ artistic 
and  empirical  varieties  of  thinking  to  go  on  making  crucial  contributions  to  the 
intellectual world. To enable such collaborations to take place, it is essential that the  
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empirical world also starts reassessing the ‘integrity’ of its paradigm. It is time for all 
of us to wake up to the call. We talk the talk. It’s about time to walk the walk. 
  
 
 
225   
References 
 
Abramson M., and S. Goldinger 1997. What the reader’s eye tells the mind’s ear: 
Silent reading activates inner speech. Perception and Psychophysics 59: 1059-1068. 
 
Arnheim, R. 1974. Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye. (2
nd 
ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Bach,  K.  and  R.  M.  Harnish  1979.  Linguistic  Communication  and  Speech  Acts. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
 
Barsalou, L. 1987. The instability of graded structure: implications for the nature of 
concepts. In Neisser, U.  (ed.) Concepts and Conceptual Development. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Barsalou, L. 1992. Frames, concepts, and conceptual fields. In Kittay, E.  and A. 
Lehrer (eds.) Frames, Fields, and Contrasts: New Essays in Semantic and Lexical 
Organization. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale , NJ. 
 
Barry Smith et al. Open letter against Derrida receiving an honorary doctorate from 
Cambridge University. The Times, London, 9 May 1992.  
 
Benjamin, W. 1936/ 2008. The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. 
London: Penguin Books.  
  
 
 
226   
Blutner, R. 1998. Lexical pragmatics. Journal of Semantics 15: 115–62.  
 
Blutner, R. 2002. Lexical semantics and pragmatics. Linguistische Berichte 10: 27-58.  
 
Boukova, I. 2000. The Boat in the Eye. Sofia: Heron Press. 
 
Boyd,  B.  1998.  Jane  Meet  Charles:  Literature,  Evolution  and  Human  Nature. 
Philosophy and Literature 22: 1-30. 
 
Brewer, W.  1994. Mary  Shelley on the therapeutic  value of language. Papers  on 
Language  and  Literature.  Available  at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3708/is_199410/ai_n8731488/ 
 
Brown, J. W. 1999. On aesthetic perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6: 
144-160.  
 
Cacciari, C. 1998.  Why do we speak Metaphorically? Reflections in thought and 
language.  In  Katz,  A.  N.,  Cacciari,  C.,  Gibbs  R.W.  and  M.  Turner  Figurative 
Language and Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Carruthers,  P.  and  J.  Boucher  (eds.)  1998.  Language  and  Thought.  Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Carston,  R.  and  S.  Uchida  (eds.)  1997.  Relevance  Theory:  Applications  and 
Implications. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   
 
 
227   
Carston,  R.  2002.  Thoughts  and  Utterances:  The  Pragmatics  of  Explicit 
Communication. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Chomsky, N. 1976. Reflections on Language. London: Temple Smith. 
 
Chomsky, N. 2000. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Clark,  B.  2009.  Salient  inferences:  Pragmatics  and  The  Inheritors.  Language  and 
Literature 18: 173-212. 
 
Cohen, N. 1999. The inadequacy of language in Graves' ‘Recalling War’. English 
354: Finley [online paper]. 
 
Crane,  T. 1992.  The  nonconceptual content  of experience.  In Crane, T.  (ed.)  The 
Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Danto, A. C. 1981. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: a Philosophy of Art.  
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
Davis, S. (ed.) 1991. Pragmatics: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Derrida,  J.  1976.  Of  Grammatology.  Baltimore  and  London:  Johns  Hopkins 
University Press. 
  
 
 
228   
Dewey, J. 1935. Art as Experience. Minton: Balch.  
 
Dretske, F. 1988. Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes. Cambridge 
Massachusetts: MIT PRESS.   
 
Dretske, F. 1999. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. USA: CSLI Publications. 
 
Dutton, D. 2003. Aesthetics and evolutionary psychology. In Levinson, J. (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook for Aesthetics. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Dutton,  D.  2008.  The  Art  Instinct:  Beauty,  Pleasure  and  Human  Evolution. 
Bloomsbury Press. 
 
Elytis, O. 1972. The Light-tree and the Fourteenth Beauty. Athens: Ikaros. 
 
Elytis, O. 1998. Journal of an Unseen April. Athens: Ypsilon Books.   
 
Enkvist, N. E. 1964. On defining style; an essay in applied linguistics. In Enkvist, N. 
E., Spencer, J. and M. J. Gregory (eds.) Linguistics and Style. Oxford University 
Press 
 
Evans, G. 1985. Collected Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
  
 
 
229   
Fabb, N. and A. Durant 1987a. Introduction: The linguistics of writing: retrospect and 
prospect  after  twenty  five  years.  In  Fabb,  N.  et  al.  The  Linguistics  of  Writing; 
Arguments between Language and Literature. Manchester University Press. 
 
Fabb, N. and A. Durant 1987b. New courses in the linguistics of writing. In Fabb, N. 
et  al.  The  Linguistics  of  Writing;  Arguments  between  Language  and  Literature. 
Manchester University Press. 
 
Fodor, J. A. 1993. Déjà vu all over again: How Danto’s aesthetics recapitulates the 
philosophy of mind. In Rollins, M. (ed.) Danto and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Fodor, J. A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Fowler,  R.  1996.  Studying  literature  as  language.  In  Weber,  J.  J.  The  Stylistics 
Reader. London: Arnold. 
 
Freeland, C. 2001. But is it Art? Oxford University Press. 
 
Grice, H. P. 1967. Logic and conversation. William James Lectures, reprinted in  
 
Grice, H. P. 1989 Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
 
 
230   
Halliday, M. A. K. 1971: Linguistic function and literary style: An inquiry into the 
language  of William  Golding’s ‘The Inheritors’. In  Weber, J.  J. 1996  (ed.)  The 
Stylistics Reader. London: Arnold. 
 
Halliday, M. A. K. and R. Hasan 1976. Cohesion in English. London: Longman. 
 
Heidegger, M. 1971. Poetry, Language, Thought. New York: Perennial Classics. 
 
Heil,  J.  1991.  Perceptual  experience.  In  Mc  Laughlin,  B.  (ed.)  Dretske  and  His 
Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Hernandi, P. 2002. Why is literature? A coevolutionary perspective on imaginative 
worldmaking. Poetics Today 23: 21-42. 
 
Holquist, M. 1981 (ed.). The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin. 
Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
Goodman, N. 1976. Languages of Art (2
nd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company. 
 
Gottschall, J. and D. S. Wilson (eds.) 2005. The Literary Animal: Evolution and the 
Nature of Narrative. Northwestern University Press. 
 
Iliopoulou, K. 2007. Mister T. Athens: Melani. 
  
 
 
231   
Jackson,  T.  E.  2002.  Issues  and  problems  in  the  blending  of  cognitive  science, 
evolutionary psychology and literary study. Poetics Today 23: 161-179. 
 
Jakobson, R. 1958/ 1996. Closing statement: linguistics and poetics. In Weber, J. J. 
1996. The Stylistics Reader. London: Arnold. 
 
Kawabata, H. and Zeki, S. 2004. Neural correlates of beauty, J Neurophisiology 91: 
1699-1705.  
 
Katz, A. N., Cacciari, C., Gibbs R.W. and M. Turner 1998. Figurative Language and 
Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kiparsky, P. 1987. On theory and interpretation. In Fabb, N. et al. The Linguistics of 
Writing;  Arguments  between  Language  and  Literature.  Manchester  University 
Press. 
 
Kolaiti, P. 2005. The empty vessel makes the greatest sound: Corpus analysis and 
lexical pragmatics, talk delivered at the International Workshop in Word Meaning, 
Concepts  and  Communication  at  Cumberland  Lodge,  Windsor,  London  and 
available online at www. lexprag.ucl.ac.uk 
 
Kolaiti, P. 2007. Celesteia. Athens: Nefeli publishings. 
 
Kotoula, D. 2007. Snapshot. The Karaoke Poetry Bar Anthology. Athens: Futura. 
  
 
 
232   
Kripke,  S.  1972.  Naming  and  necessity.  In  Davidson,  D  and  G.  Harman  (eds.) 
Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.  
 
Kuhn, T. S. 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
LaMarque, P. 1999. Poetry and Private Language. In The Padeia Project On-Line: 
Proceedings  of  the  Twentieth  World  Congress  of  Philosophy,  available  at 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Aest/AestLam2.htm. 
 
LaMarque, P. 2007. Aesthetics and the problem of indiscernible objects. Deykalion; a 
journal for philosophical research and critique. Athens: Stigmi 25: 31-51. 
 
Lascarides,  A.  &  A.  Copestake  1998.  Pragmatics  and  word  meaning.  Journal  of 
Linguistics 34: 387-414. 
 
Leech, G. 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman. 
 
Levinson, S. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Levinson, S. 2000. Presumptive Meanings. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
 
Mc Ginn, C. 1989. Mental Content. Oxford: Blackwell. 
  
 
 
233   
Meyer, L. B. 1983. Forgery and the anthropology of art. Ιn Dutton, D. (ed.) The 
Forgers’ Art. University of California Press. 
 
Miller, G. F. 2000. The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of 
Human Nature. New York: Doubleday.  
 
Pilkington,  A.  2000.  Poetic  effects:  a  Relevance  Theory  perspective.  Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins. 
Pilkington,  A.  2001.  Non-lexicalised  concepts  and  degrees  of  effability:  poetic 
thoughts  and  the  attraction  of  what  is  not  in  the  dictionary.  Belgian  Journal  of 
Linguistics 15: 1-10. 
Pinker, S. 2007. Toward a consilient study of literature, Philosophy and Literature 31: 
162-178. 
  
Polenakis, S. 2007. The blue horses by Franz Mark. Athens: Odos Panos. 
 
Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of ‘meaning’. Ιn Gunderson, K. (ed.) Language, Mind 
and Knowledge. XΧΧ University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Ramachandran, V. and W. Hirstein 1999. The science of art: A neurological theory of 
aesthetic experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6: 15-51.  
 
Richardson, A. 1998. Brains, Minds, and Texts. Review 20: 39–48. 
  
 
 
234   
Sagoff, M. 1983. The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries. In Dutton, D. (ed.) The Forgers’ 
Art. University of California Press. 
 
Searle,  J.  1983.  Intentionality;  An  essay  in  the  philosophy  of  mind.  Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Seidenberg, M. S. 1985. The time course of information activation and utilization in 
visual word recognition. In Humphreys, G. and Bruce, V. 1989. Visual Cognition; 
Computational, Experimental and Neuropsychological Perspectives. LEA. 
 
Smith, V. L. 2006. Ransacking the Language": Finding the Missing Goods in Virginia 
Woolf's Orlando. Journal of Modern Literature 29: 57-75. 
 
Sperber, D. 1996. Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Sperber, D. 1997. Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind and Language 12: 67-83. 
 
Sperber, D. 2000. Metarepresentations in an Evolutionary Perspective. In Sperber, D. 
(ed.) Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. OUP. 
Sperber,  D.  2003.  Seedless  grapes:  nature  and  culture.  In  Laurence,  S.  and  E. 
Margolis  (eds.)  Creations  of  the  Mind:  Theories  of  Artifacts  and  their 
Representations. OUP. 
 
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson 1995. Relevance: Communication and Cognition (2
nd ed.). 
Oxford: Blackwell.   
 
 
235   
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson 1998. The mapping between the mental and the public 
lexicon.  In  Carruthers,  P.  &  J.  Boucher  (eds.)  Language  and  Thought: 
Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 184–200.  
 
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson 2008. A deflationary account of metaphors. In Gibbs, R. 
(ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought.  
 
Tayllor-Batty,  J.  2007.  Imperfect  mastery:  the  failure  of  grammar  in  Beckett's 
L'Innommable. Journal of Modern Literature 30: 163-179. 
 
Tilghman, B. R.  1984. But is it art?; The Value of Art and the Temptation Theory. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Todorov, T. 1981. Introduction to Poetics. Brighton: Harvester.  
 
Tooby, J. and  L.  Cosmides 2001. Does beauty build adapted minds? Towards an 
evolutionary theory of aesthetics, fiction and the arts. SubStance 30: 6-27.   
 
Toolan, M. 1996. Stylistics and its discontents; or, getting off the Fish ‘hook’. Ιn 
Weber, J. J. (ed.) The Stylistics Reader. London: Arnold. 
  
Tsvetaeva, Μ. 1935/ 2004. Poets with history and poets without history. In Cook, J. 
(ed.) Poetry in Theory: An Anthology 1900-2000. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Turner, M. 1996. The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language.  New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
 
236   
Turner, M. 2002. The cognitive study of art, language and literature. Poetics Today 
23: 9-20.   
 
Tye, M. 2006. The thesis of nonconceptual content. European Review of Philosophy 
6: 7-30.  
 
Tye,  M.  2006.  Absent  qualia  and  the  mind-body  problem.  Philosophical  Review 
115:139-169. 
 
Tye,  M.  (forthcoming).  New  troubles  for  the  qualia  freak.  In  Cohen,  J.  and  B. 
McLaughlin Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Van der Henst, J. B. and D. Sperber 2004. Testing the cognitive and communicative 
principles of relevance. In Noveck, I. & D. Sperber (eds.) Experimental Pragmatics. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.  
 
Waldrop, R. 1971. Against Language? 'Dissatisfaction with Language’ as Theme and 
as Impulse towards Experiments in Twentieth Century Poetry. The Hague, Paris: 
Mouton.  
 
Wharton  T.  2003.  Pragmatics  and  the  Showing  –  Saying  distinction.  PhD  in 
Linguistics. UCL.  
 
Weber, J. J. 1996. The Stylistics Reader. London: Arnold. 
  
 
 
237   
Wilson, D. 2003. Relevance and lexical pragmatics. Italian Journal of Linguistics/ 
Rivista di Linguistica 15: 273-291. Special issue on Pragmatics and the Lexicon.  
 
Wilson, D. and R. Carston 2006. Metaphor, relevance and the ‘emergent property’ 
issue. Mind & Language 21: 404-433. 
 
Wilson, D. and R. Carston 2007. A unitary approach to lexical pragmatics: relevance, 
inference and ad hoc concepts. In Burton-Roberts, N. (ed.) Pragmatics. Palgrave 
Advances in Linguistics series. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. 2001. Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised 
English Translation (3
rd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Zangwill, N. 2003. Aesthetic Realism. In Levinson, J. (ed.) The Oxford Companion in 
Aesthetics. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Zangwill, N. 1998. The concept of the aesthetic. European Journal of philosophy 6: 
78-93.  
 
Zangwill,  N.  2002.  Are  there  counterexamples  to  aesthetic  theories  of  art?  The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60: 111-118. 
 
Zangwill, N. 2003. Aesthetic realism. In Levinson, J. (ed.) The Oxford Companion in 
Aesthetics. Oxford University Press. 
  
 
 
238   
Zeki,  S.  2002.  Neural  concept  formation  and  art:  Dante,  Michelangelo,  Wagner. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 9: 53-76. 
 
 